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ABSTRACT
The world is increasingly connected through a series of smart, connected systems such
as smartphone systems, smart home systems, and emerging smart transportation and au-
tonomous vehicle systems. While leading to improved services, such transformation also
introduces new security challenges. To address these challenges, in contrast to existing
defense mechanisms that are mostly ad hoc and reactive, my dissertation research is dedi-
cated to developing systematic problem analysis approaches that can proactively discover
and assess new security problems in smart, connected systems.
To achieve this goal, my dissertation focuses on two most fundamental capabilities
in any smart, connected system: network stack and smart control, and demonstrates that
static/dynamic program analysis and network measurement can be used to systematically
identify new code-level and network-level security challenges in smart, connected systems,
and gain insights about problem severity to address design trade-offs in the defense solu-
tions. More specifically, my research is able to leverage these techniques to discover a
new attack vector (US-CERT alert TA16-144A) that is unexpectedly brought by the recent
expansion in the DNS system, and new algorithm-level security vulnerabilities in the next-
generation smart transportation systems. For these discoveries, systematic vulnerability
cause analysis is performed subsequently to uncover the associated new network-level and
code-level security challenges. On the defense side, these techniques are also used in my
dissertation research to build the first automated detection tool for packet injection vulner-
ability, a recurring problem in network communication protocols, and define more useful
attack surface to balance the design trade-off in name collision attack defenses.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The world is entering a new era of transformational change: both ourselves as humans
and our physical living environments are becoming increasingly connected by smart tech-
nologies. Such revolution starts from the popularization of smartphones, which are now
connecting more than 2.5 billion individuals to the Internet and others on the move [86].
Soon after that, physical objects such as door locks, cars, and traffic lights are increas-
ingly computerized [14, 55, 46], forming numerous Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), and
then further become ubiquitously interconnected with the recent advances of the Internet
of Things (IoT) technology [102, 10, 52, 131]. The resulting systems from such transforma-
tion, which we call smart, connected systems, include smart, connected end systems such
as smartphones, IoT devices, and emerging autonomous vehicles, and smart, connected
distributed systems such as smart home and emerging smart transportation systems.
These smart, connected systems feature more ubiquitous network-based access and in-
formation sharing, and more functionality rich and usable control platforms, leading to new
opportunities for innovation, improved services, and enhanced quality of life. However,
such transformation also introduces new security challenges. First, the newly-introduced
system capabilities, e.g., network connectivity and smart control, inevitably increase the at-
tack surface and also the problem complexity, making security analysis and defense design
more challenging than before. Second, to fully utilize the new system capabilities, new sys-
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tem operation models (e.g., machine learning based perception and control in autonomous
driving [138, 49, 60]) and new user interaction methods (e.g., voice control [4, 53, 44])
are typically created. This inherently introduces new security requirements, with which a
secure and robust design can be fundamentally challenging. Third, even if these challenges
at the design level are fully solved, challenges still remain at the implementation level. As
repeatedly discovered in my dissertation research (e.g., for network protocols in §III and
smart control algorithms in §VI), the actual implementation of security-critical features
may not always conform to the design due to various reasons ranging from development
mistakes to deployment-time constraints.
In this dissertation, my research focuses on the manifestation of these three security
challenges in two most basic features in any smart, connected system:
(1) Network stack. Network connectivity is the most basic capability in smart, con-
nected systems to enable more advanced sensing, actuation, and control. However, adding
network-based access into previously isolated physical objects largely increases the attack
surface, making remote compromise possible. For example, the widespread security weak-
nesses in today’s IoT devices have already be remotely exploited and caused a series of
massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [81]. Wireless communication ser-
vices in modern vehicles, e.g., Bluetooth and cellular connections, were found to have
various vulnerabilities that allow remote attackers to have long distance vehicle control and
location tracking [171]. To solve these problems, not only the design of the network proto-
cols but also their implementations need to be secure, which are both challenging research
problems today [250, 234, 152, 121, 266]. In addition, even with effective security features
carefully designed and correctly implemented, it also requires the users of the protocols,
e.g., developers at higher layers, to avoid misuses of these features, which is also shown to
a common source of security vulnerabilities in practice [184, 196].
(2) Smart control. In smart, connected systems, the system controller is the key en-
abler of the advanced and intelligent services by making more optimized use of the network
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connectivity and system capabilities, e.g., enabling autonomous driving based on a variety
of machine learning algorithms [138, 49, 60], and enabling more intelligently traffic light
control based on more optimized traffic control algorithms [82]. Like discussed earlier, a
secure and robust design for these new system control features can be fundamentally chal-
lenging and in many cases even requires multidisciplinary research efforts to address. For
example, it is found that the machine learning models used in smart, connected systems
such as smart homes and autonomous vehicles are generally vulnerable to adversarial in-
put and can be deliberately tricked into making wrong control decisions in autonomous
driving [167, 247], voice assistants [165, 283], and face recognitions [263]. At this point,
how to generate a sufficiently robust machine learning model is still an open problem that
requires joint research efforts from both machine learning and security communities to
solve [166, 233]. In my research, we find similar problems in smart traffic signal control
algorithms, which we believe also requires joint research efforts from both transportation
and security communities to solve (detailed later in §VI).
To address these security challenges, existing defense mechanisms are mostly ad hoc
and reactive, creating case-by-case solutions to fix exposed vulnerabilities, many times
even after they have been actively exploited in practice, such as the recent Mirai botnet and
WannaCry ransom attacks [81, 137]. These solutions can neither systematically address
the exposed problems in existing smart, connected systems, nor be applied to future smart,
connected systems to prevent similar problems. With the transformation to smart, con-
nected systems becoming increasingly faster and pervasive, this situation only deteriorates
and becomes more favorable to attackers.
Research goal. To win this arms race, my research aims at developing systematic pro-
gram analysis approaches that can proactively discovery and assess new security challenges
in existing and future smart, connected systems. More specifically, these approaches sys-
tematically look for vulnerabilities using rigorous techniques such as static/dynamic pro-
gram analysis for code-level vulnerabilities and network measurement for network-level
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vulnerabilities, and thus lead to design improvements that are more systematic than before.
Thus, even for future smart, connected systems in different application domains, most of
the methodology and solution design can be adapted and evolved.
To achieve this goal, my research leverages three types of analysis techniques to achieve
high rigorousness:
• Static program analysis. Static program analysis is capable of automatically analyz-
ing the behaviors of computer programs based on their source code or binaries with-
out executing them. Before the analysis, the targeted program behaviors usually need
to be precisely defined at the code level. Thus, static program analysis is most useful
in detecting and analyzing known classes of vulnerabilities. With the main benefit
in automation, it has been applied to address various security problems including
detecting vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow [182] and cross-site scripting [275],
detecting privacy leakage [203, 158], detecting and analyzing malware [268], etc.
Due to the lack of run-time information, tools built upon static program analysis
techniques tend to overestimate a program’s vulnerability status and thus have high
false positive rates [262, 158].
• Dynamic program analysis. Dynamic program analysis analyzes a computer pro-
gram by generating test inputs to trigger the behaviors of interest. Compared to static
program analysis, dynamic program analysis techniques do not require access to the
source code or binaries of the target programs, and thus can more conveniently han-
dle situations where the binaries are obfuscated [278], or running remotely, e.g., on
a remote server [170]. Also, since it executes the program, it can provide run-time
information and handle dynamic program language features, and thus does not suffer
from false positives. In addition, such analysis can have generic analysis metrics,
e.g., code coverage in fuzz testing [5], instead of pre-defined vulnerability patterns,
and thus may help discover new classes of vulnerabilities. However, it is very diffi-
cult to efficiently generate test inputs that can ensure a high code coverage, and thus
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usually have high false negative rates [115]. Thus, it is complementary to static anal-
ysis techniques, and sometimes they are used in combination to balance the trade-off
between efficiency and effectiveness [160, 289].
• Network measurement. Since static and dynamic program analysis techniques target
computer program behaviors, they are applicable to vulnerabilities at the code level
but not those at the network level, e.g., those caused by configuration, policies, or
inter-dependencies in networked systems. For the latter, network measurement is an
effective method to systematically discover new network-level vulnerabilities [193],
analyze vulnerability status [192, 244], analyze vulnerability causes [172], monitor
vulnerability patching status [252], etc. In such network measurement based analy-
sis, it needs to first define the network traffic patterns of interest, e.g., a vulnerability
related traffic signature, which is similar to the program behavior used in static and
dynamic program analysis. Since connectivity is the most basic capability in smart,
connected systems, network measurement is a necessary vulnerability analysis tech-
nique when studying the network-level security problems in these systems.
These three analysis techniques are thus generally applicable for systematically discov-
ering and characterizing security problems that can manifest as patterns in source code,
run-time system behavior, or network traffic. When applying these techniques, it’s usually
necessary to address various design challenges due to the need for balancing different prop-
erties of the solution systems, e.g., efficiency, effectiveness, scalability, etc. For example,
one program analysis technique, symbolic execution, is capable of creating inputs to all ex-
ecution paths in a program, but suffers from severe scalability limitations and can hardly be
applied to important real-world code bases such as the Linux kernel [254]. Thus, care must
be exercised to choose appropriate analysis techniques and creatively define analysis targets
in the solution system design to solve a problem in practice. In this dissertation, one com-
mon strategy my research uses is to first understand the different levels of problem severity
and then design the solution system to target the most severe subset of the problem. For
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example, my work in §III is able to identify a subset of packet injection vulnerabilities that
has the highest exploitability in practice and then design the vulnerability detection system
to prioritize them, which is found to effectively reduce false alarms without compromising
vulnerability detection effectiveness.
In this dissertation, my research demonstrates that static/dynamic program analysis
and network measurement can be used to systematically identify new code-level and
network-level security challenges in smart, connected systems, and gain insights about
problem severity to address design trade-offs in the defense solutions. More specifi-
cally, my dissertation research is able to leverage these analysis techniques to (1) build the
first system to automatically detect packet injection vulnerability, a recurring problem in
network communication protocols; (2) discover a new attack vector (US-CERT alert TA16-
144A [127]) that is unexpectedly brought by the recent expansion in the DNS system, and
perform subsequent systematic analysis at both network and software levels for its defense,
and (3) perform the first security analysis of the next-generation Connected Vehicle (CV)
smart transportation system, which discovers new security vulnerabilities at the level of the
traffic control algorithm.
Research impact. My dissertation research has impact in both academia and in-
dustry in the form of research papers in top-tier security conferences, media coverage
in The Register, SC Magazine, Security Week, Naked Security, Bleeping Computer,
etc. [56, 125, 143, 140, 111, 88, 117, 126, 142], vulnerability disclosures such as a US
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) US-CERT Alert [127], and industry discussions
and responses [136, 100].
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1.1 Network Stack: Systematic Detection of Packet Injection Vulnera-
bilities in Network Communication
In the network stack of smart, connected systems, off-path packet injection attacks
remain a serious threat to communication integrity, causing attacks such as phishing and
malicious script injection. Current solution is to apply case-by-case patches, but due to
the complex nature of the problem, new variants of packet injection vulnerabilities are
still emerging in recent years, targeting critical protocols such as TCP. We argue that such
recurring problems need a systematic solution. In my dissertation research, we design
and implement PacketGuardian, a precise static taint analysis tool that comprehensively
checks the packet handling logic of various network protocol implementations [173]. The
analysis operates in two steps. First, it identifies the critical paths and constraints that lead
to accepting an incoming packet. If paths with weak constraints exist, a vulnerability may
be revealed immediately. Otherwise, based on “secret” protocol states in the constraints, a
subsequent analysis is performed to check whether such states can be leaked to an attacker.
In the second step, observing that all previously reported leaks are through implicit
flows, our tool supports implicit flow tainting, which is a commonly excluded feature due
to high volumes of false alarms caused by it. To address this challenge, we propose the
concept of attacker-controlled implicit information leaks, and prioritize our tool to detect
them, which effectively reduces false alarms without compromising tool effectiveness. We
use PacketGuardian on 6 popular protocol implementations of TCP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP,
and uncover new vulnerabilities in Linux kernel TCP as well as 2 out of 3 RTP implementa-
tions. We validate these vulnerabilities and confirm that they are indeed highly exploitable.
Detailed results are summarized on our project website [87].
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1.2 Network Stack: Discovery and Systematic Analysis of Name Colli-
sion Vulnerabilities in Network Service Discovery
Besides network communication, another important network function in smart, con-
nected systems is service discovery, which helps an end system automatically configure
network services. We find that Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD), a popular service dis-
covery protocol based on domain name system (DNS), has significant DNS query leakage
problem and can be exploited to launch Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks from anywhere
in the Internet. We call this newly-exposed MitM attack vector WPAD name collision at-
tack, and perform the first systematic vulnerability study [172]. We first characterize the
query leakage problem to understand the fundamental problem cause, and then use attack
surface definition and quantification to systematically study the vulnerability status in the
wild. Our results show that 10% of highly-vulnerable domains have already been registered
and their exploitation can start at any time, showing real threat to Internet users. Based on
our analysis, we propose and empirically evaluate a set of remediation strategies. Due to
the significant impact on corporate and end users, the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) released a US-CERT alert based on our work Various DNS operators contacted
us to obtain the list of highly-vulnerable domains [127]. Domain name company Verisign
also acknowledged the attack severity [136].
While we have shown that the name collision problem is a real threat today, our un-
derstanding of its impact on the internal services is limited to the WPAD service. In fact,
over 600 services are registered to support DNS-based service discovery, and thus the name
collision problem may have much broader impact than the WPAD service alone. Thus, we
then generalize the WPAD exploit to a new class of attacks on DNS-based service discov-
ery, and perform a systematic study of the affected services under name collisions [175].
We find that the name collision problem broadly breaks common security assumptions
made in todays service software, and nearly all of the affected services expose vulnerabil-
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ities in popular clients. To demonstrate the severity, we construct exploits and find many
new name collision attacks including another MitM attack vector, document leakage, mali-
cious library injection, and credential theft. Leveraging the insights from our analysis, we
propose multiple service software level solutions. We have performed responsible disclo-
sure and got email acknowledgement from Apple, Microsoft and Comcast on the identified
vulnerabilities.
1.3 Smart Control: Systematic Discovery and Analysis of Algorithm-
level Vulnerabilities in Next-generation Smart Transportation
As discussed earlier, smart control is another fundamental capability in smart, con-
nected systems besides network connectivity. Thus, I also perform vulnerability analysis
on system controllers, by focusing on the emerging Connected vehicle (CV) based smart
transportation systems. In such systems, vehicles and the transportation infrastructure are
connected through wireless communication, which is an ongoing effort of the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation (USDoT) to dramatically improve the transportation systems
in mobility, safety, environmental impact, and public agency operations [129]. Having
demonstrated the potential to greatly improve transportation mobility efficiency, such dra-
matically increased connectivity also opens a new door for cyber attacks. In this work, we
perform the first detailed security analysis of the next-generation CV-based transportation
systems [176]. As a first step, we target the USDOT (U.S. Department of Transportation)
sponsored CV-based traffic control system, which has been tested and shown high effective-
ness in real road intersections. In the analysis, we target a realistic threat, namely CV data
spoofing from one single attack vehicle, with the attack goal of creating traffic congestion.
We first analyze the system design and identify data spoofing strategies that can poten-
tially influence the traffic control. Based on the strategies, we perform vulnerability anal-
ysis by exhaustively trying all the data spoofing options for these strategies to understand
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the upper bound of the attack effectiveness. For the highly effective cases, we analyze the
causes and find that the current signal control algorithm design and configuration choices
are highly vulnerable to data spoofing attacks from even a single attack vehicle. These
vulnerabilities can be exploited to completely reverse the benefit of the CV-based signal
control system by causing the traffic mobility to be 23.4% worse than that without adopt-
ing such system. We then construct practical exploits and evaluate them under real-world
intersection settings. The evaluation results are consistent with our vulnerability analysis,
and we find that the attacks can even cause a blocking effect to jam an entire approach.
In the jamming period, 22% of the vehicles need to spend over 7 minutes for an original
half-minute trip, which is 14 times higher. We also discuss promising defense directions
leveraging the insights from our analysis.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II describes background and related
work for the problem domains studied in my dissertation research. In Chapter III, we
describe our design and implementation of the first automated detection tool for packet
injection vulnerability, a recurring problem in network communication protocols. In Chap-
ter IV, we describe our discovery of a new attack vector, WPAD name collision attack, that
was unexpectedly brought by the recent expansion in DNS, and our subsequent systematic
cause analysis and vulnerability assessment. Chapter V then describes our generalization
of the WPAD name collision attack and the first systematic analysis of the vulnerability sta-
tus at the service level under this generalized class of attacks. In Chapter VI, we describe
the first security analysis of next-generation smart transportation and the discovery of new
algorithm-level security vulnerabilities. In Chapter VII, we conclude this dissertation and
discuss potential future directions.
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CHAPTER II
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we describe the background and related work for the three problem
domains studied in my dissertation research: network communication protocol security,
DNS system security in the new gTLD era, and software security in next-generation smart
transportation.
2.1 Problem Domain 1: Network Communication Protocol Security
2.1.1 Related Work
Network protocol analysis. To detect protocol design vulnerabilities, prior work has used
formal methods such as model checking and specification languages to perform rigorous
protocol specification testing [163, 162]. However, these cannot prevent vulnerabilities
due to weak implementations. For implementation-level vulnerabilities, static analysis has
been applied to identify system DoS vulnerabilities [169], on-path protocol manipulation
attacks [225], and protocol interoperability problems [248]. However, none focused on
the off-path packet injection vulnerability studied in this paper. In addition, due to the
unique vulnerability pattern (detailed in§3.3.2), our work needs to support implicit data
flow analysis and address the associated challenge of high false positive rates, which is not
handled by previous work.
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Side-channel attack and detection. Recently years witness a rise in the discovery of
new side channels. For storage channels, it has been found that proc file systems can be
abused as side channels to infer keystrokes [285], webpage [215], and system state [174].
In particular, Qian et al. [250, 251] used proc file packet counters to infer TCP sequence
number. Another popular channel is timing channel, including code path [222], data [155],
and cache-access timing channel [282, 209]. In network protocol attacks, some header
fields are also found to be useful for inferring sequence number [204]. In comparison,
our goal is not to report new side channels but focuses on designing an automated tool to
systematically detect side channels.
In contrast to new side channel discovery, automated detection of side channels has
been less explored. Dynamic analysis such as black-box testing has been used to find
side channels in web application [170], and timing side channels in SSL/TLS implementa-
tion [237]. To overcome the limitation of dynamic analysis in the analysis completeness,
static analysis tools are also developed to detect web application and cache side chan-
nels [284, 188]. In comparison, our work focuses on storage side channels for network
protocol states, which is not covered by existing tools. In addition, our work identifies and
prioritizes the detection of a new category of highly-exploitable implicit information leaks
called attacker-controlled implicit information leaks (detailed in§3.3.2), which is also not
discussed in previous work.
Static analysis for taint-style vulnerability. For taint-style vulnerabilities, static analysis
tools have been designed to detect buffer overflow [182], format string vulnerabilities [261],
and SQL injection and XSS [216, 220, 271]. Recently, Yamaguchi et al. [281] propose
to use code property graph to effectively mine such vulnerabilities in large amounts of
code. Different from them, our analysis targets packet injection instead of code injection,
which requires handling much more and also diverse checks due to header field semantics.
Moreover, we have a follow-up leakage analysis which is not included in previous tools.
Static taint analysis are also used to detect information leakage vulnerabilities in recent
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years, especially for privacy leakage in Android system [158, 203, 208]. However, these
tools exclude implicit flow tainting due to its low-entropy in leakage and the problem of
high FPs [221]. In comparison, our tool taints implicit flows as required by our analysis
goal, and proposes to target attacker-controlled implicit information leaks to mitigate the
FP problem while maintaining high accuracy.
Quantitative information flow for side channel assessment. Quantitative information
flow (QIF) is an approach to estimate the capacity, e.g., the entropy, of information
leaks [230, 181]. Previous work used QIF to quantify the information leaks from cache
side channels [189] and from network traffic of web applications [284, 170, 177]. In com-
parison, our work focuses on research challenges in detecting information leaks in network
protocols, instead of the challenges in quantify them. Following up our work, Zhou et
al. design a framework for more scalable and flexible side-channel leakage assessment in
software, which is able to quantify the storage side channels studied in this paper [292].
2.2 Problem Domain 2: DNS System Security in the New gTLD Era
2.2.1 Background: DNS Ecosystem
DNS (Domain Name System) [238] is a distributed system which translates domain
names to network service identifiers (such as IP addresses for computers in the Inter-
net or a private network). Domain names are a set of labels separated by dots, for ex-
ample www.example.com, and are organized in hierarchical subdomains of the DNS
root domain. The first level of domain name labels under the root domain are the
TLDs [123], including gTLDs such as .com, and country code Top-Level Domains such
as .us. Directly below TLDs are Second-Level Domains (SLD) [104], e.g., example
in www.example.com. In this dissertation, the term domain is defined to be any DNS
name, and TLDs and SLDs are specific types of domains.
Domain name management and delegation. In DNS, a DNS zone is defined as the
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set of DNS domain names that are contiguous in the DNS tree hierarchy, and which are ad-
ministered by the same authority. The DNS root zone is the canonical top of the DNS tree.
It is the authoritative zone for all of DNS’ TLDs. The structure and contents of the DNS
root zone are determined by an organizational role called the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA), which is performed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). The DNS root zone’s actual operational and authoritative main-
tainer is a role called the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM), which is currently performed by
Verisign. ICANN delegates the management of its subdomains, the TLDs, to TLD registry
operators. Under TLDs, SLDs are registered in the process of domain name registration.
Domain name registration. A domain name registration is the delegation of the ad-
ministration of an SLD and its subdomains under a TLD, which usually involves 3 parties:
TLD registry operators, registrars, and registrants [246]. At a high level, registry operators
manage TLDs, registrars conduct the daily business of transacting with clients for SLDs,
and registrants pay to receive administrative authority to run SLDs. Once a domain is reg-
istered by a registrant, the registrar submits certain information to the corresponding TLD
registry operators, and the WHOIS database [141] then maps the registered domain name
to the registrant details.
Domain name resolution. In the domain name resolution process, end hosts rely on
recursive DNS resolvers, usually configured by network providers, e.g., corporate net-
work administrators and home network providers. Using the cached results whenever
possible, the resolvers query the name servers following the DNS domain label hierar-
chy, getting either the corresponding IP address, or an NXDomain response (rcode 3 in
RFC1035 [239], NXD for short), indicating that no such domain name exists.
The New gTLD Program. In the history of DNS, the set of TLDs has remained rel-
atively small and stable, with only 66 new TLDs added in 14 years before 2013 [245]. In
2011, with the goal of enhancing competition and consumer choice, ICANN approved the
launch of the New gTLD Program [146], which in less than 2 years has added over 700
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new gTLDs as of 2015/08/25. To differentiate these new gTLDs from the legacy ones such
as .com, in this dissertation they are also referred to as nTLDs. This enormous wave of
new gTLD delegation raised name collision concern in the domain name industry [245],
and in this dissertation, we perform the first systematic study of one of the consequences
of this problem in the wild.
2.2.2 Background: Internal DNS Namespace and iTLD Usage
The DNS ecosystem described above is the public DNS namespace for domain names
visible to the Internet. Similarly, a local area network, e.g., a corporate network, can also
set up an internal DNS namespace with private domain names. This helps control the
access to internal confidential information, and can operate despite any external network
connectivity disruption, making it a common practice for companies.
To create an internal DNS namespace, internal name servers are used to serve the zone
files for a customized internal domain, and the resolvers are configured to query these
servers instead of the DNS servers in public namespace. To make the internal domain name
easy to reference and also to prevent confusion between internal and public namespaces,
some administrators in the past used TLD strings that have not been delegated (in the public
DNS namespace) as iTLDs.
The use of iTLDs implicitly assumes that these TLD strings will not be delegated in
the public namespace; however, with the launching of the New gTLD Program, many of
the popular iTLD strings have already been delegated today and are open for public regis-
teration [151]. This breaks the implied assumption that previously undelegated iTLDs will
never be delegated. As a side effect, the leaked internal queries to these iTLD strings that
were previously benign now expose issuers to the MitM attacks studied in this dissertation.
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2.2.3 Background: DNS-based Service Discovery
The WPAD proxy configuration belongs to a general class of DNS-based service dis-
covery processes that utilize named and structured DNS records to facilitate service dis-
covery in a discovery domain. The traditional approach for the discovery issues A or
AAAA DNS queries with the service name prepended to the discovery domain. A more
advanced approach is to use SRV records [1]. To discover service svc over transport
protocol prot (e.g., TCP or UDP) in domain comp.ntld, the SRV query format is
svc. prot.comp.ntld. From the response, the client obtains the server’s domain
name and the port number. Subsequent A or AAAA queries are then issued to obtain the
server’s IP address.
This DNS-based discovery process is formally defined in RFC 6763 [40], named the
DNS-based Service Discovery or DNS-SD. In the discovery process, a DNS PTR query
is first issued to retrieve a list of available service instance names. For each instance
name, an SRV query is then issued to locate the server name and port. Like the traditional
SRV-based discovery process, the PTR and SRV queries in DNS-SD all use the format
svc. prot.comp.ntld. DNS-SD is compatible with both unicast DNS and multi-
cast DNS (mDNS) [179]. When used with mDNS, DNS-SD can provide Zeroconf [144],
which can discover services on nearby devices in local link without setting up unicast DNS
servers. A popular Zeroconf implementation is the Apple Bonjour [22], which is built-in
with the latest macOS [23].
My dissertation research considers the general concept of DNS-based service discov-
ery including both the standard DNS-SD procedure and the traditional approach. For the
query format, we refer to the queries in the form of svc. prot.comp.ntld as stan-
dard queries and others as non-standard queries. To standardize the discovery process,
the official use of certain service names are registered in the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) service name registry [65]. In this dissertation, we refer to the service
names in the IANA registry registered names and others as non-registered names.
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2.2.4 Background: Server Authentication Mechanisms
To prevent connecting to an unintended server, the service client can perform server
authentication to validate the server identity before performing the designed service func-
tionality. When TLS is used, the client can use the server’s TLS certificate to certify the
server’s ownership of the requested name subject, e.g., the domain name. In the validation
process, the certificate chain is inspected to check if the certificate is issued by a trusted
certification authority (CA). For the public Internet, a set of trusted third-party CAs are pre-
installed in popular OSes or browsers. For an internal network, the network administrators
typically use self-signed local CAs [24], which are installed into the end user systems be-
forehand.
Another popular authentication approach is to use a PSK distributed to the client and
the server. PSK-based authentication methods can be used for client authentication only,
for example by sending the key in plain text or hashed format to the server. Some methods
can provide both client and server authentications called mutual authentication, e.g., Ker-
beros [73] and DIGEST-MD5 [134]. In my dissertation research, we perform a systematic
vulnerability analysis to understand whether the clients with server authentication support
are robust enough under the name collision threat model.
2.2.5 Related Work
DNS spoofing attacks. Like the WPAD name collision attack studied in §IV in this dis-
sertation, some previous DNS spoofing attacks also try to deceive victims using malicious
DNS response. One attack category assumes that the attacker is MitM and thus replies
forged response when observing a query. This can be achieved through attacking the net-
work configurations of the victim devices. For example, prior work [269, 59] show that
scripts on web pages can change home routers’ DNS configurations and point the client
resolver IP to attacker’s servers. Another category of attacks assumes that the attacker is
off path. One such example is DNS cache poisoning attack [267, 240], which corrupts the
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resolver’s cache with spoofed DNS responses, causing all downstream devices to be redi-
rected to the attacker’s IP addresses. These previous attacks exist since the victim cannot
determine whether the received DNS responses are legitimate or manipulated, which can
be solved by DNSSEC protocol [157, 156]. Compared to them, the attacker in the WPAD
name collision attack is actually authoritative for the request domains. This means that
she can legitimately give malicious response and launch MitM attack without the need of
spoofing, making it exploitable even if DNSSEC is used.
Attack on DNS and DNS-based service discovery. To attack end systems using ma-
licious DNS responses, previous attacks require the attacker to be either on the resolving
path [190], or off the path but physically inside the targeted network [267]. Compared to
these attacks with tight attack placement and timing requirements, the name collision at-
tack studied in this dissertation only needs a domain registration to exploit users from all
over the world, which are thus easier to launch and also of larger scale. Recently, Lever et
al. proposed the concept of residual domain trust abuse in the public DNS namespace, and
used DNS traffic to characterize such abuse [227]. In comparison, residual trust exploita-
tion is for the same domain in a single namespace triggered by domain re-registration, but
the trust exploitation in this work is for domains across namespaces triggered by the name
collision problem. Besides, our work also performs vulnerability analysis at the service
software design level, which is not discussed in previous work.
Besides DNS systems, there has also been work on studying the security problems in
using DNS-SD. Ko¨nings et al. analyzed the mDNS traffic in a university network to study
the privacy leakage [223]. Xing et al. studied the major Zeroconf frameworks, and found
popular apps such as AirDrop are vulnerable to MitM attacks [159]. Compared to these
local network attacks, our work considers the name collision attack threat model, which
are more powerful, of larger scale, and easier to launch (discussed in §5.2.1). Due to such
threat model difference, our analysis covers not only the local-link discovery usage scenario
targeted in these previous work, but the unicast DNS domain discovery usage scenario as
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well.
New TLD delegation study. The addition of new gTLDs into the DNS root zone usually
requires considerable debate about the extent to which new TLDs will actually serve a real
need. Before the New gTLD Program, the growth of gTLD set maintained a very slow
and steady rate. Some previous work studied the impact of certain early gTLD delegation,
e.g., for .biz [213] and .xxx [212], and recently Halvorson et al. perform the first study
targeting the New gTLD Program [211]. These studies mostly focus on characterizing the
registration intent; in comparison, our work targets newly-discovered security problems
specifically introduced by the new gTLD delegation.
Name collision from new gTLD delegation. Before our work, concerns from the domain
name industry have already been raised about potential name collision problem from new
gTLD delegation [243]. Several studies have measured the leaked DNS queries to the DNS
root servers and shown the potential risks of information leakage, denial of service, and
MitM attack [245, 265]. The discussions resulted in a name collision management frame-
work from ICANN in 2013 [68], which allows the majority of new gTLD strings to be
delegated by following an Alternate Path to Delegation (APD). In APD, the new gTLD
registries are required to block large numbers of high-risk SLDs according to measurement
of DITL (Day in the Life of the Internet) dataset. Later on in 2014 a new framework allows
releasing these blocked names after a 90-day period called “controlled interruption” for
testing and resolving name collision problem [67]. However, previous studies have shown
that the block list is ineffective due to the statistical limitation of DITL dataset [270]. In
addition, the controlled interruption period is unlikely to change anything for problems sim-
ilar to the WPAD name collision attack, since the victim machines automatically perform
the vulnerable operations even without user awareness [265]. This indicates the lack of a
systematic approach to understand and find effective solutions for the newly-exposed name
collision problem. Our work uses in-depth cause analysis and attack surface quantification
to fill this critical research gap.
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Vulnerability in server authentication usage. Previous work uncovered a series of
security problems in server authentication in TLS, e.g., certificate validation vulnerabili-
ties due to incorrect use of TLS APIs [196, 200]. In comparison, my dissertation research
uncovers additional usage that is not incorrect or weak by itself, but only becomes vulner-
able under the name collision attack threat model. For PSK-based authentications, some
methods are known to be weak due to the lack of server authentication, e.g., Basic and
NTLM [61, 30]. Instead of finding new security problems in these authentication mecha-
nism, our work focuses on characterizing the vulnerable use of these weak methods in the
network service clients, which is found to be a common vulnerable design choice under
name collision attacks.
2.3 Problem Domain 3: Software Security in Next-generation Smart
Transportation
2.3.1 Background: CV Technology and Recent Advances
Connected vehicle (CV) technology uses wireless communications to connect vehicles
and the infrastructure with the goal of dramatically improving the transportation systems
in mobility, safety, environmental impact, and public agency operations [129]. Due to the
high data transmission requirement in the transportation scenario, the DSRC (Dedicated
Short Range Communications) protocol is specifically designed for the CV communica-
tion scenarios with dedicated band allocated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) [43].
The communication in the CV environment has two categories: vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication, and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. To support
them, both the vehicle and the infrastructure sides need to install DSRC devices, which
are called On-Board Units (OBUs) and Road-side Units (RSUs) respectively. In such CV
environment, vehicles use OBUs to periodically broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSM)
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including its real-time trajectory data, e.g., location and speed, to the surrounding vehicles
and infrastructure. This enables a series of safety functions on the vehicle side, e.g., blind
spot and lane change warnings, and also enables the traffic infrastructure to leverage the
real-time traffic data to improve traffic control performance.
Recent advances in the CV deployment. With the DSRC standard becoming ma-
ture [219], OBUs and RSUs products are already on market today [28]. USDOT estimates
that equipping the OBUs would cost around $341 to $350 per vehicle in 2020 [130]. This
makes the CV technology a very cost-effective option to increase transportation system
performance in practice, and the USDOT has already proposed to mandate all new light-
duty vehicles to equip OBUs [128]. The market penetration rate will gradually increase
after such mandate [135], and in our analysis we call the vehicles with and without OBUs
equipped vehicles and unequipped vehicles respectively.
To foster the development of CV-based transportation systems, in 2010 the USDOT
launched the Dynamic Mobility Applications (DMA) research program and developed
nearly 70 such systems, or CV applications [35]. To encourage service providers, re-
searchers, and application developers to participate, these applications are open sourced
and are available free to the public [89]. Built on the success of the DMA program, on
September 1, 2016, the USDOT awarded $45 million to start small-scale deployment of
these systems, called the CV Pilot Deployment Program, in three sites including New
York [129]. In my dissertation research, we perform the first security analysis of such CV-
based transportation systems as a timely study to understand the potential security problems
and challenges at the design level before large-scale deployment.
Security and Credential Management System (SCMS). As one of the most impor-
tatnt infrastructure, the transpiration systems are highly security and safety critical. Thus,
to enhance the communication security in the CV environment, the USDOT will deploy the
Security and Credential Management System (SCMS) on both the vehicle and infrastruc-
ture sides [133]. It is a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) system that requires every BSM
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messages to be signed by the sender’s digital certificates issued beforehand, and thus the
receivers can verify the signature before acting on it [133, 276].
2.3.2 Related Work
Data spoofing attack in the CV environment. Similar to our work, previous work
also identifies data spoofing as a realistic attack vector in the CV environment. Amoozadeh
et al. studied the V2V-based automated vehicle platoon system, and found that spoofed
attacks can cause rear-end collision or significant instability [153]. A more recent work
summarizes a comprehensive list of data spoofing attack sources including not only DSRC
but also other sensors such as GPS [187]. While these work focus on data spoofing attacks
on the vehicle side through V2V, our work is the first study that exposes concrete data
spoofing attacks on the transportation infrastructure side through V2I. In addition, com-
pared to V2V attacks that can at most affect one lane of vehicles at a time, V2I attacks can
affect all vehicles in an intersection as concretely shown in our evaluation, and thus are
able to cause much wider impact on the transportation system.
Critical infrastructure security. Several studies have investigated the security of criti-
cal infrastructure and facilities, e.g., smart grid [154, 229]. These studies highlight the secu-
rity challenges and the severe consequences brought by introducing connectivity into these
previously isolated critical systems, which is also concretely shown in this work for the
next-generation CV-based transportation. Closer to our work, Ghena et al. performed the
first publicly available security analysis of a deployed traffic infrastructure system [202].
Their work found that the traffic controllers uses weak credentials and can be remotely
controlled by the attacker. In comparison, our work targets the next-generation CV-based
traffic control instead of the traditional one. In addition, the weak credential problem they
discovered is a known problem across many embedded network devices [183], and can be
fixed using state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms [202]. In comparison, our study as-
sumes that such problem has already been solves, and targets new security problems at the
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traffic control algorithm level.
Traffic control algorithm security. Prior to our study, very few studies explored the
security problems in the traffic control algorithms. Laszka et al. performed a theoretical
analysis to estimate the potential congestion an attacker can create assuming that she can
arbitrarily compromise multiple signal controllers [226]. A follow-up study was then per-
formed for the same attack goal but with a weak assumption, in which the attacker can
only compromise the sensors that collects traffic flow information [201]. In comparison,
neither of these work analyzes the CV-based signal control scenario targeted in our work.
In addition, compared to their thread model that assumes the ability of compromising ar-
bitrary numbers of infrastructure-side devices, our threat model, data spoofing from one
signal attack vehicle, is much more realistic (§6.3).
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CHAPTER III
Systematic Detection of Packet Injection Vulnerabilities
3.1 Introduction
The encryption coverage on today’s Internet is unfortunately still poor: only 50% in
2017 [58]. Thus, off-path packet injection attacks remain a serious threat to network se-
curity. Recently a number of such attacks and their variants have been reported includ-
ing off-path TCP packet injection [250, 251, 204, 205] and DNS cache poisoning at-
tacks [267, 240]. These attacks jeopardize the integrity of network communication, and
lead to serious damage where personal data from unsuspecting users can be leaked when
visiting a web site. Despite application-layer encryption support (e.g., SSL and TLS), net-
work connections are still vulnerable. For instance, for HTTPS connections, the initial
request sent by the browser may still be an unencrypted HTTP request, and the server sub-
sequently redirects the client to the HTTPS site. As shown in a recent study [250], an
off-path attacker can inject a legitimate response to the very first HTTP request. Further-
more, such packet injection attacks can result in DoS, e.g., by injecting a reset (RST) packet
with an inferred TCP sequence number.
To combat such threats, the network stacks typically implement stringent checks on
various fields to verify if an incoming packet is valid. In fact, a number of RFCs like
RFC 5961 [253] are dedicated to this purpose. However, two problems remain. First, the
design of an RFC may not be formally verified to be secure. Second, even if the design
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is secure, the actual implementation may not always conform to the design. In fact, the
implementation is generally much more complex and difficult to get right. For instance, it
has been shown that TCP implementations on Linux and FreeBSD are significantly weaker
than what the RFC recommends regarding the mitigation against off-path attacks [251].
This calls for a systematic approach to verify protocol implementations.
In this work, we fulfill this very need by developing an effective and scalable static
program analysis tool, PacketGuardian, which can systematically evaluate the robustness
(e.g., the level of security strength) of a network protocol implementation against off-path
packet injection attacks. To ensure effectiveness and accuracy, our tool uses a precise
context-, flow-, and field-sensitive static taint analysis with pointer analysis support. To
address the scalability challenge caused by such high analysis sensitivity, we choose a data
flow analysis of summary-based approach, which is known to be more scalable compared
to other frameworks [258], and is demonstrated to scale to very large code base like the
Linux kernel [280].
At a high level, the tool operates by performing analysis in two steps: (1) Find all paths
leading to the program execution point of accepting an incoming packet. This helps iden-
tify the critical checks that a protocol implementation relies on to prevent packet injection,
and may directly reveal a packet injection vulnerability if any check is weak. (2) Motivated
by the observation that strong checks typically rely on certain hard-to-guess or “secret”
communication protocol state, e.g., TCP sequence numbers, or RTP source IDs, we per-
form a subsequent analysis to check whether such secret states can be leaked to an attacker
through side channels.
In network protocol implementations, these “secret” protocol states are unlikely to be
leaked directly through explicit flows, and all previously reported leakage has been through
implicit flows [250, 251, 204]. Therefore, PacketGuardian supports implicit flow tainting,
which is known to be of much less value compared to explicit flow tracking (implicit flow
usually leaks at most 1 bit of information) and at the same time cause large numbers of
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false positives [221]. It is thus a commonly excluded feature in nearly all taint analysis
tools [158, 203, 208, 216]. To address the false positive challenge without compromising
tool effectiveness, we leverage a key insight that the previously-discovered practical leaks
are all attacker-controlled implicit information leaks, meaning that an attacker can influence
which bit to leak. By prioritizing this special type of leak, we effectively reduce the false
positive number and make the tool more useful for finding practical vulnerabilities.
Our analysis requires access to source code, which is a realistic assumption for many
key network protocols. The tool we have developed is fully functional and is able to analyze
arbitrary portions of the Linux kernel source code. By applying our tool to the Linux kernel
TCP, SCTP, DCCP, and variants of open source RTP protocol implementations, we are
able to identify a set of new vulnerabilities not previously reported. For example, for the
3 RTP implementations, two can be compromised by injecting less than 51 packets. For
the Linux kernel TCP implementation, our tool identifies 17 high-entropy protocol state
leakage, with 11 of them successfully validated in a realistic test bed. This illustrates that
the Linux kernel TCP stack is still vulnerable even after the recent patches for the previous
known leakage [253, 191], indicating the complex nature of the problem.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We formulate the problem to systematically analyze the security properties of net-
work protocol implementations against off-path packet injection attacks, and develop an
effective and scalable static program analysis tool to address it using a precise context-,
flow-, and field-sensitive taint analysis with pointer analysis.
• To enable the detection of practical information leaks due to implicit flows while
ensuring low false positives, we propose the concept of attacker-controlled implicit infor-
mation leaks and prioritize our tool to detect them. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to design a taint analysis tool for detecting attacker-controlled implicit information
leaks.
• We implement and apply our tool on 6 real implementations for 4 network proto-
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Figure 3.1: Packet injection attack threat model in §III.
cols. From the result, we are able to discover new and realistic vulnerabilities confirmed
by proof-of-concept attacks for Linux kernel TCP and 2 out of 3 RTP implementations.
3.2 Attack Threat Model
Fig. 3.1 depicts the threat model for the off-path packet injection attack considered in
this work. As shown, an existing communication channel (e.g., a TCP connection, a UDP
session, or RTP session) is established between Alice and Bob. The attacker’s goal is to
inject a packet into the channel targeting Bob, pretending to be a packet from Alice. The
attack goal can be to inject payload, e.g., to launch attack such as phishing, or to trigger
the termination of the channel, resulting in denial-of-service (DoS). The attacker in this
threat model is off-path, i.e., much weaker and more realistic than a man-in-the-middle
attacker. To ensure channel integrity, Alice and Bob usually share several secret protocol
states, denoted as s in the figure, and include it in the packet. These states are unknown to
the off-path attacker and should be hard to guess.
To incorporate recently-discovered packet injection vulnerabilities [250, 251, 204, 205],
our threat model also optionally considers a collaborative attacker sharing the same system
as Bob. This collaborative attacker can be an unprivileged malware program [250, 251], or
a script in the browser [204, 205]. This collaborative attacker is tasked to provide feedback
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1: void tcp_rcv_established(tcp_sock* tp,
    sk_buff* skb) {
2: If (!skb->ack && !skb->rst) return;
3: If (!tcp_validate_incoming(tp, skb)) return;
4: If (tcp_ack(tp, skb) < 0) return;
5: accept_payload();
6: }
1: bool tcp_validate_incoming(tcp_sock* tp, sk_buff* skb) {
2:   If ((skb->seq >= tp->rcv_nxt ) && (skb->seq <= tp->rcv_nxt + tp->win1)) {
3:     tcp_send_dupack(tp, skb);
4:     return false;
5:   }
6:   return true;
7: }
1: bool tcp_ack(tcp_sock* tp, sk_buff* skb) {
2:   If (skb->ack_seq < tp->snd_una) {
3:     if (skb->ack_seq < tp->snd_una - tp->win2) return -1;
4:     return 0;
5:   }
6:   If (skb->ack_seq > tp->snd_nxt) return -1;
7:   return 0;
8: }
1: void tcp_send_dupack(tcp_sock* tp, sk_buff* skb) {
2:   If (skb->seq < tp->rcv_nxt)
3:      tp->net_statistics[DelayedACKLost]++;
4: }
Version <= 3.7:
1: void tcp_rcv_established(tcp_sock* tp,
    sk_buff* skb) {
2: If (!tcp_validate_incoming(tp, skb)) return;
3: If (skb->ack && tcp_ack(tp, skb) < 0) return;
4: accept_payload();
5: }
Figure 3.2: An illustrative code example of a simplified implementation for handling an
incoming TCP packet in Linux kernel 3.15.
about any packet injection attempt of the off-path attacker, facilitating the inference of the
secret protocol state for a successful injection.
3.3 Illustrative Example
3.3.1 Packet Injection Attack for TCP
To illustrate how static analysis can help detect packet injection attacks for TCP,
Fig. 3.2 shows a significantly simplified implementation example for handling an incom-
ing TCP packet, which is the entry for an injection packet from an off-path attacker.
This implementation is mostly based on Linux kernel 3.15, from which we only include
the important logic, i.e., sequence and acknowledgment number checks. In this figure,
tcp rcv established() is the main entry function, parameter tp is the socket sta-
tus maintained by the system, and parameter skb is the data structure for the incoming
packet. Function accept payload() copies the packet data into the application layer,
indicating the acceptance of the incoming packet for this TCP connection, i.e., a successful
injection.
To evaluate the robustness of this implementation against off-path packet injection,
the key question is what strong checks exist to prevent an off-path injected packet
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from reaching accept payload(). As we can see in tcp rcv established(),
3 checks on line 2, 3, and 4 exist. The check on line 2 requires the incoming packet
to have either ACK or RST bit set, which is easy to bypass by an attacker. The checks
on line 3 and 4 call into tcp validate incoming() and tcp ack(), and can be
passed only if the former returns true, and the later returns a non-negative value. In
tcp validate incoming(), to return true, the seq field of the incoming packet
needs to fall into the receive window [tp->rcv nxt, tp->rcv nxt + tp->win1],
and the size of this window is usually between 214 to 220. tp->rcv nxt is a proto-
col state unknown to an off-path attacker, thus it takes up to 218 guesses to pass the
check. In addition, for tcp ack() to return a non-negative value, ack seq needs to
fall into [tp->snd una - tp->win2, tp->snd nxt]. Like rcv nxt, snd una
and snd nxt are also protocol states unknown to the attacker, making this check also
hard to pass. Combined with the check in tcp validate incoming(), it takes up to
236 = 68, 719, 476, 736 guesses for a single packet to be accepted, making it practically
unexploitable. Therefore, these are important checks to prevent off-path attackers. In this
work, we use the number of packets needed for one injection as the metric for evaluating
off-path packet injection robustness of a protocol implementation, denoted by Npkt.
We note that the robustness strongly depends on the implementation details. As shown
in the bottom-left rectangle of Fig. 3.2, before Linux 3.7, the ACK bit check was much
weaker. In this case, off-path attacker can simply set the ACK bit to 0 to avoid the checks
in tcp ack(), resulting in a large reduction in Npkt from 2
36 to 218. This turns out to be
a missing implementation of a check required by the protocol specification [191]. Thus,
even for a well-designed protocol, the corresponding implementation of it may not be robust
against off-path packet injection attacks.
If strong checks do exist, which usually depend on secret protocol states unknown to the
attacker, a further question is whether with the help of a collaborative attacker, these proto-
col states can be leaked. This is of concern since previous work [251, 204] has shown that
29
rcv nxt and snd nxt can have leakage through storage channels such as proc files. The
threat demonstrated by Qian et al. [251] is especially realistic as rcv nxt and snd nxt
can be inferred under only a second. The upper-right rectangle in Fig. 3.2 illustrates this
reported leakage for rcv nxt. Since it is very unlikely to pass the check on line 1 in
tcp validate incoming(), the attack packet reaches tcp send dupack(), and
if seq set by the attacker is smaller than rcv nxt, it changes a counter DelayedACK-
Lost in proc file, otherwise not. If we inspect this counter closely, each comparison leaks
1 bit of information, and thus at most 32 guesses/packets are needed to infer the exact
value of rcv nxt. Note that at the time of Qian et al. [251], the check in tcp ack() is
easy to bypass. In the current version, the check in tcp ack() is strengthened as shown
in the bottom-right rectangle in Fig. 3.2, and even if rcv nxt is guessed, the code still
does not have exploitable vulnerabilities for packet injection. However, from our auto-
mated vulnerability detection shown later in §3.7, we discover 14 new highly-exploitable
leaks for snd nxt/snd una even after the fix. Thus, even for well-implemented pro-
tocols with strong checks, the protocol states of these checks can still be leaked through
attacker-accessible channels, rendering the checks ineffective.
To systematically discover such vulnerabilities, we argue that automated analysis is re-
quired to ensure correctness and coverage, given that the implementations are rather com-
plex — 64 different paths with more than 300 direct and 600 indirect checks are found
before accepting an incoming packet in Linux kernel 3.15.8.
3.3.2 Attacker-controlled Implicit Information Leaks
In the above example, the leakage of protocol state rcv nxt is one case of implicit
information leaks as the secret is leaked through control dependency (predicates on line 2 in
tcp send dupack()). Compared to classic implicit information leaks, this instance is
quite special in that it involves attacker-controlled data in the predicates (skb->seq in the
example), giving an attacker the ability to influence the control flow. We name this special
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Implicit information Exploit- Example of exploits and related work
leak category ability Exploit case Attack Detection/defense
Classic Low N/A N/A N/A
Strict control High Crypto key extraction [209, 287, 282, 228] [188, 288, 274, 255]
dependency (SCD) Side-channel leaks in [178, 174, 291] [284, 170, 232]
based [161] web/Android apps
Attacker-controlled High Packet injection attack [250, 251, 204] This work
Table 3.1: Categorization of implicit information leaks and position of the work in §III.
type of leaks attacker-controlled implicit information leaks, a new concept proposed in this
work. As shown in the illustrative example, since attacker-controlled data is involved, an
attacker can use different input to actively trigger leaks from the same predicate multiple
times and thus extract the secret bit by bit, making it highly-exploitable in practice.
Table 3.1 shows a categorization of implicit information leaks to help illustrate the
position of this new concept and this work. Classic implicit information leaks is from
a secret information related predicate (e.g., if (secret > 100)) to an information
sink (e.g., a public value), which usually just leaks 1 bit of information (e.g., whether
secret is above 100 or not). Since the leakage volume is extremely low compared to
explicit information leaks, and tracking it causes large numbers of false positives [221,
161], detecting classic implicit information leaks is a commonly excluded feature in nearly
all taint analysis tools [158, 203, 208, 216].
To enable detection of severe information leaks from implicit flows without causing
high volumes of false positives, Bao et al. propose to limit implicit flow tracking to a
special type of control dependency called strict control dependency (SCD) [161]. SCD
denotes the correlation between an equivalency predicate (e.g., if (secret == 100))
and an information sink, thus when the information sink is changed, it directly reveals
all bits of the secret, making it much more severe than the classic implicit information
leaks. Cryptographic key extraction through cache side channels [209, 287, 282, 228] is
one real-world exploit example of SCD-based leaks, which leverages the SCD in bitwise
equivalence testing of the secret key in certain cryptographic system implementations such
as RSA implementation of GnuPG [287, 282]. Another exploit example is side-channel
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leaks in web and Android applications [178, 174, 291], in which network traffic pattern is
SCD on user choices in web or Android applications. As shown in Table 3.1, both examples
are studied extensively on both attack and defense sides.
Attacker-controlled implicit information leaks is a newly-identified category of highly-
exploitable implicit information leaks, and similar to Bao et al. [161], we propose to prior-
itize this special type of leaks in order to balance the vulnerability detection effectiveness
and false positives. This concept is orthogonal to SCD in that attacker-controlled data is
involved in the control dependency. The target of this work is to identify exploitable cases
of such leaks focusing on off-path packet injection attacks [250, 251, 204], and we are the
first to design a taint analysis tool for detecting this type of leaks (detailed in §3.6).
3.4 PacketGuardian Overview
In this section, we first describe the analysis required for detecting packet injection
vulnerabilities, and then present a design overview of PacketGuardian which supports this
analysis.
3.4.1 Analysis Steps
Following the discussion in §3.3, we break the analysis into two steps: accept path
analysis and protocol state leakage analysis.
Step 1: Accept path analysis. For a packet injection, the goal is to pass all checks
and reach the program point where the packet is accepted, e.g., accept payload()
in Fig. 3.2. In this chapter, we refer to these paths as accept paths. For a particular protocol
implementation, the off-path packet injection robustness depends on the weakest accept
path. Thus, the first analysis step is to find the weak accept paths in the implementation.
The output needs to highlight the checks related to attacker-controlled information, e.g.,
header fields, to help analyze the accept path strength.
Step 2: Protocol state leakage analysis. If all accept paths are all well-protected by
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Figure 3.3: PacketGuardian design overview.
“secret” protocol states unknown to the attacker, the implementation can still be vulnerable
if these protocol states are vulnerable to information leakage as illustrated in §3.3. Thus,
after accept path analysis, we follow up with an information leakage analysis for important
protocol states.
The first step is to analyze the strength of the checks related to attacker input on the pro-
gram path reaching a pre-defined analysis sink, which is similar to the traditional code in-
jection analysis, and thus it can be modeled as a static taint analysis problem with attacker-
controlled data as taint source like in previous work [216, 290, 281]. The second step is an
information leakage problem and again can be solved by static taint analysis.
Note that symbolic execution is alternative choice, but since it tracks finer-grained in-
formation for each variable than taint analysis, it comes with much higher computation
overhead, which is unlikely to be efficient and scalable enough in practice, especially in
our case high analysis sensitivity are necessary (shown in §3.7.1). Thus, we choose taint
analysis in the current design.
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3.4.2 PacketGuardian Design
To support the analysis in §3.4.1, PacketGuardian has 2 major components: taint-based
summarizer, and vulnerability analyzer, as shown in Fig. 3.3. In this section, we briefly
introduce the design of each component, and details are provided in §3.5 and §3.6.
Pre-processing. To support taint analysis, the source code needs to be first pre-processed to
the format required by a certain static analysis tool. We choose CIL [242] for our analysis,
so for its input requirement, .c files are pre-processed to .i files in this step.
Taint-based summarizer. With pre-processed source code, given an entry function, taint-
based summarizer performs a precise static taint analysis with flow, field, and context sen-
sitivity with pointer analysis. In §3.7.1, we show that such analysis strength is required to
discover real vulnerabilities with minimum false positives (FPs). Further, we employ im-
plicit flow tracking (with separate taints from explicit flows), as the protocol logic checks
commonly induce leakage through control dependence (see §3.3). Note that implicit taint-
ing is known to generate a large number of FPs [221], and nearly all existing taint analysis
tools choose to ignore implicit flows [158, 203, 208, 216]. We show that after prioritiz-
ing attacker-controlled implicit information leaks, PacketGuardian does not suffer from the
excessive FP problem.
To achieve context sensitivity, our static taint analysis needs to be performed in an
inter-procedural data flow analysis framework, with two major choices: IFDS/IDE frame-
work [257, 259], and summary-based (or functional) approach [273]. IFDS/IDE frame-
work performs analysis from function caller to callee, and in the worst case, the analysis
complexity is proportional to the number of call graph edges. In contrast, summary-based
approach first generates strongly-connected components (SCC) of the call graph and com-
putes function summary from callee to caller. In this approach, each function only needs to
be analyzed once and thus has lower complexity and significant performance gains [258].
Its disadvantage is that it needs storage for function summaries, and the callee-to-caller
order makes taint path construction unnatural. To support high sensitivity and implicit
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flow tracking, our analysis faces a significant scalability challenge if applied to a large
code base like the Linux kernel. Fortunately, as demonstrated in previous studies [280],
summary-based approach can scale to very large programs.
Following these design choices, as shown in Fig. 3.3, all related source files are first
crawled in a breath-first search framework starting from the entry function. After merging
these files, function SCCs are computed and serve as input to the taint analysis engine. Taint
analysis are then performed in the order of callee to caller, and output function summaries.
Vulnerability analyzer. In vulnerability analyzer, our tool uses the function summaries
from the taint-based summarizer to construct paths for accept path analysis and protocol
state leakage analysis in §3.4.1. Taking attacker-controlled data as taint source and packet
accept functions as sink, accept path constructor constructs accept paths with the attacker-
controlled data related predicates labeled. The output is further analyzed, with the result
being either an obvious packet injection vulnerability, or a set of protocol states that the
implementation relies on to prevent injection.
If the accept paths are well-protected by a set of protocol states, leakage path con-
structor performs the second step to find possible leakage of these important states. In
this analysis, we also use the function summaries, but the taint sources and sinks become
the protocol states and public side channels accessible to the attacker. These channels can
be storage side channels [251, 215, 174, 291], public events like sending packets [204],
timing, power, etc. Besides detecting leaks, we also construct the leakage paths to help
tool users understand and analyze these leaks. In this step, we prioritize attacker-controlled
implicit information leaks, as all previously reported highly-exploitable leaks are of this
special type [250, 251, 204].
With the choice of summary-based approach, even though the taint sources and sinks
are different in the two steps, our tool only needs to perform taint analysis, the most time-
consuming part, once instead of multiple times for each source and sink pair. While iden-
tifying sources and sinks is a problem for taint analysis in general [256], PacketGuardian
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users can conveniently try different sinks in the analysis without re-running the taint anal-
ysis.
Manual effort in analysis. In our design, the manual effort mainly lies in identifying pro-
tocol states, and the amount of it depends on the number of output paths and predicates. As
detailed in §3.6, our design mitigates this problem using path pruning and taint information
annotations, which is shown to be effective in §3.7, e.g., our pruning reduces 42.6% paths
on average.
3.5 Taint-based Summarizer
In this section, we detail the two core designs of the taint-based summarizer, the taint
analysis engine and function summary.
3.5.1 Taint Analysis Engine
In this section, we detail the design of taint environment, propagation logic, and how
we support flow, context, and field sensitivity with pointer analysis.
Taint environment. To specify the tainting relationship, each program variable v is asso-
ciated with a taint environment γ : v → T , where T is a set of taint values {ti|i = 1, ..., k}.
Each taint value ti is associated with a variable vi, meaning that v is tainted by variable vi.
In our design, variables in γ include local, global, formal, and function return variables.
Each v is specified by a tuple with its identification information such as variable name and
type.
Taint label of explicit and implicit flows. As discussed in §3.4.2, it is a design requirement
to include implicit flows, which is known to cause excessive FPs [221]. At the same time,
the importance of explicit leaks is much higher than implicit leaks since the former directly
leaks the entire data. Thus, to distinguish leaks of different importance and be able to
support policies on limiting implicit flow tainting [218], we label each taint value with 2
boolean values d and c, for taint values coming from explicit flows (d = true) or implicit
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Statement/expression Taint operation
Const, Sizeof(typ/str) Texp = ∅
v Texp = Ld(γ(v))
Sizeof(exp1) Texp = Ld(Texp1)
Cast(exp1) Texp = Ld(Texp1)
unop(exp1) Texp = Ld(Texp1)
biop(exp1, exp2) Texp = Ld(Texp1) ∪
l Ld(Texp2)
exp : exp1?exp2 : exp3 Texp = Lc(Texp1) ∪
l Ld(Texp2) ∪
l Ld(Texp3)
v = exp γ(v) = Ld(Texp) ∪
l Lc(∪
l{Tctk |ctk ∈ CT })
Asm({expini |i}, γ(voutj ) = Ld(∪
l{Texpini |i)
{voutj |j}) ∪
lLc(∪
l{Tctk |ctk ∈ CT })
Table 3.2: Taint value calculation and propagation logic for intra-procedure propagation.
CT includes the constraints that the current statement is control dependent on.
flows (c = true). This is a unique design in PacketGuardian and not supported in most
existing taint analysis tool [158, 203, 208, 216].
Taint propagation. The tainting process is to propagate taint values by updating γ(.) after
processing each statement. Table 3.2 shows the taint propagation logic in the statement and
expression format defined by CIL [242]. This table only has intra-procedure propagation
logic, and inter-procedure logic will be covered later.
In the table, we introduce 3 new operations for taint label management, Ld, Lc, and
∪l. Ld and Lc modify the labels of all taint values in a set with explicit flow and implicit
flow label respectively, and ∪l is simply the set union operation but with label merging, for
example if both sets have v but with different labels di, ci and dj , cj , the merged taint value
label is (di||dj) and (ci||cj).
Flow-sensitive tainting with both explicit and implicit flows. Our taint propagation is
performed in a data flow analysis framework, where each stmti has a taint environment
γi(.), and after tainting according to the rules in Table 3.2, γi(.) is updated and passed to
the egress statements in CFG. Our data flow analysis is a may-taint analysis to tradeoff
potentially higher FPs for lower FNs (we have other mechanisms to lower FPs later on). To
increase the analysis efficiency, we use topology order to visit CFG nodes.
To support implicit flow tainting, we maintain a constraint path, CT , during the data
flow analysis. CT describes the list of conditional branch statements such as if exp and
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Switch exp, which we call constraints (denoted by ct), that the current statement is con-
trol dependent on. Each ct is described by a tuple {exp, Texp}, and adds a new ct after
processing a conditional branch statements with exp. We compute the control dependence
relationship with a postdominator analysis [273], and delete the ct from CT if the current
statement is not control dependent on it. With this constraint list, we compute the implicit
flow taint value set by merging Texp of all ct in CT . As shown in Table 3.2, this implicit
flow taint is added in taint propagation after applying Lc(.).
Context sensitivity. To support context sensitivity, function call statements need to be
correctly handled for inter-procedure taint propagation. According to our design, the taint
modifications after calling a callee function can also be described in a function taint envi-
ronment γf (.), by merging the return statement taint environments in the callee function
using ∪l operation.
Before being applied, γf(.) needs to be transformed to the caller function context since
γf(.) is computed in the callee context. This transformation is done in an instantiate func-
tion Inst : vcallee → vcaller, which replaces the formal parameter variables in callee func-
tion with the caller actual parameter variables in the call site of caller function. Inst(.)
also handles the side effect in the process for the callee function variables, i.e., caused by
changing the values of de-referenced pointer formal or global parameter variables, using a
context-sensitive pointer analysis explained later.
Field sensitivity. As shown in the example in §3.3, the header fields related to protocol
states in a network protocol are usually implemented as a few fields of a composite type
variable. Thus, it will cause large numbers of FPs if we don’t distinguish same variable
with different fields and taint the whole variable like in some previous tools [203, 114].
We support field sensitivity with the standard technique of expanding each variable with
an offset element in the variable tuple. After adding this feature, both the intra- and inter-
procedure taint propagation logic need to be updated accordingly.
Adding offset element in variable tuple can also cause γf(.) to keep increasing with
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same variable having different offset due to recursive fields (e.g., next in linked list data
structure) in a loop. To solve this problem, we add an iteration limit of loops, which is a
common practice in field-sensitive data flow analysis.
Taint with pointer analysis. As shown in §3.3, network protocol implementations use
pointer extensively, and in our example, the leakage sink is changed with de-referencing
a pointer, making pointer analysis a must. In our design, we choose pointer analysis to
support referencing and de-referencing pointers when needed during taint propagation. To
better work with our taint analysis, our pointer analysis is also flow-, field-, and context-
sensitive based on the traditional flow-sensitive pointer analysis framework [214].
With this feature, our analysis has another environment, pointer environment, Ptr :
v → {vi|i = 1, ..., k}, meaning that v points to a set of variables {vi|i = 1, ..., k}. Like
taint environment, we associate each statement stmti with a pointer environment for flow-
sensitive analysis. In inter-procedure case, the pointer relationship in a callee function is
summarized to a a function pointer environment Ptrcallee, and Inst(.) is also needed to
transform the variables to caller function context accordingly.
Note that parameter aliasing is a classic problem in summarizing points-to relationship,
which is typically solved by partial transfer functions (PTF) [277]. In network protocol
implementations, pointer parameters typically are used for semantically different purposes,
e.g., tp for socket status and skb for the incoming packet in the illustrative example (§3.3),
thus we assume no parameter aliasing in the current implementation. This may introduce
inaccuracies, and we plan to implement PTF for improvement in future work.
3.5.2 Function Summary
After taint analysis, the function summary are generated with 4 parts : taint summary,
pointer summary, taint tracking summary, and path summary.
Taint and pointer summaries. Taint and pointer summaries are the function taint envi-
ronment γf (.) and function pointer environment Ptrf(.) respectively (detailed in §3.5.1).
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After generated, they are fed back into the taint analysis engine for subsequent analysis to
support inter-procedure taint and pointer analysis.
Taint tracking summary. As mentioned in §3.4.2, since we choose summary-based ap-
proach over IFDS/IDE for scalability, tracking taint propagation becomes unnatural. How-
ever, we do need this tracking since it benefits our vulnerability analysis by making the
taint result explainable. Thus, we design taint tracking summary to fulfill this goal in Pack-
etGuardian. Note that this summary has another important benefit for our analysis as it can
help us locate the indirect constraints of implicit flow taint to obtain a complete accept path
and leakage path (detailed later in §3.6).
Like function taint and pointer environments, this summary is specified by a track-
ing environment Track : 〈v, t〉 → TR, where t = γf(v) and TR is the set of track
values. Each track value describes one source for a taint value, which can come from intra-
procedure explicit flow, intra-procedure implicit flow, or inter-procedure explicit or implicit
flow from a callee function. Since explicit flow is relatively easy to understand, to lower the
tracking overhead we only record the source file line numbers of the program point passing
the taint. For implicit flows, we create a track value for each ct in CT to make it precise.
For inter-procedure taint tracking, we don’t let the track value propagate from callee
to caller function like in taint and pointer summaries. Otherwise, the track value set will
increase accumulatively at each time of inter-procedure propagation, making the analy-
sis hard to scale. More importantly, in that case each taint tracking summary will have
complete taint history for each variable and taint value pair, which is unnecessary since
only a few important variables need tracking. Thus, in our design, during function call we
only store a “function pointer” in the TR, and delay the actual inter-procedure tracking
computation till the vulnerability analysis phase when needed. This “function pointer” is
designed to have complete context information to load the callee taint tracking summary
and reconstruct the inter-procedure tainting path later.
Path summary. To meet the goal of outputting the accept and leakage paths for explaining
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the packet injection vulnerability, during the taint analysis we also summarize the important
paths. Like taint tracking summary, recording the inter-procedure program paths is not
necessary, and we only record the intra-procedure program paths, and keep a “function
pointer”.
To satisfy the analysis requirements, the path we record has 2 parts, a constraint path
and a path end point. The constraint path is the same as CT mentioned earlier, and here the
list of ct is those ones that the path end point is control dependent on. To help explain the
path and also enable further tracking of the expression taint, we expand ct = {exp, Texp}
with 3 elements: variable taint value set {〈vi, ti, T rack(〈vi, ti〉)〉|i = 1...k}, branch br, and
line number, where vi is a variable used in exp. Variable taint value set gives fine-grained
information about the taint values and track values for each variables used in ct, which
helps the path pruning and prioritizing detailed later in §3.6. Branch br records whether
this path takes the true branch of ct or the false branch of it.
The path end point can be in two forms: a function, or a sink-related statement. The
path end point of a function is designed to serve for the role of “function pointer” men-
tioned earlier, and it can also serve for the vulnerability analysis with a function sink, e.g.,
accept payload() in Fig. 3.2. The path end point of a sink-related statement is de-
signed to mainly serve for protocol state leakage analysis when this statement is related to a
channel accessible to an off-path attacker. For example, this statement can be modifying a
public value in storage channels [250, 174], or related to a special instruction in data timing
channels (e.g., SSE instructions discussed by Andrysco et. al. [155]), etc. In our current
implementation, we focus on storage channels and record the statement changing a global
variable, or the de-referenced value of a formal or global parameters since they may point
to a global variable depending on the caller context.
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Figure 3.4: Path analysis process in DFS path construction and analysis framework.
3.6 Path Construction and Vulnerability Analysis
In this section, we first introduce a path construction and analysis framework, and then
detail accept path analysis and protocol state leakage analysis.
3.6.1 DFS Path Construction and Analysis Framework
The difference between an accept path and a leakage path merely lies in the analysis
sink definition and the constraint analyzing and filtering rules that can be applied to re-
duce FPs. Thus, both analysis can be supported by a general path construction framework
following a DFS (depth-first search) paradigm based on the path summary. As mentioned
in §3.5.2, each path in a path summary has a constraint path part and a path end point part.
Starting from an entry function, the DFS path construction process analyzes the paths in
the summary, passes the paths to the callee functions if the path end point is a “function
pointer” and continues the DFS process. The process ends when it reaches the analysis
sink defined by an analysis task, and output concatenated inter-procedure paths. Like the
inter-procedure propagation in taint analysis engine, here we need to use the calling context
stored in the “function pointer” and Inst(.) to change the variable context.
Path analysis with implicit flow tracking. In the path construction process, we analyze
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each path in the path summary following the procedure shown in Fig. 3.4. We first check
whether the path end point is the analysis sink or whether it is a “function pointer” that
can call into the analysis sink. If not, this path is unrelated to the analysis task and we
discard this path. After that, the property of the path is checked according to the purpose
of the analysis task. If its property is considered valid for the analysis, it will be further
judged on its importance; otherwise it is discarded. If its property is considered important
and the layered analysis mode is on, the path result will be output. Otherwise, the DFS
process continues to its callee function. The layered analysis mode will be described later
in this section. When reaching the analysis sink, we only output the path if it is considered
important.
The path property is determined by analyzing the variables and variable taints of the
constraints in the constraint path. These constraints are directly related to the analy-
sis, which we call direct constraints. However, besides direct constraints there are also
other important constraints that the analysis sink depends on. For example, in Fig. 3.2,
the sequence number check on line 2 in tcp validate incoming() is one of the
most important checks preventing off-path packet injection, but it is not the constraint
that accept payload() is control dependent on. This dependence is passed through
the return value of tcp validate incoming() to the direct constraint on line 3
in tcp rcv established(). In order to find these indirect constraints, we use
Track(〈v, t〉) in variable taint value set stored in the path summary, and if t includes im-
plicit flow taints, we track its taint path to the indirect constraint that passes these taint
values. Based on our taint tracking design, these indirect constraints can be found in an
inter-procedure fashion.
Layered path construction. To ensure minimum FNs, the path pruning rules in our accept
path and leakage path analysis prefer to be conservative. However, this conservativeness
may lead to more FPs, causing heavy analysis overhead. This problem can be quite serious
for us since our output is program paths and nested constraint can exponentially increase the
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path number. To mitigate this problem, PacketGuardian supports a layered analysis mode,
which is included at the bottom of Fig. 3.4. In this mode, when the path is important, we
stop the DFS process and output the partial results. With these partial results, tool users
can filter out the paths that are not of interest as early as possible, and feed the rest back
to the tool to continue the DFS. As shown in our evaluation later in §3.7, this can largely
reduce both the number of unimportant output paths and the analysis time. To reduce
manual effort, PacketGuardian only stops when the path is considered important as this
indicates that some constraints on the path are tightly related to the analysis but it is hard
to automatically tell whether they are of interest.
3.6.2 Accept Path Analysis
In accept path analysis, the path is constructed and analyzed with attacker-controlled
data and accept functions as input. Attacker-controlled data is usually the function param-
eters related the incoming packet (e.g., skb in Fig. 3.2), and accept functions are functions
that indicate the acceptance of the incoming packet, for example copying data to upper
layers, or terminating the channel. If it is hard to find such functions, PacketGuardian also
supports adding pseudo accept functions to label the analysis sink of interest.
Analysis sink check. In this analysis the analysis sink is a function, so we only consider
the paths with end points of functions in path summary. Also, we only care about end point
functions that are or may call into the accept functions. Thus, before the analysis, we first
create a list of such functions by a DFS crawling process, and then in the analysis sink
check discard the paths without an end point function in the list.
Constraint path property check. In the path analysis, each constraint is determined with
a property of protocol state check, weak check, and strong check. For a constraint ct, we
first check whether it is tainted by attacker-controlled data by looking at Texp, and if not,
it is a comparison related to a protocol state and thus labeled as channel state check. If it
is tainted through explicit flows, we find out which variable v is attacker-controlled using
44
the variable taint set in ct, and use exp to understand the comparison this constraint does
for v. If it is tainted through implicit flows, the important comparison is done in a indirect
constraint and we use the tracking described in §3.6.1 to find it out. We only consider this
constraint to be weak check if (1) except v, all other variables are constants, or (2) this
constraint requires v to be non-equal to non-constant variables. For the former, an attacker
can easily spoof the corresponding packet fields to pass the check, and for the latter, it is
very likely that a random value can pass the check. For all other cases, we conservatively
label the constraint as strong check to avoid FNs.
In the path construction framework, if the path has a strong check constraint, it is con-
sidered important, and otherwise unimportant. A path is considered invalid if it has conflict
constraints, e.g., one constraint requires v to be larger than a value while another one re-
quires it to be smaller. In our tool, we use a simple approach to detect this conflict by
checking whether two constraints are exactly the same but one has br = true and another
has br = false.
Weak path candidate output. After the DFS path construction, all the output paths are
valid accept paths. To reduce analysis effort, by default the path output consists of only
protocol state check and strong check constraints. We include protocol state checks as it
can help understand the channel conditions for an accept path. Note that we filter out the
weak check constraints only in the last step so that the user can also configure the tool to
show all constraints.
Since the goal is to identify the weakest accept path, we also apply path filtering to filter
out stronger paths before the final output. If the constraints of one path is a subset of that
of another path, the latter is stronger and will be filtered out.
3.6.3 Leakage Path Analysis
In this analysis, the information sources are the protocol states the strong accept path
checks depend on, and the sinks are the channels accessible to an off-path attacker. Based
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on our path summary design, our sinks can be a function, a statement, or the paths reach-
ing an important program point. This can support storage channels related to a statement
that changes a global value [215, 250, 174], timing channels related to a statement or pro-
gram path lengths [155, 222], or public events related to a function such as sending a
packet [204].
Leakage detection. The taint summary for the entry function is a summarized variable
tainting relationship, and we can directly tell whether there is possible storage channel
leakage by checking if the storage channel sink variables are tainted through explicit or
implicit flows. This is a convenient way to quickly tell the leakage status, but lacks de-
tailed information for understanding the leakage, especially for implicit information leaks.
Also, it cannot cover channels except storage channels. Thus, we also use the DFS path
construction framework to construct leakage paths in this analysis.
Explicit information leaks are relatively easy to understand and PacketGuardian user
can just use the taint propagation line numbers in the tracking summary to analyze the
leakage. The user can also use the DFS path construction framework to construct the paths
just like the accept path construction in §3.6.2 with a change of the analysis sink. However,
in a protocol implementation the protocol states are usually not directly leaked through
explicit flows to a storage channel – more common leakage is implicit information leaks as
shown in recent vulnerability reports [250, 204].
For implicit information leaks, as discussed in §3.3.2, even though classic ones are
generally considered of less value and commonly excluded in taint analysis tool de-
sign [158, 203, 208, 216], attacker-controlled implicit information leaks proposed by this
work are highly-exploitable according to existing vulnerability reports for practical proto-
col state leakage [250, 204]. Thus, our leakage path analysis targets this special type of
leaks, and a very important benefit of this is that this can largely reduce FPs, which is a
critical problem for implicit flow analysis [221].
In this following part of this section, we describe how to use the DFS path construction
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framework to find leakage paths through attacker-controlled implicit flows.
Analysis sink check. In this analysis, we filter out the paths which cannot reach the leakage
sinks we defined. For storage channels, we can use the taint summary to check this, and
for function sinks and other statement sinks, a DFS process like in the accept path analysis
can be used to label function callees of interest, and discard the path of no interest in the
DFS path construction.
Constraint property check. In the path analysis, each constraint is determined with a
property of unrelated, valid low entropy, invalid low entropy, and high entropy. Since we
target attacker-controlled implicit information leaks, the constraint is of interest only if it
is tainted by both attacker-controlled data and the information sources. If not, it is labeled
as unrelated constraint. If related, we find out the variables tainted by attacker-controlled
data va and those tainted by the information source vs respectively in direct and indirect
constraints. With exp in the constraint we can figure out the comparison it does, and label
the constraint as invalid low entropy if the constraint requires va to be equal to vs, and as
valid low entropy if the requirement for va is to be non-equal to vs. For both cases the
constraint has low entropy, but for the former it is unlikely to pass this check while for the
latter it is very likely. For all other cases, we label the constraint as high entropy.
If the path has an invalid low entropy constraint, it is considered invalid and will be
discarded. Otherwise, if it has a high entropy constraint, it is considered important. For all
other cases it is considered unimportant. Like in accept path analysis, we also check the
constraint conflicts and discard the paths with conflicts. For this analysis, layered analysis
mode can be very helpful since it is usually hard to judge the entropy automatically. For
example, in the illustrative example the receive and send window ranges are depending
on dynamic protocol states and protocol design, making automatic judgement difficult.
As shown in our evaluation in §3.7, with tool users filtering out paths with invalid low
entropy constraints which are labeled conservatively as high entropy ones, finding practical
vulnerabilities can be much more efficient.
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Leakage path candidate output. Each leak is categorized by the high entropy constraints
and the leakage sink, and by default PacketGuardian does not present unrelated and valid
low entropy constraints to the user. PacketGuardian users can also configure the tool to
output all constraints for more details. For an output path to break the non-inference prop-
erty [206] and cause leakage, the same sink cannot be triggered for both true and false
branches of a high-entropy constraint under all conditions. To check this, for a leakage
path p1 we first find all paths, say p2, sharing the same sink with p1 but takes the opposite
branch in the high-entropy constraint cthigh in p1. Then, we check whether all constraints in
p2 excluding ct
high are a subset of all other constraints in p1. If so, p1 is considered invalid
and won’t be included in the output.
3.7 Evaluation
Following the design, we implemented the taint-based summarizer and vulnerability
analyzer in OCaml with roughly 15K and 2.8K lines of code respectively. In this section,
we evaluate the tool’s effectiveness, accuracy, efficiency by applying it to 6 real network
protocol implementations, covering 4 different network protocols. All experiments are run
on a desktop computer with a 2.60GHz 8-core Intel Xeon CPU and 128 GB memory.
Code bases. The first code base we target is TCP in Linux kernel version 3.15.8, and we
denote it as TCP-Kernel. Different from previous work which reported vulnerabilities in
TCP code base by manual inspection [251], our tool performs automated analysis, and out-
puts not only all existing ones but also 11 new highly-exploitable ones. Besides TCP, we
also choose two other famous protocols in the Linux kernel, SCTP and DCCP, denoted as
SCTP-Kernel and DCCP-Kernel. Both of them are transport layer protocols providing reli-
able message delivery like TCP but having distinct features to support other communication
requirements.
Besides transport protocols, we also analyze an application layer protocol, RTP, which
is one of the most popular protocol for delivering audio and video over IP networks. We
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Code base Analysis entry function Func #
TCP-Kernel tcp rcv established() 1730
RTP-oRTP rtp process incoming packet() 141
RTP-PJSIP on rx rtp() 67
RTP-VLC rtp queue() 22
SCTP-Kernel sctp sf eat data 6 2() 290
sctp sf do 9 1 abort() 277
DCCP-Kernel dccp rcv established() 359
Table 3.3: Statistics for the 6 code bases in our evaluation.
Tool w/o features TP # FP # FN # Low-entropy #
w/o field 4 501 0 27
w/o implicit flow 0 N/A 4 N/A
w/o pointer analysis 0 N/A 4 N/A
w/o layered 4 0 0 1336
w/ all above 4 0 0 (base line) 14
Table 3.4: Evaluation of accumulative improvement using rcv nxt leakage in TCP-Kernel.
pick 3 different popular libraries, oRTP 0.24.1, PJSIP 2.4, and VLC 2.2.0, all of which
implement RTP. In the following sections, we denote them as RTP-oRTP, RTP-PJSIP, and
RTP-VLC.
For all 6 cases, the analysis chooses the function handling incoming packets as the entry,
which are listed in Table 3.3. The last column shows the number of functions reachable
from the entry point, showing the complexity of the code bases.
3.7.1 Tool Effectiveness and Accuracy
Table 3.5 summarizes the vulnerability and accuracy result for all 6 code bases. Column
2 describes the type of accept path defined in the analysis task, which in our experiments
we consider 2 types: data and close, which means the analysis sink is to feed data to upper
layers and to close the channel respectively. We call them inject-payload and close-channel
accept paths in this section. Column 4–6 show the number of output paths, true positive
(TP) number and false positive (FP) number. Here the ground truth is the feasible paths
among all accept paths before pruning, and since our design is conservative in path pruning
and filtering, we do not have any false negative (FN) cases for all 6 code bases. Column
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Weak path output Pkt # Pkt # needed Protocol states
Code base Type Path Path TP FP needed for for injection that the strong
# w/o # # # injection w/ protocol checks rely on
prune state leakage
rcv nxt,
TCP-Kernel Data 64 9 9 0 ( 2
32
win1
× 2
32
win2
)* (32 + 32) snd nxt,
snd una
Close 40 1 1 0 232 32 rcv nxt
RTP-oRTP Data 21 15 10 5 51 * N/A N/A
RTP-PJSIP Data 1 1 1 0 3 N/A N/A
RTP-VLC Data 32 8 4 4 232 * 232 ssrc
my vtag,
Data 12 5 4 1 232 × 2
32
rem win
232 + 2
32
rem win
base tsn,
SCTP-Kernel cumulative
tsn ack point
Close 5 2 2 0 231 231 my vtag,
peer vtag
Data, dccps gsr,
DCCP-Kernel Close 2 1 1 0 2
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seqno win
2
48
seqno win
dccps swh,
dccps swl
Table 3.5: Summary of vulnerability analysis results. Number labeled with “*” indicates
that it can be smaller under special channel conditions. win1 and win2 is usually between
214 to 220, rem win is less than 4096 by default, and seqno win is 100 during default
initialization.
3 shows the path number without the path pruning described in §3.6.2. As shown, our
pruning reduces 42.6% output paths on average without introducing FNs. Since this output
will be analyzed by an analyst, this pruning greatly reduces human efforts.
Column 7 shows the worst case number of packets needed for one injection after the
accept path analysis, which is Npkt defined earlier in §3.3. As shown, the Npkt for 3 Linux
kernel code bases is at least 107 for either inject-packet or close-channel cases, which are
unlikely to be exploitable in practice. Their protections solely rely on a few “secret” proto-
col states unknown to the off-path attacker, which are listed in the last column.
In contrast, the 3 code bases for RTP protocol show diverse results. RTP-oRTP and
RTP-PJSIP only need 51 and 3 packets to achieve injection, which are both easy to ex-
ploit in practice. But for RTP-VLC 232 packets are needed, which is rather robust. All 3
code bases claim to follow RTP RFC 3550, but our result indicates that even following the
same design, their packet injection robustness can be very different due to implementation
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differences.
For the code bases that do not have practical vulnerabilities in accept path analysis,
we proceed to the second analysis step — protocol state leakage analysis. The Npkt after
leveraging leakage are shown in the column 8. For TCP, both protocol state rcv nxt
and snd nxt/snd una have high-entropy leakage, and largely degrade the Npkt to only
64 and 32 for inject-payload and close-channel cases respectively. Leakage for snd nxt
and snd nxt/snd una have been reported previously [251] by manual discovery, and it is
noteworthy that the snd nxt/snd una leakage has already been strengthened after Linux
kernel version 3.8 and thus the vulnerability no longer exists. However, using our tool, we
automatically find 4 high-entropy leakage for rcv nxt, including the one reported before
and 3 new ones. We validated all of them through experiments and confirm that they
are indeed exploitable. For snd nxt/snd una, even after the fix, our tool successfully
reports 13 new ones and 7 of them are validated.
For inject-payload case in SCTP-Kernel, a low-entropy leakage of my vtag exists and
also greatly reduces Npkt from 2
32 × 2
32
rem win
to 232 + 2
32
rem win
. However, it is still a large
number and not exploitable in practice. For RTP-VLC, DCCP-Kernel and close-channel
case in SCTP-Kernel, no high-entropy leakage is output and thus their Npkt with leakage
remains the same. In §3.7.3, we provide more details on these results.
We further conduct an experiment to understand the effects of our static analysis en-
hancement. As shown in Table 3.4, we breakdown the accuracy improvement with each
analysis enhancement using the rcv nxt leakage analysis in TCP-kernel. The evaluation
includes TP, FP, FN, and low-entropy leakage, and due to the difficulty of determining
ground truth, we use the result of the tool with all features as baseline to evaluate FN for
other cases. The results show that all static analysis enhancements, especially implicit flow
tainting tracking, are necessary and play an important role.
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3.7.2 Tool Efficiency
Before the taint analysis, the code pre-process is a one-time effort which takes around
8.7 hours for the entire Linux kernel, and only less than a minute for oRTP, PJSIP, and
VLC.
For taint-based summarizer, since summarizing the entire Linux kernel is infeasible, we
limit the scope of TCP-Kernel, SCTP-Kernel, and DCCP-Kernel to the net folder under
the self-contained Linux kernel networking subsystem. TCP-kernel takes the longest time
of 7.8 hours, which we believe is acceptable considering that the computed summary can
be reused later for further analysis. In addition, the time can further improved by analyzing
functions in parallel as shown in Saturn [280], which is another advantage of our choice of
summary-based approach.
With the function summaries, the accept path and protocol state leakage path analysis
are very efficient, and perform these analysis on all code bases is less than 10 seconds.
Note that this efficiency also benefits a lot from our layered analysis mode, for example,
for rcv nxt leakage analysis in TCP-Kernel, it takes 984.5 seconds in total if not using
layered analysis mode.
3.7.3 Result analysis
In this section, we detail the vulnerability analysis results summarized in Table 3.5.
Due to the space limit we cannot provide code-level details for all results, and for more
details about the experiment setup and vulnerability results, please visit our result website
http://tinyurl.com/PacketInjectionVulnerability [7].
3.7.3.1 TCP-Kernel
Accept path analysis. Our tool outputs 9 inject-payload accept paths which are all TPs.
6 out of them are in TCP fast path processing. The conditions for entering fast path is
shown in Fig. 3.5. On line 1, to match the prediction flag it requires the receiver’s exact
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Code base Protocol state Output Validated Hard to FP # Low-
# # trigger # entropy #
TCP-Kernel rcv nxt 18 4 0 0 14
snd nxt/una 65 7 6 9 43
SCTP-Kernel base tsn, cumulative 3 N/A N/A 0 3
tsn ack point
DCCP-Kernel dccps gsr/swh/swl 5 N/A N/A 1 4
Table 3.6: Protocol state leakage analysis result. Ssrc for RTP-VLC and my/peer vtag for
SCTP-Kernel is not included since our tool does not output any high-entropy leakage for
them.
send window size, which is possible to achieve in some cases, e.g., when TCP connection
is idle. The hard requirement of falling into fast path is that the sequence number, seq,
needs to equal to the protocol state rcv nxt on line 2. The other 3 output paths are on the
slow path, which correctly implements the latest standard specified in RFC 5961 to defend
against off-path attacks. In short, they all require the seq to fall in the receive window,
and ack to fall into another window like shown in Fig. 3.2. Thus, their Npkt is roughly
232
win1
× 2
32
win2
.
For channel-close case, our tool outputs 1 path due to the effectiveness of our pruning
and it is a TP. This path resets the TCP connection in tcp validata incoming(), and
requires seq to be equal to rcv nxt. Thus, itsNpkt is 2
32. Note this an update as specified
in RFC 5961 from the previous TCP implementation where a TCP RST is accepted as long
as the seq falls in the receive window. This change significantly increases the blind in-
window RST attacks.
Protocol state leakage. Both inject-payload and close-channel accept paths are pro-
tected by protocol state rcv nxt, so we first use this as the leakage source in our leak-
age path analysis. In our experiments, we use network statistics output in netstat,
snmp and sockstat in /proc/net/ as storage channel leakage sinks. To find
the variables that are output to these sinks for taint analysis, we perform static anal-
ysis in file net/ipv4/proc.c starting from proc create(), locate the proc file
function operation registration and find the target variables in the output function, e.g.,
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1: If ((tcp_flag_word(th) & TCP_HP_HITS) == tp->pred_flags &&
2:  TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt &&
3:  !after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq, tp->snd_nxt) {
...
4: }
Figure 3.5: Code snippet for conditions of entering TCP fast path.
netstat seq show() for netstat. With these sink variables, we first check taint
summary for the entry function, and find that these variables are tainted only by rcv nxt
through implicit flow. Then we use these tainted variables as leakage sinks in the leakage
path analysis.
The leakage results are summarized in Table 3.6. For rcv nxt our tool outputs 18
leakage candidates, and 4 of them are high-entropy TPs. 14 of them are low-entropy leak-
age, which are mostly pruned out by layered analysis. Note that since falling into fast
path requires seq equaling to rcv nxt, all fast path related leakage are filtered out au-
tomatically as invalid low-entropy leakage. Among the 4 TPs, one of them is reported by
previous work [251] by manual discovery. The other 3 are all new discovery, and one uses
the same high-entropy constraint in tcp send dupack() as the one reported, but has
a newly-discovered sink TCPDSACKOldSent in netstat. For the other 2, the attacker
packet also makes the code calling into tcp send dupack() but with different calling
context by deliberately failing the PAWS check, e.g., by using an old time stamp, before
the seq check (line 2 in Fig. 3.2).
After knowing rcv nxt, the attacker can successfully reset the connection and causing
DoS. However, to injection payload, the attacker still lacks the knowledge of snd nxt or
snd una to pass the ack check. We then run another leakage path analysis with these
two values together as leakage sources. Like rcv nxt, the sink variables are only tainted
by implicit flow. In this setting, we assume that the attacker already knows the correct
rcv nxt using the leaks discovered above. For leakage sinks, we use the same ones as
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Figure 3.6: Leakage of snd nxt through sink TCPChallengeACK.
those in the rcv nxt analysis.
Since at this time the exact rcv nxt is known, the attacker’s packet can exploit leak-
age vulnerabilities in more program paths including both fast path and slow path area. Our
tool outputs 66 leakage candidates for snd una, and 43 of them are low-entropy leakage
which are filtered during layered analysis. Among the 9 FPs, 3 cases are caused by re-
quiring packet length to be smaller than data offset field or having an incorrect checksum
value, but actually such packets are dropped in tcp v4 rcv() before entering our en-
try function tcp rcv established(). Other 4 FP cases requires a fast path protocol
state tcp header len to be greater than 4, but in the implementation it can only be 0
or 4. The last 2 cases are caused by conflicting constraints across procedures, which can
be solved by applying more advanced constraint solver such as a SMT solver [185], which
we leave as future improvement. The 13 TPs are all new discovery, and 8 are in fast path
while 5 are in slow path. All the 8 fast path ones use the comparison between snd nxt
and ack one line 3 in Fig. 3.5, and after this comparison, there are 8 different sinks in
tcp rcv established(), tcp send ack(), etc.
The 5 leaks in slow path both goes into tcp ack(), and the high-entropy constraint
they use is on line 1 and 2 in tcp ack() of Fig. 3.2. As shown in Fig. 3.6, probability of
reaching the return on line 3 is 2
31
−win2
232
, which leaks around 1 bit of information under
the assumption that win2 is usually smaller than 220. In the code base, right before the
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return on line 3 there is a tcp send challenge ack(), in which sink TCPChal-
lengeACK is triggered when the challenge ACKs that are already sent is under a thresh-
old set in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp challenge ack limit, which is usually
around 100.
Validation. We setup a TCP connection between desktop computer A and B, and have
another attack computer using raw socket to send attack packets to B to validate these leaks.
Computer B is installed with Linux kernel 3.15.8 and added debug information along the
program path to validate whether the leakage path is triggered exactly as our tool output,
and at the same time monitor the corresponding leakage sinks in A’s proc file system. For
rcv nxt, we validate all 4 high-entropy leakage. For snd nxt/snd una, 7 out of the 13
cases are validated. The other 6 cases are relatively hard to trigger, for example, 5 of them
requires kernel configuration CONFIG NET DMA, which is only available for processors of
certain architecture, e.g., Intel Xscale I/O processors 32/33x.
3.7.3.2 RTP
Since the 3 RTP code bases flow the same network protocol and thus similar to each
other in most of the core logic, we cover their results all together in this section. RTP
usually doesn’t have the option to close the channel with an incoming packet, so our accept
path analysis are all inject-payload accept path analysis.
RTP-oRTP. The output for RTP-oRTP has 15 paths, among which 10 are TPs and 5 are
FPs. The 5 FPs are all caused by two channel variables having the same meaning, one
indicating whether ssrc is set, and another indicating whether the first packet is delivered.
The changing of two variables is usually correlated and thus they have equivalent values,
but our analysis treats them separately, resulting in FP paths with semantically-conflicting
constraints. Among the 10 TP cases, 3 requires guessing the correct 32-bit protocol state
ssrc value, thus Npkt is 2
32. However, another 3 TPs indicate that in its logic by default
after 50 packets with a new ssrc and consecutive sequence numbers, RTP-oRTP will
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1: matched_ssrc = NULL;
2: for (i=0; i<n; i++) {
3:    if (pkt->ssrc == ssrc) {
4   matched_ssrc = ssrc;
5:  break;
6:    }
7: }
8: if (matched_ssrc != NULL) {
9: ...
Figure 3.7: False positive causes for RTP-VLC accept path analysis.
change the ssrc to the new one, making the Npkt reducing to 51. The other 6 TPs are all
under very special channel conditions, for example Npkt can be as low as 1 if the attacker
precisely captures the moment when ssrc is not set yet.
RTP-PJSIP. For RTP-PJSIP, the output only has 1 path and it is a TP. In this path, unlike
RTP-oRTP, it changes its protocol state ssrc right away if it sees a new one, and relies
its robustness solely on the sequence number. According to its logic output by our tool,
2 packets with consecutive sequence numbers will trigger a channel restart, and the 3rd
packet’s payload will be accepted. Thus, Npkt for RTP-PJSIP is 3.
RTP-VLC. The output for RTP-VLC has 8 paths and 4 of them are TPs. The causes of
the 4 FPs are shown in Fig. 3.7. In these paths, it takes both the false branch of i<n on
line 2 and the true branch on line 8, which is actually not feasible. This is mainly because
we construct paths in a flow-sensitive framework and merge the paths from the break
on line 5 and i<n on line 2 when reaching line 8. This can be solved by path-sensitive
analysis which has higher precision but also much higher overhead. For the 4 TPs, 2 of
them requires the correct ssrc, thus their Npkt is 2
32. Like RTP-PJSIP, the other 2 TPs
change ssrc right away, and since RTP-VLC maintains sequence number state separately
for each ssrc, theNpkt is actually 1. However, changing ssrc in RTP-VLC is only when
the channel is configured to support more than one ssrc, and by default RTP-VLC only
supports one. Thus, in normal cases the Npkt is 2
32 for RTP-VLC.
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RTP-VLC protocol state leakage. Among these 3 RTP code bases, only RTP-VLC is
hard to inject in default setting due to the protection from the protocol state ssrc. In the
taint summary of the entry function, 14 variables are tainted by ssrc, all through implicit
flows. To check the leakage possibility, we set all these 14 variables as leakage sinks in the
leakage path analysis but no high-entropy leak is found.
Validation. We build oRTP 0.24.1 and PJSIP in pjproject 2.4, establish audio communica-
tion between computer A and B, and read payload in B from application layer APIs. Since
proc file netstat only shows the local IP address and UDP port for the RTP channel,
the attacker computer sends attack RTP packets to B with correct destination IP address
and port but different source IP address and port from A’s. In the audio data we sent, we
include packet number so that we know which packet’s payload gets in to the upper layer.
We successfully validate that the payload of the 51-st packet for oRTP, and the 3rd packet
for PJSIP gets accepted. We also confirm that for VLC without correct ssrc the injection
cannot succeed.
3.7.3.3 SCTP-Kernel
Accept path analysis. Our tool outputs 5 paths for inject-payload accept path analysis,
and 4 are TPs. One SCTP packet can have multiple chunks, and the 1 FP case is because
it requires previous chunks from the same packet to have ready been accepted, which is
an implementation semantic information that is not known by our tool. One of the TPs
has no special channel condition dependence, and it requires (1) it has the correct 32-bit
protocol state my vtag, and (2) the sequence number tsn falls into a windowwin starting
from a protocol state base tsn, and by default this win is 4096. At the same time, tsn
also needs to be larger than the previously-received tsn, stored in a third protocol state,
cumulative tsn ack point. We denote the valid tsn range as rem win, which is
win excluding the parts before cumulative tsn ack point. Thus, the Npkt is 2
32 ×
232
rem win
. The other 3 TPs all depend on special channel conditions and their Npkt is not
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smaller.
For close-channel case, our tool outputs 2 results and both are TPs. One path handles
error cause code in the incoming packet, and the other handles packets without error cause
code. In both cases, the packet needs to have correct my vtag or peer vtag, which are
both 32 bits. Considering the probability that my vtag equals peer vtag, the Npkt is
231.
Protocol state leakage. The accept paths are protected by my vtag, base tsn, and
cumulative tsn ack point, so we use them as leak sources. For sinks, we also
use storage channel like in TCP-Kernel, and for SCTP we use SNMP statistics in proc
file /proc/net/sctp/snmp. To get the variables in these sinks, we perform the same
static analysis described in §3.7.3.1.
We run the leakage path analysis and find no high-entropy leaks. From the analysis log
we find that all leakage paths start with my vtag check, and thus are low-entropy leaks.
One of them can be used to tell whether the attack packet has the correct my vtag by
looking at sink SctpInPktDiscards. This needs 232 packets in the worst case, but it can still
be helpful to lower the Npkt from 2
32 × 2
32
rem win
to 232 + 2
32
rem win
.
With the knowledge of my vtag, we still needs to have a tsn that can fall into the
window specified by base tsn and cumulative tsn ack point. We use them as
leak sources and find 3 leaks but all are low-entropy ones.
For the close-channel accept paths, the protocol states they rely on are my vtag and
peer vtag. In the taint summary, the sinks are also only tainted by implicit flows, but
our tool outputs no high-entropy leaks for both of the sources.
3.7.3.4 DCCP-Kernel
Accept path analysis. In DCCP, the checks for copying payload and resetting connection
are the same. In this analysis, our tool outputs 1 path and it is a TP. In this path, the
DCCP sequence number seqno needs to fall into a sequence window seqno win around
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a protocol state dccps gsr as long as 48 bits, and the higher and lower bounds of this
window are another two protocol states dccps swh and dccps swl. Thus, the Npkt is
248
seqno win
. Note that the initial size of this seq win is only 100, making it impractical to
inject. In normal cases there should be another check for the DCCP acknowledge sequence
number ackno, but as shown in our analysis output, attacker can send a DATA type DCCP
message without acknowledge sequence number to avoid that check.
Protocol state leakage. We use all 3 protocol states as sources in this analysis. For sinks,
currently DCCP does not create a proc file to store global statistics yet, but it does have a
structure for SNMP statistics like TCP-Kernel and SCTP-Kernel, which has same leakage
potential if enabled in the future. Thus, we use these variables as leakage sinks. Our tool
outputs 5 leaks and 4 of them are TPs. The 1 FP path requires (1) the attack packet is a
SYNC or SYNCACK packet having the right ackno, (2) seqno is larger than dccps swl,
and (3) it fails the seqno win check. However, when (1) and (2) happen, dccps gsr is
updated with seqno and it won’t fail the seqno win check. In our analysis, we can know
that dccps gsr is updated, but cannot be sure that seqno can pass the seqno win check.
The 4 TPs all require seqno to fall into seqno win, and thus are all low-entropy leaks.
3.8 Limitation and Future Work
Possible FNs due to implementation simplification. We design and implement a high
precision data flow analysis with implicit flow tainting and pointer analysis to avoid FNs
as much as possible. However, there may still be cases causing FNs due to simplified
implementation. For example, as described in §3.5.1, we add an iteration limit of loops
to avoid adding recursive fields and this may lead to FN cases if the leakage sinks have
recursive fields.
Failure to identify semantically-conflicting and low-entropy constraints. As discussed
in §3.7.3, the majority of the FPs are caused by conflicting constraints that are tricky to
identify. In the future, we plan to use a SMT solver [185] commonly employed by symbolic
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execution as tool improvement.
Limited scope of storage channel. As described in §3.6.3, our tool is designed with
the capability to cover a range of leakage channels such as storage channels, data timing
channels, and public events like sending packets. However, in our experiments we only use
storage channels in proc file system as leakage sinks, and may miss practical vulnerabilities
leaked through other channels. In the future, we plan to incorporate other sinks in the
leakage path analysis.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, we design and implement an effective and scalable static program anal-
ysis tool, PacketGuardian to systematically analyze the security properties of network pro-
tocol implementations against off-path packet injection attacks. PacketGuardian uses a
context-, flow-, and field-sensitive taint analysis with pointer analysis to achieve high pre-
cision, and also targets attacker-controlled implicit information leaks. The solution signifi-
cantly eases the classic problem of false positives of implicit flow tracking while still yields
high detection accuracy of practical exploits. By applying our tool on 6 real network proto-
col implementations, we are able to discover new and realistic vulnerabilities confirmed by
proof-of-concept attacks for both Linux kernel TCP and 2 out of 3 RTP implementations.
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CHAPTER IV
Discovery and Systematic Analysis of WPAD Name
Collision Attack
4.1 Introduction
Recently, Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks on web browsing have become easier than
they have ever been before — the attacker only needs to register one of certain domain
names, and web traffic of Internet users from all over the world can be automatically redi-
rected to the attacker’s MitM proxy. The underlying vulnerability comes from a problem
called “Name Collision” [245]. Name collisions occur when administrators configure their
internal systems to use names from local/internal namespaces that are also used in other
namespaces (such as the global Domain Name System, DNS), and a collision happens
when a query for a name is resolved in an unexpected namespace.
TheMitM attack focused upon in this chapter is a name collision based attack that arises
from leakage of internal namespace Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) queries. These
WPAD queries are designed to automatically configure proxies for end systems only from
within an administrative domain such as a corporate internal DNS namespace, but only in
two of 13 DNS root servers, roughly 20 million such queries are observed to be leaking to
the public DNS namespace every day. This has been a known problem for years but remains
understudied, mainly because these queries typically use undelegated TLDs as internal Top-
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Level Domains (iTLDs) [194, 147, 84], and thus were not exploitable previously. However,
in the recently-launched New gTLD (generic Top-Level Domains) Program [146], many of
these popular iTLD strings have begun to be delegated and are open for public domain
name registration, allowing attackers to exploit these leaked WPAD queries by setting up
MitM proxies from anywhere on the Internet with only a domain name registration. Note
that this is not a limitation or weakness of new gTLDs per se, but instead a manifestation of
a name configuration problem leading to name collisions which we argue should be fully
mitigated.
To characterize the magnitude of this newly-exposed MitM threat, we perform the first
systematic study of the underlying problem causes and the vulnerability status in the wild.
First, we investigate the fundamental underlying cause of WPAD query leaks from inter-
nal networks. Using a local testbed and traffic analysis, we find that a major cause that
accounts for a significant proportion of the leakage traffic is actually a result of settings
on the end user devices. More specifically, we find that under common settings, devices
can mistakenly generate internal queries when used outside an internal network (e.g., used
at home). From this finding, we identify a set of highly-vulnerable Autonomous Systems
(ASes) with both high volume of leaked WPAD queries and high diversity of vulnerable
query domain names, which is found to be dominated by home access network ASes.
Second, for these highly-vulnerable ASes, we perform a systematic assessment of the
vulnerability status in the wild. Leveraging the insights that most domain names in leaked
WPAD queries are transient and low-volume, we propose that a more useful characteriza-
tion of attack surface should focus on domain names that persistently expose many vic-
tims. We call such domain names highly-vulnerable domains (HVDs), because an adver-
sary could gain more value from operating them. From this definition, we then design an
attack surface quantification method which systematically balances the trade-off between
query persistence and high query volume. This allows us to focus on the most exploitable
domain names. For example, for the delegated new gTLD .network, only 4% of the
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domain names in the leaked WPAD queries match the HVD definition.
By applying our attack surface quantification method to the victim ASes, we find that
almost all of the leaked queries are for new gTLD domain names defined to have high vul-
nerability, which indirectly validates our attack surface definition. If these domain names
are registered by an attacker, she becomes authoritative to answer all the vulnerable queries,
and actual exploits can start at any time. Fortunately, as of September 2015, the registration
of these HVDs just started, and our registration status analysis (detailed in §4.6.2) does not
find statistical evidence showing that these domains are being maliciously targeted for reg-
istration. Nevertheless, we did find seemingly naı¨ve attack registration patterns in the wild,
showing potential attack attempts. These results illustrate real MitM threat for Internet
users in the wild, and provide a strong and urgent message to deploy proactive protection.
To effectively defend against this attack, remediation strategies can be deployed at the
new gTLD registry level to scrutinize the registration of HVDs, and also at the AS level
and end user level to prevent the vulnerable queries from being leaked to the public DNS
namespace. Based on the insights from the problem cause and vulnerability characteriza-
tion, we discuss feasible defense methods for each of these three levels, and use empirical
data analysis to estimate and compare their effectiveness and deployment difficulties.
We summarize the key contributions as follows:
• Targeting the new MitM attack vector exposed by name collisions, we perform
a characterization of the problem and its severity, and an in-depth analysis on the funda-
mental internal namespace WPAD query leakage problem. From the analysis, we are able
to uncover the major leak sources and the underlying device-side causes using both local
testbed and DNS root server traffic analysis.
• We present a candidate definition and quantification method for the attack surface
of this MitM threat, and use it to systematically study the vulnerability status in the wild.
With this, we are able to find a set of highly-vulnerable domains (HVDs) which persistently
expose many victims in the wild. We find that over 97% of the leaked WPAD queries are
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for these HVDs, and at this point, the HVDs for 10% of the new gTLDs have already been
fully registered. These results show a real threat for Internet users in the wild.
• To prevent users from being exploited by this newly-exposed attack vector, based
on the insights in our cause analysis and vulnerability quantification, we discuss a set of
remediation strategies at the new gTLD registry, AS, and end user levels, and use empirical
data analysis to evaluate their effectiveness and deployment challenges.
4.2 The WPAD Service Discovery Protocol
WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery) is a protocol designed for browsers or operating
systems (OSes) to automatically locate a web proxy configuration file. It is primarily used
in internal networks where clients are restricted from communicating to the public HTTP
network, e.g., in some corporate networks. The proxy configuration file is by default named
wpad.dat, which is written in proxy auto-config (PAC) format, and specifies the proxy
IP and port using code PROXY 〈IP〉:〈port〉.
To find the proxy configuration file, WPAD supports two methods: DHCP WPAD and
DNS WPAD. In the implementation, usually DHCP WPAD is attempted first by issuing a
DHCPINFORM message to the local DHCP server. If the local infrastructure supports this
proxy configuration, the PAC file location is included in option 252 in the response.
If no such configuration is found in DHCP, DNS WPAD is performed. Without an
explicit configuration like that in DHCP WPAD, DNS WPAD infers the location of the
proxy file based on the device domain name. For example, in a company’s internal network,
a corporate device can be configured with internal domain company.ntld in the OS.
In DNS WPAD proxy discovery, the proxy file location is inferred from this name and
fetched using HTTP request http://wpad.company.ntld/wpad.dat, involving
a DNS request for wpad.company.ntld. To serve this proxy discovery, a company
can simply set up a web server with wpad.dat under its root directory, and point a DNS
record for wpad.company.ntld in its local DNS zone file to this server. In this process,
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Supported OSes Verified versions Enabled
and browsers for DNS WPAD by default
Internet Explorer 6–11 Yes
Browser Chrome 43 No
Firefox 12, 33 No
Safari 8 No
Windows OS XP, Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 10 Yes
OS Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04 No
Mac OS X 10.10 No
Table 4.1: Popular OSes and browsers that support WPAD.
all the WPAD DNS queries should be served only by the local DNS resolvers, but as we
show later, millions of such queries are leaked to the public DNS namespace every day,
causing the name collision problem.
Browser and OS support. WPAD service discovery can be supported in both OS and
browser levels. The configuration is typically named “Automatically detect setting” in the
LAN proxy setting [145]. Table 4.1 summarizes the popular browsers and OSes supporting
WPAD, along with their versions which we have verified using a local testbed. As shown,
DNS WPAD is supported by all popular browsers and OSes, and some of them even use
it by default, e.g., Windows OSes and Internet Explorer (IE) browsers. Note that for the
browsers and OSes that do not enable it by default, the local network administrator, e.g.,
the IT department in a company, may enable it during the device setup process so that
end devices can use its convenient proxy discovery feature. For the browsers tested in our
experiments, the discovery process starts right after the browser is launched. With a valid
PAC file fetched, all subsequent web traffic is redirected to the configured proxy.
4.3 Threat Model and Attack Surface
In this section, we describe the threat model and attack surface definition of the newly-
exposed MitM attack vector, which we call WPAD name collision attack.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the WPAD name collision attack. If an internal namespace TLD
is delegated as a new gTLD, internal namespace WPAD query leaks can be easily exploited
using MitM attack from anywhere on the Internet.
4.3.1 Threat Model
As introduced in the previous section, the WPAD protocol is designed to only con-
figure proxies for end systems from within an administrative domain such as a corporate
internal DNS namespace. Ideally, for a device belonging to a corporate domain, it performs
discovery to configure a WPAD proxy only inside that domain. While these queries may
have always been vulnerable to DNS spoofing attacks, the adversaries would need to be
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on-path or be able to spoof DNS responses in a narrow attack window. The intended local
scope of queries, the on-path requirement, and the narrow attack window have kept WPAD
deceptively safe.
However, because internal queries leak to the DNS root servers and internal namespaces
now collide with new gTLD domains, which are both happening in large scale today as
characterized later in §4.4.1, the inherent security weaknesses in WPAD are significantly
easier to exploit. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the WPAD name collision attack, in which a malicious
domain registrant can exploit name collisions of leaked WPAD queries, and launch MitM
attacks from anywhere on the Internet. In this attack, victim devices are assumed to be
configured to use DNS WPAD for automatic proxy discovery by issuing WPAD queries in
an internal DNS namespace, e.g., company.ntld. Here, .ntld is assumed to be used
as iTLD but also delegated in the public DNS namespace. Under some common settings
(uncovered in §4.4), such queries are mistakenly leaked out. This allows an attacker to
create name collisions for these queries by registering the domain name company.ntld
in new gTLD .ntld. Thus, the leaked WPAD queries from affected systems, which may
be anywhere on the Internet are sent to the attacker’s authoritative name server and get
resolved to fetch the attacker’s proxy configuration file. This causes all the subsequent web
traffic in the browser or traffic from the entire OS to be redirected to the proxy controlled
by the attacker. The victim user may not even recognize the attack, since the WPAD proxy
discovery is fully automated at the browser launch time, and some OSes and browsers
enable it by default without explicit consent from users (shown in Table 4.1). The attacker
can leverage this MitM position to not only eavesdrop sensitive data such as confidential
documents and user credentials, but also manipulate the traffic to inject malicious code,
launch phishing attacks, or other malicious impacts to vulnerable systems.
In this attack, the adversaries only need to register new gTLD domains to direct po-
tentially vulnerable WPAD queries to them. This means that if a potentially colliding
internal domain is registered, the attacker can detect and respond authoritatively to WPAD
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queries without the need of spoofing. This frees the on-path requirement and elimi-
nates the narrow attack window drawback of previous WPAD attacks. More importantly,
the authoritative nature of the malicious responses makes this attack exploitable despite
DNSSEC [157, 156].
This attack is also very stealthy, since once the domain name is registered, due to pri-
vacy protection it is difficult for both new gTLD registries and third parties to examine
its subdomains for attack attempts. Note that we do not assume that the attacker is fully
aware of the set of the vulnerable domains (i.e., domains with leaked queries), and thus
deliberately exploits them. The attackers can be sophisticated registrants who know some
vulnerable domains based on their own analysis, e.g., by sniffing local network queries or
accessing DNS traffic collected by organizations such as DNS-OARC [120]. Meanwhile,
the registrants can also be innocent at the domain registration time, but realize and start
exploitation after observing a large number of misdirected WPAD queries. Another possi-
bility is that the registrant is completely honest but the DNS servers are compromised by
an attacker to exploit these vulnerable queries.
4.3.2 Attack Surface
In order to characterize the magnitude of this newly-exposed MitM threat, we propose
a candidate methodology to quantify the WPAD attack surface exposed by registrations of
new domain names under new gTLDs. With that, we describe a measure of how exposed
(or open) the total attack surface is based on registration status.
Our threat model focuses on the fact that MitM attacks can be launched against any
client who issues a WPAD query to a domain name that is controlled by an attacker. Thus,
all domain names with leaked queries to the public namespace are vulnerable. However, we
find that most of the domains in the leaked query traffic appears infrequently with low query
volume, implying that they may not be easily exploited in practice. For example, we find
that for the delegated new gTLD .network, 42.3% of the domains with leaked queries
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(e.g., company.ntld in Fig. 4.1) to two of 13 DNS root servers appeared in less than
14 days within a one-year period. Furthermore, less than 4% of these domains account
for more than 98% of all leaked WPAD traffic observed at the two DNS root servers.
Thus, using all the domains with leaked queries as the attack surface is an overestimate
of the actual vulnerability status in practice. Therefore, we define a notion of “highly-
vulnerable domains” based on a more accurate and useful attack surface characterization
method described as follows.
Attack surface: highly-vulnerable domains (HVDs). In this work, we define highly-
vulnerable domains for a new gTLD to be those WPAD query domains persistently expos-
ing a large number of victims. We denote these domains as the attack surface for this new
gTLD. These attack surface domains or HVDs need to have two properties: (1) high persis-
tence, meaning that their queries are leaked to the public namespace frequently over a long
time period, e.g., every day or days with regular periodicity, and (2) high query volume,
indicating that once registered, many victims can be continuously exploited. From this def-
inition, these domains are quantifiably attractive targets for adversaries, and are likely to
keep exposing such vulnerability after the delegation of their TLD strings.
This methodology defines a measurably stable set of highly-vulnerable domain names.
To quantify the attack surface based on this definition, we first concretely define the level of
persistence using period length p and persistence duration n. We then balance the trade-off
between persistence and high query volume by systematically exploring p and n, detailed
later in §4.5.1. This quantification method allows us to estimate the size and composition
of domains that, when registered, constitute the bulk of the WPAD name collision vulner-
abilities.
4.3.3 Dataset
We describe the datasets used in our study as follows.
New gTLD list. We obtain the new gTLD list along with their delegation dates directly
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from ICANN website [151]. In this work, we consider the new gTLDs delegated before
2015/08/25, consisting of 738 new gTLDs in total.
Root NXD WPAD. Due to the usage of non-delegated iTLDs, the leaked internal
namespace queries are captured and replied with NXD by the DNS root servers. Thus,
our vulnerability characterization and attack quantification mainly rely on NXD traffic col-
lected at 2 of the 13 root servers — A root and J root, both managed by Verisign. Both root
servers utilize IP anycasted services from a globally diverse set of locations [101], which
should reduce any significant geographical biases in the data collection. The leaked queries
become unobservable in this dataset after the delegation of their TLD strings. Thus, in the
analysis of each new gTLD, we only use the data collected before its delegation date.
This dataset was collected internally by Verisign for around 2 years, spanning from
September 2013 to July 2015. Since the first new gTLD delegation in the New gTLD
Program occurred in October 2013, this dataset covers leaked query traffic for all the new
gTLDs delegated so far. To study leaked WPAD queries, we extract the query traffic with
query names in the form of wpad.〈domain name〉. Considering that single label do-
mains, e.g., wpad.ntld are more easily defended at the new gTLD registries, in this
dataset we only include WPAD queries with at least 2 labels in 〈domain name〉, e.g.,
wpad.sld.ntld, wpad.3ld.sld.ntld, etc.
New gTLD zone files andWHOIS data. Once a domain is registered, it appears in the
corresponding new gTLD’s zone files. Meanwhile, mapping from registered domains to the
domain registrants are included in the new gTLD’s WHOIS data. To study the registration
status and registration pattern of HVDs in our attack surface, we use new gTLDs’ zone
files from ICANN Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS) [149] and WHOIS data from
BestWhois service [20], which are both pulled daily from 2014/02 to 2015/09.
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Figure 4.2: The most popular first labels in root NXD traffic.
4.4 WPAD Query Leakage Characterization
The WPAD name collision attack stems from the unintentional leakage of internal
WPAD DNS queries into the public DNS namespace. This problem emerged soon after
the popularization of the WPAD protocol [245, 265], however remains understudied since
it was not easily exploitable until the expansion of the new gTLDs.
To systematically characterize this newly-exposed threat and help find effective solu-
tions, we need to first have an in-depth understanding of this fundamental leakage problem.
In this section, we first characterize its severity by quantitative measurements of leaked
WPAD query traffic seen in the DNS root servers, and then elucidate the underlying causes
of these leaks using query traffic analysis and controlled local testbed experiments.
4.4.1 Quantification of Leaked Queries
Fig. 4.2 shows the popular first labels ranked by their average daily query numbers
in NXD traffic at DNS root server A and J from January to July in 2015. In DNS-based
protocols, usually the protocol name is the first label. Thus, in the figure many labels
belong to popular protocols such as WPAD, ISATAP, etc. The first label query number
distribution exhibits a very long tail. As shown, WPAD protocol is ranked top 4 with
more than 20 million leaked queries every day, showing high severity in terms of the query
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Figure 4.3: The most popular delegated new gTLDs observed in root NXDWPAD queries.
leakage problem. Using the number of distinct IP address and WPAD query domain pairs
in our 2-year root NXD WPAD dataset, these queries are estimated to have at least 6.6
million potential victim users in the wild.
For these leakedWPAD queries to be exploitable in our attack, their TLD domains need
to be delegated so that the attacker can register the SLD and create name collisions. We
study the 738 new gTLDs that have already been delegated before 2015/08/25, and find
that 65.7% (485) of them exhibited leaked WPAD queries to the 2 DNS root servers in
our dataset before their delegation, revealing a significant attack surface. In §4.5, we use
a more systematic approach to quantify the attack surface for these delegated new gTLDs
based on the definition in §4.3.2.
To understand the vulnerability exposed by the new gTLDs that have already been
delegated today, we measure the daily query percentage of these delegated new gTLD
strings in the leaked queries using 1 month of root NXD WPAD data immediately prior to
the delegation of the first new gTLD in the New gTLD Program on 2013/10/23. Fig. 4.3
shows the daily query volume and the overall query percentage in root NXDWPAD dataset
for delegated new gTLD strings with leaked queries. As shown, even though the query
percentage is not high, some top ones such as .global already have over 30,000 leaked
WPAD queries every day. In total, 2.3% of the daily leaked WPAD queries, which are over
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238,000 queries per day on average from only 2 DNS root servers, belong to the delegated
new gTLD set. According to our threat model, these queries are already exploitable today.
Note that these are query volumes from just 2 of the 13 DNS root servers. Furthermore,
the number will only increase as more new gTLD strings continue to be delegated (as
of 2016/03/20, 27.2% (201) more new gTLDs have been delegated since this study was
conducted).
4.4.2 Leak Cause Analysis
4.4.2.1 Major Leak Source ASes
To identify the cause, we start by measuring where the leaks originate. We first break
down the leaked WPAD traffic into country level according to their query IP addresses.
Fig. 4.4 shows the country codes ranked by their average daily leak percentage in our root
NXDWPAD dataset from January to July 2015. As shown, U.S. (United States) dominates
the leaked traffic with nearly 70% worldwide, and its share is over 6× more than that of
the country ranked the second. In the following analysis, our focus is mainly on the leaked
query traffic from the U.S.
Within the U.S., we further characterize the query traffic according to ASes. Fig. 4.5
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Figure 4.5: ASes ranked by WPAD query leak percentage in US.
shows the ASes with top average daily WPAD query leaks from January to July, 2015. As
shown, the overall distribution exhibits a long tail, in which nearly 2000 ASes have leaked
queries, but the majority of these queries come from only a few top ASes. The top 12
ASes account for 85% of all the leaks, and their names are listed in Table 4.2. In the table,
we denote these ASes A1 to A12 to obfuscate the actual AS in our data. As shown, 10
out of the 12 ASes are home access network ASes. The remaining two ASes both operate
open (publicly accessible) DNS resolvers, and we find that the queries come predominantly
from source IP addresses within the IP address ranges listed as open DNS resolver servers
on their websites. Thus, both ASes are associated with open resolver usage, which is also
commonly configured by home access network users. These results suggest the major cause
of WPAD query leaks is user behavior at home instead of in corporate networks.
4.4.2.2 Leak Domain Suffixes
To investigate why WPAD queries are leaked from home, we closely examine the do-
mains of leaked WPAD queries in these home access network ASes. Surprisingly, instead
of being dominated by a few popular home device domain names as we expected, we found
that the leaked queries have on average more than 10,000 different domain suffixes in these
12 ASes. For example, home access network AS A1 originated WPAD queries with more
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AS code name Home access network related
A1 Yes
A2 Yes
A3 Yes
A4 Likely
A5 Yes
A6 Yes
A7 Likely
A8 Yes
A9 Yes
A10 Yes
A11 Yes
A12 Yes
Table 4.2: AS code names (used in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6) of the top 12 WPAD query leak
ASes in the U.S., accounting for 85% of total leak queries. We anonymize the AS names
for privacy consideration.
Domain suffix Query Home network Corporate network
string % related related
〈defense contractor〉 0.28 No Unclear
.master.
corp.local. 0.26 No Yes
〈marketing〉.local. 0.22 No Yes
root.local. 0.21 Unclear Unclear
〈manufacture〉.inc. 0.15 No Yes
〈town name〉.local. 0.14 No Yes
prod.dca. 0.13 No Yes
〈consulting〉.local. 0.13 No Yes
us.local. 0.13 Unclear Unclear
〈real estate〉.local. 0.12 No Yes
〈computer〉.lan. 0.11 No Yes
〈bank〉.ubc. 0.11 No Yes
datacenters.ww. 0.11 No Yes
〈marketing〉.intraxa. 0.10 No Yes
root.corp. 0.09 No Yes
Table 4.3: Top domain suffixes of the leaked WPAD queries in home access network AS
A1. For privacy consideration, we anonymize some company or institution names with
their business types in brackets.
than 70,000 different domain suffixes, with the most popular one accounting only for 0.28%
of all leaked queries. Moreover, we manually classify the top domain suffixes and find that
they are almost all corporate internal network suffixes instead of home device domains.
Table 4.3 lists the top 15 leaked query domain suffixes from A1. As before, we obfuscate
the details of the domain names for discretion. As shown, none are domains for home
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Figure 4.6: ASes ranked by their domain suffix entropy scores. Home access networks with
top leak query volume (Table 4.2) are also high-entropy ASes. A13 is the only exception
that did not appear in the top 12 WPAD query leak ASes.
devices such as routers. Based on the labels, e.g., “corp”, “inc”, 12 of them are related to
corporate internal networks that are unlikely to be hosted in home networks. This suggests
that a potential cause of WPAD query leaks can be attributed to individuals using corporate
devices on their home networks.
To further validate this cause, we measure the average daily domain query entropy of
each leak source AS. The intuition is that home access networks with end-user machines
using different internal network domain suffixes should have higher entropy due to the
suffix diversity. In this analysis, we measure the daily query domain suffix entropy using
equation entropy(ASi) = −
∑
suf∈S psuf ln psuf , where S is the set of distinct 2-level
domain suffixes (e.g., company.ntld in Fig. 4.1) appearing in AS ASi in a day, and
psuf is the query percentage of 2-level domain suffix suf ∈ S.
Fig. 4.6 shows the leak source ASes ranked by their average daily domain suffix entropy
scores from January to July, 2015. As shown, the home access network ASes with top leak
query volume are also high-entropy ASes. Moreover, the top 12 high leak volume ASes
are all ranked top 15 in entropy scores out of over 2000 ASes in total, which supports
our hypothesis. Thus, the major cause of the WPAD leaks is very likely using devices
configured with internal domain names outside of internal networks, e.g., using corporate
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laptops at home.
4.4.2.3 Device-side Causes
From this cause, the major problem is on the device side: why does a corporate device
still issue corporate internal WPAD queries when the device is actually not in the corporate
network? In fact, with the support of DHCP, a device should be able to automatically
update domain suffixes when the network changes. To find out the causes, we set up a local
testbed to perform controlled experiments.
Experiment setup. We use VirtualBox to launch a virtual machine running different
testing OSes on a host machine using NAT (Network Address Translation) configuration.
In our experiments, we choose Mac OS X, Ubuntu 12.04, Windows XP, Vista, 7, 8, 8.1,
and 10 as testing OSes.
The host machine can be connected to 3 different network environments. Two of them
have 2 different domain suffixes configured in DHCP, which are automatically propagated
to the host. The third environment does not have a domain suffix, which is created using
the tethering feature of a smartphone on a cellular network. In our experiment, we switch
the network of the host machine among the 3 environments to simulate network condition
changes on the testing OSes, e.g., from corporate to home network.
Results. As summarized in Table 4.4, we find several common OS settings under which
internal query leaks can happen even with automatic domain configuration from DHCP.
The first case is setting the domain of a computer, which can be found in the control panel
of Windows OSes. This configuration is recommended for businesses and schools, since
it can remotely manage laptops they provide to their employees and students with their
domain controller over VPN or Internet connection [148]. However, we find that once this
is set, the OS keeps this domain name regardless of the DHCP domain configuration, and
thus still issues internal WPAD queries even after the network has already changed.
The second case is about domain search list configuration, which can be accessed in the
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OS configuration Affected OSes
Set Windows PC domain Windows XP/Vista/7/8/8.1/10
Hardcode domain search list Windows XP/Vista/7/8/8.1/10,
Mac OS X, Ubuntu 12.04
Change from a network with Windows Vista
domain to a network without domain
Table 4.4: Common OS configurations that can cause a device to mistakenly issue internal
queries when the device is used outside internal network.
network setting panels of all OSes we tested. When a queried name is not considered fully-
qualified [239], e.g., a dotless single label like wpad, the OS appends the domains in this
search list one by one until obtaining a valid response. This search list can enable the OS
to support both home network and corporate network by including both of their network
domain suffixes. But if the corporate network domain suffixes are listed first, internal
queries are tried first and thus leaked when outside the internal network. This cause has
been discussed before in the web browsing context [186]; in contrast, in our experiment we
study it for the WPAD proxy discovery process.
The third case is specific to Windows Vista, where we find that the domain is not unset
when changing from a network with a configured domain to a network without a configured
domain. This is likely a specific implementation flaw in Windows Vista, as all other OSes
quickly change the domain setting to an empty string under the same condition. Due to this
problem, corporate computers with Windows Vista leak internal queries when connected
to a network without a configured domain, which can happen both at home and at public
networks such as a cafe´.
These results show that there exist common configurations in popular OSes that can
mistakenly issue internal WPAD queries when the device is used outside corporate net-
works, causing internal query leaks. Note that these experiments are not intended to be
exhaustive in finding all possible device-side causes, which is a rather difficult task. In fact,
these identified causes might just be the tip of the iceberg, and merely patching them may
only fix a small portion of the problem.
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4.4.3 Result Summary and Highly-vulnerable ASes
Concluding from the characterization results above, we find that millions of vulnerable
queries are leaked from internal networks every day, and the cause for the majority of the
leaks is on the device side. Under common OS configurations, devices with popular OSes
mistakenly keep internal domains even outside internal networks, and thus issue internal
namespace WPAD queries. Once these queries are issued outside an internal network, the
DNS resolvers have no idea where the local name servers are for these internal domains.
Thus, they end up querying the DNS servers in the public namespace.
From our analysis above, we are also able to find 10 ASes with both highest query
leak volume and query domain suffix entropy score in the U.S. as shown in Fig. 4.5 and
Fig. 4.6. These ASes account for 81.2% of total WPAD query leaks in the U.S., and at the
same time expose the largest variety of different victims. Thus, we consider them as the
most vulnerable leak sources in our study. In the following sections, we will focus on these
10 ASes, especially the one with highest query leak volume, A1, to perform systematic
assessment of the vulnerability status in the wild.
4.5 Attack Surface Quantification
Shown in the previous section, a large number of vulnerable WPAD queries are found
in the public DNS namespace, many of which are already exploitable today. In this section
we propose a candidate attack surface quantification method derived from the definition
in §4.3.2, and evaluate its effectiveness.
4.5.1 Quantification Method
As defined in §4.3.2, the attack surface for a new gTLD is highly-vulnerable SLDs
with two properties: (1) high persistence, and (2) high query volume. Because “high”
query volume is a relative measure, we use query ratio, qr, as the metric for the high query
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volume property. For an SLD set S under a new gTLD ntld, we represent query ratio as
qrntld(S) =
∑
sld∈S Qsld.ntld
Qntld
, where Qsld.ntld and Qntld are the number of leaked queries with
domain sld.ntld, and with new gTLD ntld respectively.
To find highly-vulnerable domains, our method is to first identify domains with high
persistence. This is because a domain can be exploited as long as it is queried again for
WPAD proxy discovery after domain registration. To quantify the level of persistence for
a domain sldi.ntld, we use period length p and persistence duration n to identify domains
with leaked WPAD queries to the DNS root server in every p-day period for at least n
days until the delegation of ntld. High persistence is reflected by a small p and large n,
e.g., the domain has leaked queries every day for at least 1 year before the delegation of
ntld. We use this as evidence indicating that the leakage may likely occur with some degree
of frequency even after the delegation because of high persistence.
For a new gTLD ntld, given a certain p and n, we can find a set of SLDs under ntld,
Sp,n, that meet this level of persistence in root WPAD NXD dataset, with a corresponding
average query ratio value qrntld(S
p,n) =
∑D
i=1 qr
i
ntld
(Sp,n)
D
. Here, D = ⌊n
p
⌋ is the number of
p-day periods during which WPAD query leaks with domains in Sp,n are observed, which
we call persistence period. In this equation, qrintld(S
p,n) is the query ratio for the i-th
period.
To meet the high query ratio property, we need to find the set Sp,n with the highest
qrntld(S
p,n) under a satisfiable persistence level defined by p and n. This is non-trivial as
there are trade-offs between the choices of p, n and the query ratio value. For the period
length, the smaller, the more persistent, but with a small p we may lose high query ratio
domains with longer appearing periods. And for the persistence duration, the larger, the
more persistent, but with a large n we may lose some recent high query ratio domains.
Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 show examples of these trade-offs using 6 delegated new gTLD
strings with the highest leaked query percentage (according to Fig. 4.3). As shown, when
p increases, the increase of query ratio slows down, and when n increases, the decrease of
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Figure 4.7: Relationship of attack surface query ratio and period length p.
query ratio starts to drop more sharply. Thus, to balance the trade off, for a period length
p, we stop increasing it to avoid sacrificing the persistence level, once the increase rate of
qr reaches a limit, thrp, indicating that we have already included enough high query ratio
domains. For the persistence duration n, we also set such a limit, thrn, and stop increasing
persistence level once the decrease rate of qr exceeds this limit, indicating more sacrifice
in the high query ratio property.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of our quantification method. For p, our method
first tries p = 1, and then tries multiples of 7 days considering the weekly pattern of DNS
queries, i.e., p = 7(j − 1) where j = 2, 3, .... This process stops when △qrntld(S
p,n) is
less than thrp, or ⌊
n
p
⌋ is less than 2, which reaches the point of no periodicity. For n, our
method tries multiples of 91 days, i.e., N = 91i where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., until △qrntld(S
p,n)
is larger than thresn, or the n is so large that it exhausts our 2-year dataset. We choose 91
days because it is roughly 3 months, which is considered the least persistence duration in
this work to avoid short-term domain query phenomena.
4.5.2 Evaluation
We implemented our attack surface quantification method, and applied to the 10 highly-
vulnerable ASes using the root NXDWPAD dataset. In this section we use A1 as an exam-
ple to show our results, because it was the top AS in both query leak volume and domain
suffix entropy score, and the findings below also apply to the other 9 highly-vulnerable
82
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500A
tta
ck
 s
ur
fa
ce
 q
ue
ry
 ra
tio
 (%
)
Persistence duration n (days)
.global
.ads
.group
.network
.dev
.office
Figure 4.8: Relationship of attack surface query ratio and persistence duration n. Since the
6 new gTLDs have different delegation dates, the data range for the curves are different.
ASes.
In total, A1 presented queries in 255 out of the 738 new gTLDs delegated as of
2015/08/25. Among them, 19 new gTLDs only have leaked query data for 1 day, which
are not enough to conclude their attack surface according to our definition of persistence.
For the remaining 236 new gTLDs, our method is able to find attack surface domains for
204 (86.4%) of them, which are the ones accounting for 99.99% of total new gTLDWPAD
query leaks in this AS.
Fig. 4.9 shows CDF of attack surface query ratio qrntld, for the 204 new gTLDs in
TLD percentage and leaked WPAD query traffic percentage. As shown, for 185 (90.7%)
of them, the attack surface query ratio qr output by our method are over 92.1%. These 185
new gTLDs account for 98.4% of total new gTLD WPAD query leaks in A1, showing that
we are able to find domains meeting high query ratio property for new gTLDs that expose
most vulnerabilities in a victim AS.
We also evaluate how well the attack surface output by our method can meet the high
persistence property. As shown in Fig. 4.10, for 148 (72.5%) out of the 204 new gTLDs,
which account for 98.8% of total new gTLD WPAD query leaks in this AS, their attack
surface domains have periodical appearance for more than 4 periods (D >= 4). Thus,
our method is also able to find domains meeting high persistence property for new gTLDs
exposing most vulnerabilities.
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Algorithm 1 Attack surface quantification method
Require: Qntld (the set of daily leaked WPAD query domains for new gTLD ntld in a
victim AS), thrp, thrn
Ensure: Attack surface domain set S for new gTLD ntld
1: ni = 91i, where i = 1, 2, 3, ...
2: p1 = 1
3: pj = 7(j − 1), where j = 2, 3, 4, ...
4: for i = 1.2, 3, ... do
5: for j = 1, 2, 3, ... do
6: Find domain set Spj ,ni from Qntld
7: dPqr = qrntld(S
pj ,ni)− qrntld(S
pj−1,ni)
8: if dPqr 6 thrp or ⌊
ni
pj+1
⌋ < 2 then
9: break
10: end if
11: end for
12: qi = qrntld(S
pj ,ni)
13: dNqr = qi−1 − qi
14: if dNqr > thrn or ni+1 > |Qntld| then
15: break
16: end if
17: end forreturn Spj ,ni
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Figure 4.9: CDF of attack surface query ratio in TLD percentage and TLD leaked WPAD
query traffic percentage.
4.6 Attack Surface and Exploit Status Characterization
With attack surface successfully computed, in this section we characterize their proper-
ties in the victim ASes, and also study their registration and exploit status in the wild.
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Figure 4.10: CDF of attack surface period number in TLD percentage and TLD leaked
WPAD query traffic percentage.
AS code Attack surface domain characterization
name Domain Domain Distinct # of TLDs have Distinct # of SLD strings
# query % TLD # only 1 SLD SLD # unique to 1 TLD
A1 1185 97.4 204 109 (53.4%) 1122 1080 (96.3%)
A2 486 97.0 122 75 (61.5%) 463 447 (96.5%)
A3 747 97.7 154 91 (59.1%) 714 694 (91.2%)
A4 3621 96.2 331 130 (39.3%) 3324 3145 (94.6%)
A5 704 96.1 146 80 (54.8%) 673 653 (97.0%)
A6 701 97.2 144 75 (52.1%) 668 646 (96.7%)
A7 1751 95.7 230 117 (50.9%) 1633 1566 (95.9%)
A8 457 97.6 113 74 (65.1%) 439 426 (97.0%)
A10 254 96.8 73 42 (57.5%) 235 224 (95.3%)
A12 255 95.5 70 44 (62.9%) 239 227 (95.0%)
Union 8918 97.0 406 92 (22.7%) 7966 7447 (93.5%)
Intersection 90 58.2 33 21 (63.6%) 80 73 (91.3%)
Table 4.5: Attack surface domain characteristics (as of 2015/09/26).
AS code Registration status (as of 2015/09/26)
name Reg. # # of TLDs w/ reg. # of TLDs w/ full reg.
A1 129 (10.9%) 56 (27.5%) 18 (8.8%)
A2 49 (10.1%) 28 (23.0%) 10 (8.2%)
A3 68 (9.1%) 34 (22.1%) 16 (10.4%)
A4 284 (7.8%) 79 (23.9%) 8 (2.4%)
A5 67 (9.5%) 35 (24.0%) 15 (10.3%)
A6 66 (9.4%) 31 (21.5%) 9 (6.3%)
A7 123 (7.0%) 55 (23.9%) 17 (7.4%)
A8 43 (9.4%) 27 (23.9%) 12 (10.7%)
A10 28 (11.0%) 17 (23.3%) 8 (11.0%)
A12 33 (12.9%) 19 (27.1%) 14 (20.0%)
Union 589 (6.6%) 123 (30.3%) 16 (3.9%)
Intersection 14 (15.6%) 9 (27.3%) 7 (21.2%)
Table 4.6: Attack surface domain registration status (as of 2015/09/26).
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4.6.1 Attack Surface Characterization
Finding 1. Among the 10 top vulnerable victim ASes, ASes operating open re-
solvers expose the largest attack surfaces. Column 2, 4, and 6 in Table 4.5 show the
number of attack surface domains, distinct attack surface TLDs and SLDs for the 10 highly-
vulnerable ASes discussed in §4.4. As shown, A4 and A7, which both run open resolvers
as discussed in §4.4.2.1, have significantly more attack surface domains, TLDs and SLDs
than other victim ASes, even though their leaked WPAD query traffic is much less than
some home access network ASes such as A1. This is likely because these popular open
resolvers are used in all kinds of network environments and the exposed suffixes are more
diverse compared to a single home access network AS (also shown in Fig. 4.6). This sug-
gests that ASes running popular open resolvers should be the first priority for deploying
AS-level defense.
Finding 2. In victim ASes, large fractions of leaked WPAD queries are for new
gTLD domains defined to have high vulnerability (using our attack surface defini-
tion). Column 3 of Table 4.5 lists the percentage of leaked WPAD queries for the attack
surface domains during their persistence periods in the 10 highly-vulnerable victim ASes.
As shown, for all of these ASes, on average 96.7% of the leaked queries are in the HVDs,
showing a high ratio of exploitability in the wild if these domains are registered.
Finding 3. For most of the new gTLDs, only very few SLDs are highly vulnerable.
Fig. 4.11 shows the attack surface size distribution for new gTLDs with leaked queries from
A1. In the figure, even though some new gTLDs can have very large attack surface, e.g.,
over 250 for .office, 184 (90.2%) of the 204 new gTLDs have fewer than 10 domains in
their attack surface. This uneven distribution also holds for other highly-vulnerable victim
ASes. As shown in column 5 of Table 4.5, for 9 of the 10 ASes, more than half of the
new gTLDs only have one domain in their attack surface. This indicates that for most new
gTLD strings, the attack surface size is actually very small, and thus only a few domains
need to be treated more carefully in registration.
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Figure 4.12: Breakdown of new gTLDs in the leftover part in cross AS attack surface
comparison.
Finding 4. Most SLD strings only appear in one new gTLD’s attack surface. We
then measure the popular SLD strings shown across the new gTLD attack surface in A1.
From the result, the 5 most popular SLD strings are us, corp, local, home, and net,
which are mostly generic ones. Out of the 204 distinct new gTLD string in A1, we find
that the most popular SLD string, .us, is only shared by 7 new gTLDs’ attack surface. As
shown in column 7 of Table 4.5, for all the 10 highly-vulnerable victim ASes, more than
90% SLD strings only appear in one new gTLD’s attack surface in the victim AS. This
suggests that if applying SLD reservation as a defense strategy, each new gTLD registry
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needs to identify its own SLD reservation list based on its WPAD query traffic patterns.
Finding 5. A large portion of the attack surface domains are victim AS unique.
As shown in Table 4.5, 8918 domains across 406 new gTLDs are in the union set of the
attack surface of the 10 highly-vulnerable victim ASes, but only 90 (1%) of these domains
are in the intersection set. Thus, very few attack surface domains are in common among
different victim ASes. Moreover, 3689 (41.4%) of these domains are included in only 1
AS’s attack surface. These results indicate that most attack surface domains are actually
victim AS unique.
To understand why large numbers of domains are AS unique, we pick 3 home access
network ASes in the highly-vulnerable AS set, and pair-wisely compare their attack surface
domains. More specifically, for comparison between AS Ax’s attack surface, SAx , and AS
Ay’s attack surface, SAy , we study the leaked query traffic in Ay for domains in SAx − SAy
and also leaked query traffic in Ax for domains in SAy − SAx. We classify the reason
why these domains are not left out in the other AS’s attack surface into 4 categories: No
data, No recent data, Lack periodicity, Borderline. Category No data means that none of
the domains’ leaked queries are observed in the other AS in our 2-year root NXD WPAD
dataset, and No recent data means none of such queries are observed in one month before
the delegation of the corresponding new gTLDs. Category Lack periodicity means that the
domain’s queries appear in less than 50% of the days in 3 months before the delegation
of the corresponding new gTLDs, which indicates that they are left out due to low persis-
tence according to our attack surface definition. Category Borderline means that we could
include them in the other AS’s attack surface, but we left them out due to the balancing of
persistence level and query ratio as discussed in §4.5.1.
The breakdown analysis result of the AS-unique attack surface domains is shown in
Fig. 4.12. In the figure, we find that more than 80% of these domains are left out because
they have no leaked queries for at least a month before the delegation of the corresponding
new gTLDs, which can thus hardly be eligible to be considered as highly vulnerable ac-
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Figure 4.14: Linear fitting results for the estimation time for a new gTLD to have all attack
surface domains fully-registered.
cording to our attack surface definition. For the other 20% domains, almost all of them lack
periodicity, and only at most 3% of the domains are left out due to the balancing process in
our quantification method. Thus, each victim AS indeed has a large portion of HVDs that
are unique to it. This suggests that to deploy effective defense at the AS level, each victim
AS, especially those highly-vulnerable ones, should customize its own domain filtering list.
4.6.2 Registration Status
Once these HVDs are registered, the actual exploitation can start at any time. Next, we
use new gTLD zone files and WHOIS data to characterize the current registration status of
these HVDs.
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Registrant # of total # of registered 〈legacyTLD〉.
email registered domains 〈new gTLD〉 domains
〈email1〉 19 19 (100%)
〈email2〉 7 7 (100%)
〈email3〉 2 2 (100%)
〈email4〉 16 10 (62.5%)
〈email5〉 19 9 (47.4%)
〈email6〉 7 3 (42.9%)
Table 4.7: Registration ratio of legacy gTLD string for some registrants, showing potential
blind attack attempts. The email addresses are anonymized for privacy reason.
Finding 6. While for some new gTLDs their highly-vulnerable domains have al-
ready been fully registered, the overall registration status is still in the early stage.
Table 4.6 include statistics of the registered HVDs as of 2015/09/26 for the 10 highly-
vulnerable victim ASes, along with the intersection and union sets. As shown, all 10 victim
ASes have some of these HVDs registered, but the registration percentages are in the range
of 7% to 13%, which is not high. On the TLD level, approximately 22% to 28% of new
gTLDs with attack surface in a victim AS have at least 1 attack surface domain already
registered. For most victim ASes, around 10% of them have already had all of their attack
surface domains registered, indicating that their attack windows are fully open. Recall that
once an HVD is registered, the management of the underlying zones is delegated from the
new gTLD registries to the domain registrants, and thus the WPAD name collision attack
can be set up at any time outside of the new gTLD registries’ control. Fortunately, our
results show that even though some new gTLDs’ attack surface domains in victim ASes
have already been fully-registered, the overall registration has just started, and most HVDs
are still under new gTLD registries’ control.
Finding 7. For majority of the new gTLDs that have not been fully registered yet,
the attack window is opening quickly. Besides a current snapshot of the vulnerability
status, we also analyze the registration trend of these highly-vulnerable domains. In this
analysis, we choose the top vulnerable AS, A1, and estimate how fast the attack surface
domains for a new gTLD in this AS will be fully-registered. For most new gTLDs, we find
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that generally the total domain registration numbers increase linearly with time after a big
increase at the beginning. Thus, we use a basic linear model to fit the attack surface domain
registration trend for a new gTLD, and enumerate different starting dates until the average
absolute error of the computed registered attack surface domain number is less than 0.5.
Using this method, we estimate the full registration time for the 38 new gTLDs in A1
which have at least one HVD registered (so that the analysis has input) but still not yet fully
registered. Among these 38 new gTLDs, 2 new gTLDs’ HVD registration numbers do not
change in our zone file data set, and thus our method cannot perform linear fitting for them.
For the other 36 new gTLDs, our method is able to find a linear curve with less than 0.5
average absolute error for the registered HVD number. In the fitting, 89.4% (272.1 days)
of the available zone file data for a new gTLD are used on average. Fig. 4.14 shows the
estimation results for these 36 new gTLDs. In the figure, 33% of them are likely to be fully
registered in 1 year, and this percentage increases to 60% in 2 years. This is just a rough
estimation, but does indicate that even though currently most of the new gTLDs’ attack
surface domains are not yet fully-registered, their attack surface is being registered quickly,
suggesting that immediate precautions need to be applied to prevent these vulnerabilities
from further expansion.
Finding 8. We did not find strong evidence of adversaries actively registering at-
tack surface domains, but do observe potential blind attack registrations. Given that
many of these highly-vulnerable domains have been registered, we next analyze whether
some registrants are aware of these highly-vulnerable domains and thus deliberately reg-
ister them for the WPAD name collision attacks. In this analysis, we also choose the top
vulnerable AS, A1. For each new gTLD in this AS, we use 2 time series data each day: the
registered number of attack surface domains, and the registered number of other domains
shown in root NXD WPAD data for a new gTLD before delegation. For new gTLDs with
some of their attack surface domains registered, we compute the Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient, and find an average correlation score of 0.76, showing a very strong
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correlation. This means that it is just as likely to register attack surface domains as other do-
mains appearing in the root NXDWPAD data, suggesting that there are no strong evidence
of adversaries actively registering these HVDs.
However, interestingly, we observed registrations that may be used for malicious pur-
poses, such as name collision attacks. More specifically, we find that there are a number of
registrants specifically targeting the registration of legacy TLD strings, e.g., com, net, etc.
as SLDs, under new gTLDs. In this analysis, we refer to the strings of TLDs delegated be-
fore the new gTLD program as legacy TLD strings, which include gTLDs such as .com
and country-code TLDs such as .uk. We obtain legacy TLD string list by comparing the
TLD list on IANA’s root zone database webpage [150], and the new gTLD list on ICANN’s
website [151]. Using the new gTLDWHOIS dataset, we identify a list of registrants having
a very high registration ratio of legacy TLD strings under new gTLDs, which is shown in
Table 4.7. For example, one registrant with email 〈email1〉1 has registered 19 domains
as of 2015/09/26, which all contain com, edu, gov, and org as SLD strings among over
10 new gTLDs. In our new gTLD WHOIS dataset, only less than 20% of the registrants
(identified by email addresses) registered more than 1 domain. Among the 20%, majority
of them use corporate email addresses, and the registration targets are usually product re-
lated domains, e.g., a registrant with a company email registered 351 domains with a SLD
that is the name of their product. The registration behavior in Table 4.7 are very unlikely
for brand protection, since (1) they used individual email addresses, and (2) they targeted
legacy TLD strings instead of product names, which in combination make such behavior
suspicious. One likely reason is that these registrants are trying to exploit one of the ear-
liest reported name collision vulnerability due to an old BIND resolver bug [199]. These
results suggest that potential adversaries do exist who are fully aware of the name collision
vulnerability. Fortunately at this point, they probably just have not found an effective way
of identifying highly-vulnerable domains.
1We anonymize the email addresses of the registrants for privacy considerations.
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4.6.3 Exploit Status
For the registered HVDs, we are also wondering whether the domain registrants have al-
ready started exploiting the vulnerability by serving a valid MitM proxy. Since the domain
registrants have full control of the zone after the registration, it is not possible for a 3rd party
like us to get an accurate list of subdomains under these HVDs. In our experiment, we use
the list of query names in previous WPAD queries to these domains before the delegation
of their TLDs as a guess of potential attack subdomains. For each WPAD domain query
name qname in the list, we issue request using wget http://qname/wpad.dat and
check whether we can get a valid proxy configuration file. Note that even with this list,
this experiment can still have false negatives since our probing queries can be intentionally
filtered by attackers for only targeted attacks (i.e., only resolve the queries from certain AS,
IP, etc.) in order to prevent external detection.
We perform such probing several times for all the domains in the union set of the 10 vic-
tim ASes’ attack surface domains, but are not able to find valid proxy files. This indicates
that the registrants of the highly-vulnerable domains may not realize this attack vector yet,
implying that now would be a good time to start deploying remediation strategies, which is
discussed in the next section.
4.7 Remediation Strategy Discussion
Considering that the overall vulnerability registration and exploitation are still in the
early stage, it presents an opportunity to proactively mitigate this attack. In this section,
we discuss the potential remediation strategies by 3 different parties involved in the DNS
ecosystem: new gTLD registries, victim ASes, and end users.
Table 4.8 summarizes the results for the estimated effectiveness and deployment diffi-
culties for these remediation strategies. In contrast to the previous sections, which focused
on the 10 highly-vulnerable ASes in the U.S., here we consider estimations based on the
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Level Remediation strategy Effectiveness Deploy #
New gTLD Scrutinize the registration of the union 97.4% 494
registry set of highly-vulnerable domains
Filter the intersection set of 36.4%
highly-vulnerable domains
Victim AS Filter AS-specific 97.4% 11305
highly-vulnerable domains
Filter responses w/ public IP Not evaluated
Disable WPAD service (if not used in Not evaluated
End user internal networks) > 6.6
Update OS, no hardcoding ∼100.0% million
Filter device-level leaks (in theory)
Table 4.8: Effectiveness and deploy number estimation for remediation strategy at new
gTLD registry, victim AS, and end user levels. “Not evaluated” means that we cannot
evaluate its effectiveness using current dataset.
attack surface quantification using all ASes with leaked WPAD queries in our 2-year root
WPAD NXD dataset. This allows us to present more accurate global vulnerability reduc-
tion percentages and deployment numbers.
New gTLD registry level remediation. To reduce the chance of an attack, the
new gTLD registries, especially the ones we find to have large attack surface (shown in
Fig. 4.11), need to ensure that these HVDs are not registered, or treat them more carefully
and propose policies to scrutinize their registrations. A naı¨ve approach is to reserve the
registrations of all domains seen in NXD traffic. However, according to the experience of
deploying the block list in ICANN’s Alternate Path to Delegation (APD) [68], merely using
2 days of root NXD data for 3 years, each new gTLD registry needs to block 7449.3 do-
mains on average, and 7 new gTLDs need to block over 100,000 domains. Preventing such
a large number of them from being registered, especially those popular ones, is in conflict
with the original goal of providing more registration choices, and also hurts new gTLD
registries’ revenue model. ICANN now changes the policy to allowing their registrations
after a 90-day “controlled interruption” period instead of blocking them forever [67].
According to our attack surface characterization, for most of the new gTLDs, relatively
few SLD are highly vulnerable to the WPAD name collision attack and need scrutinized
registration. For example, for .network, 96% of its domains in NXD traffic have very
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Figure 4.15: Protected leaked WPAD query percentage CDF for partial deployment of new
gTLD registry level defense. The figure inset lists the top 18 new gTLDs which can protect
80% of total leaked queries if the defense is deployed.
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Figure 4.16: Filtered leaked WPAD query percentage CDF for partial deployment of AS
level defense. The figure inset shows the CDF for the top 524 ASes.
low volume and/or low persistence of WPAD queries. This is why a general-purpose block
list is counterproductive, as opposed to per-SLD and per-TLD analysis performed in this
work. Thus, the attack surface defined and quantified in this work offers a cost-effective
way of deploying new gTLD registry level domain registration scrutinization. With the
attack surface quantification results for all victim ASes, we take the union of the attack
surface domains, and find that in total 494 new gTLDs among the 738 ones delegated
before 2015/08/25 have HVDs. If all of them have registration scrutinization, 97.4% of the
95
global leaked WPAD queries in our dataset can be protected. Consistent with our findings
in §4.6, most of the new gTLDs have only very few HVDs which need protection – among
the 494 new gTLDs, 302 (61.3%) of them have less than 10 HVDs. Thus, for majority of
new gTLD registries, this defense can be deployed with very little sacrifice of the business
revenue while still being highly effective.
Considering that having all 494 new gTLD registries agreeing on the deployment may
be difficult in practice, we also evaluate the effectiveness of a partial deployment. In this
analysis, we rank the 494 new gTLDs by the protected leaked WPAD query percentages
if they deploy scrutinized registration of HVDs, and the CDF is shown in Fig. 4.15. As
shown, deployment at only the top 18 (3.6%) new gTLDs can already protect 80% of the
leaked WPAD query globally. Thus, in the deployment, a more feasible and also very
effective strategy is to start with the most important 20–40 new gTLDs.
Victim AS level remediation. As shown in §4.4, majority of the leaked WPAD queries
come from a few home access network ASes. In addition to new gTLD registry level de-
fense, another direction is to prevent their leaks at the victim AS level. Each victim AS can
distribute a black list of vulnerable domains to their DNS resolvers, and filter the queries
to these domains before sending them to the public namespace. To create such a list for all
ASes, one quick approach is to find the common vulnerable domains using the intersection
set of the attack surface domains for the victim ASes. We estimate the effectiveness of this
approach using the HVD intersection set for 10 highly-vulnerable ASes, which contains 90
domains as shown in Table 4.5. We find that if all ASes adopt this black list, approximately
36.4% of the leaked WPAD queries globally in our 2-year dataset can be filtered. Thus,
even though the creation of the black list is convenient without AS-specific customizations,
this approach has limited effectiveness, mainly because many HVDs are AS-specific as
characterized in §4.6.
To increase the effectiveness, each victim AS should customize its black lists based on
their own query traffic patterns. This can be enabled by DNS traffic monitoring and filtering
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in the recently-proposed name collision risk management framework [217]. One candidate
approach to create such list is to use the attack surface quantification method proposed
in §4.5 based on NXD query data, which can be obtained either by collecting DNS queries
on their own, or collaborating with DNS root server operators. The deployment locations
are the ASes with HVDs, including 11,305 ASes globally according to our quantification
results. If every AS deploys this, it is capable of filtering 97.4% of the leaked WPAD
queries globally in our dataset. Compared to the new gTLD registry level defense, this
approach can achieve the same level of high effectiveness, but may have higher deploy-
ment challenges due to significantly more deployment locations. Thus, we also evaluate
partial deployment strategy, shown in Fig. 4.16. In this figure, the X-axis is the 11,305
victim ASes ranked by their leaked WPAD query percentages. As shown, deploying at
the top 143 (1.2%) ASes can effectively filter more than 80% of the leaked queries. Thus,
similar to new gTLD registry level defense, it is not entirely necessary to cover all 11,305
victim ASes, and targeting the top 1–5% ASes can already achieve a relatively high level
of effectiveness.
Victim AS level filtering can also be IP based. In the WPAD discovery process, the
leaked WPAD queries are intended to get internal proxy server IP addresses, while in the
WPAD name collision attack the attacker needs to return public proxy IP addresses. Thus,
victim AS resolvers can prevent the attack by filtering the DNS responses with public IP
addresses. The effectiveness of this approach cannot be evaluated using our root NXD
dataset, which is left as future work.
End user level remediation. As shown in §4.4, the major cause of the WPAD query
leaks is using devices with internal domains outside of the internal network. Thus, to
fundamentally solve this problem, this unintended client-side behavior needs to be fixed. If
WPAD proxy discovery service is not actually used in the internal network, we suggest that
the local network administrator, e.g., the IT department in a company, disable this feature
in the supported browsers and OSes (Table 4.1) during corporate device setup process. To
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more efficiently enforce this policy without the need of enumerating the configurations
of all installed browsers or other related software, the administrator can change OS-level
domain name mapping files such as /etc/hosts to map all permutations of WPAD
URLs within the internal namespace to 127.0.0.1. In this work, the effectiveness of
this approach is not evaluated since it is difficult to measure the amount of leaked WPAD
queries belonging to local networks that do not use WPAD service internally.
For the corporate devices depending on WPAD for internal network proxy discovery,
the WPAD feature in OSes and browsers still needs to be enabled. To prevent WPAD query
leaks for these devices, leveraging our insights of the device-side causes found in §4.4,
companies or other entities with internal domains need to stop hardcoding the internal
domain search list on their devices. If Windows OS is used, they need to stop setting
the Windows PC domain, and also upgrade their OSes. As we mentioned before, these
causes may just be the tip of the iceberg, and there might exist plenty of other causes under
different conditions. Moreover, considering the large variety of software on the device, new
causes, for example domain hardcoding behavior in certain applications, can be created at
any point in the future. Thus, these are only short-term solutions and not future proof.
As a long-term solution, we propose to design an OS-level daemon which can filter
queries based on the network environment. This daemon is a background process which
intercepts DNS queries issued by all applications on the device, and can correctly tell and
filter queries with domains not belonging to current network environment. In order to
distinguish unintended queries, it tracks the network environment at each network status
change, and stores a list of intended domains suffixes for each network environment, either
by learning from DHCP configuration messages, or directly being configured by the user.
To realize this approach, there are still some design challenges, for example how to accu-
rately tell network environments apart when they use same IP address prefixes, which we
leave as future work.
For the short-term and long-term device-side solution above, in theory they can fun-
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damentally solve the problem; thus, we consider its maximum effectiveness as 100% in
Table 4.8. However, the downside is that it is extremely difficult to reach and apply these
solutions to all end user devices, which is estimated to have at least 6.6 million deploy-
ment points using the number of distinct 〈IP, sld.tld〉 pairs in our 2-year root NXDWPAD
dataset, where IP is the resolver IP sendingWPAD queries, and sld.tld is theWPAD query
domain. This is only a lower bound estimation as there might be more than one user device
with domain sld.tld behind a resolver, but it is already at least 2 orders of magnitude larger
than the new gTLD registry and victim AS level defenses described above.
To help facilitate the deployment process, OSes and browsers can displaying warning
messages when detecting potential name collision risks. For example, if the issued WPAD
query is leaked to the public namespace, the response will include a special IP address,
127.0.53.53, during the 90-day “controlled interruption” period [67]. Browsers and
OSes can thus leverage this to display risk warnings and recommend the users to consult
their IT department immediately to resolve the problem. Note that the 90-day “controlled
interruption” period [67] was ineffective to mitigate such issue since the victim machines
automatically perform the vulnerable operations even without user awareness [265]. With
more support from OS and browser sides, end users can be better notified of the imminent
threat to help with the mitigation progress.
To summarize, no single defense approach discussed here can easily solve the problem.
To maximize the chance of preventing the attack in practice, the best choice would be
using these approaches jointly. Considering the serious and disseminated nature of this
vulnerability as shown in this work, actions need to be taken as soon as possible.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we perform a systematic study of the underlying problem cause and the
vulnerability status for WPAD name collision attack in the new gTLD era. We first char-
acterize the severity of the problem, and uncover that the major cause of the fundamental
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leakage problem is very likely devices used in their non-intended network, such as work
laptops at home. Then, using a candidate attack surface definition and a quantification
method, we systematically assess the vulnerability of the attack in the wild. We find that
even though some attack surface domains have already been registered, the overall registra-
tion and exploitation status are still in the early stage, indicating that proactive protection
strategies are still feasible. Based on these insights, we discuss remediation strategies at
the new gTLD registry, AS, and end user levels, and estimate their effectiveness and de-
ployment difficulties. Our work demonstrates the importance of addressing known security
vulnerabilities, which might become more exploitable as assumptions change. This work
also serves as the first in-depth study of one type of name collision problem in the new
gTLD era, hopefully inspiring other follow-up studies.
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CHAPTER V
Systematic Analysis and Detection of Client-side Name
Collision Vulnerability
5.1 Introduction
With the unprecendented delegation of new generic top-level domains (gTLDs) since
late 2013, increasing amounts of leaked internal domain name system (DNS) namespace
queries are now resolvable in the public DNS namespace [245]. This has exacerbated a
long existing problem, which has been lying fallow, called name collisions, in which a
DNS query is resolved in an unintended namespace [245, 69]. One concrete exploit of
such problem was recently annouced (US-CERT alert TA16-144A), which specifically tar-
gets the leaked WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery) service discovery queries [172, 127].
In this attack, the attacker simply needs to register a domain that already receives vulner-
able internal WPAD query leaks. Since WPAD queries are designed for discovering and
automatically configuring web proxy services, exploiting these leaks allows the attacker
to set up Man in the Middle (MitM) proxies on end-user devices from anywhere on the
Internet.
The cornerstone of this attack exploits the leaked service discovery queries from the
internal network services using DNS-based service discovery. With over 600 services reg-
istered to support DNS-based service discovery [65], the name collision problem seems
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likely to be much broader than the WPAD service alone. However, previous work primar-
ily focus on analyzing and preventing name collisions at the new gTLD registry and the
network levels [69, 172, 217, 245], little attention has been paid to understand the vulner-
ability status and the defense solution space at the service level. Since services are the
direct victims of name collision attacks, it is necessary to provide service-level solutions
so that they can proactively protect themselves. More importantly, since the underlying
cause is the domain name resolution in an unintended namespace, compared to defenses at
other levels, only the service clients, the actual issuers of the exploited queries, know the
intended namespace and thus have the chance to fundamentally solve the problem.
In this chapter, we perform the first systematic study of the robustness of the service
client design and implementations under the name collision attack threat model for internal
network services using DNS-based service discovery. Our goal is to systematically iden-
tify client-side name collision vulnerability in the client software, which causes the client to
mistakenly accept the identity of a name collision attack server. Our results are expected to
serve as a guideline for understanding whether and why a certain client software is vulner-
able, as well as providing insights on how to mitigate against this emerging class of attacks.
To perform the study, we first measure the services that are exposed to potential name col-
lisions today by analyzing the leaked queries to the delegated new gTLDs. Based on the
measurement, we form an exposed service dataset with 80 services with high volumes of
service discovery query leaks. Compared to the recent study on the WPAD service [172],
our study for the first time uncovers the wide spectrum of services affected by the name
collision problem and the potential security implications.
With the set of exposed services, we manually collect their client software, with prioriti-
zation for services with higher query leak volumes and clients that are more popular among
corporate or end users. In total, we are able to collect 57 client implementations covering
48 exposed services. To systematically perform vulnerability analysis, we develop a dy-
namic analysis framework capable of analyzing the clients in a simulated name collision
102
attack environment. The analysis is performed by constructing attack server responses, and
a vulnerability is revealed if the client accepts the responses and proceeds with the designed
service functionality.
From the vulnerability analysis, our results reveal that nearly all (45) of these 48 ser-
vices have popular clients vulnerable due to several common software design or imple-
mentation choices. We find that the lack of server authentications, which is also exhibited
in the WPAD exploit, is the root cause for one third of these vulnerable services. For
the remaining two thirds, their clients do use standard server authentications by default,
leveraging TLS certificates or pre-shared keys (PSK). However, nearly all clients using
TLS certificates are found vulnerable due to the default choice of accepting publicly-valid
but previously-unseen certificates from a colliding domain. For the clients using PSK,
we find that majority (88.1%) of them are vulnerable since they do not enforce server
authentication. We also find a common vulnerable design choice specific to a previously
uncovered but popular use of DNS-based service discovery, Zero-configuration networking
(Zeroconf) [22], which mixes the service discovery in different namespaces. These results
show that even with standard server authentication adopted, the name collision attack threat
model still broadly breaks common security assumption in today’s internal network service
clients. We find that one fundamental cause is the lack of namespace differentiation in
the current service discovery and server authentication methods. This problem is newly
introduced by the name collision problem and it leaves the clients incapable of handling
potential name collisions.
To demonstrate the severity of the discovered vulnerabilities, we construct exploits in
our analysis framework and report our findings on a number of new name collision attacks.
These attacks are able to induce exploitation to a wide range of popular internal network
services, including MitM attacks on the Windows tunneling service, malicious library in-
jection on the Ruby library discovery service, document leakage on the macOS printer
discovery service, credential theft on the remote connection services in macOS Terminal,
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and phishing attacks on the VoIP service in Linphone and the contacts and calendar ser-
vices in macOS and iOS. Through these case studies, we demonstrate the high end-to-end
exploitability of the identified vulnerabilities in practice.
With increasingly more new gTLDs being delegated, such widespread vulnerabilities in
the exposed service clients become more critical than ever and require immediate attention
and remediation. Based on the insights from our study, we propose a series of service
client software design guidelines, e.g., proposals to enable namespace differentiation in the
existing service discovery and server authentication methods. Our proposals complement
the previously-proposed DNS ecosystem level solutions [172, 217] and enable the victim
services to actively defend against name collision attacks.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We generalize the WPAD name collision attack to a new class of attacks on the
broad set of internal network services using DNS-based service discovery. We perform the
first measurement on the exposed services today and characterize their designed function-
ality and the potential security implications.
• We collect the client implementations for the exposed services and systematically
analyze their vulnerability status under name collision attacks leveraging a dynamic anal-
ysis framework. Our results show that nearly all the exposed services have popular clients
vulnerable due to several common design choices. This suggests that the name collision at-
tack threat model broadly breaks common security assumptions made in the service clients
today.
• Based on the analysis results, we construct exploits and report our findings of a
myriad of new name collision attacks with severe security implications, including MitM
attack, malicious library injection, credential theft, etc. These findings show high end-to-
end exploitability of identified vulnerabilities in practice.
• We identify several fundamental vulnerability causes, including a cause newly in-
troduced by the name collision problem, the lack of namespace differentiation. Based on
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the insights, we propose a set of service software level solutions, which enables the victim
services to actively defend against name collision attacks.
5.2 Client-side Name Collision Vulnerability
In this section, we describe a generalized name collision attack threat model and the
vulnerability definition.
5.2.1 Threat Model
As characterized in §4.4, internal DNS namespace queries are observed to be leaked
into the public namespace. Among them, as we later characterize in §5.3, are a broad set
of internal DNS-based service discovery queries. With the vast expansion of the public
namespace via the New gTLD Program, many iTLDs are now delegated and these leaked
service discovery, intended only for a internal administrative domain, are now resolvable
in the public namespace.
In this work, we consider the attacker to control delegated new gTLD domains with
internal query leaks, or name collision domains, and provide malicious responses to exploit
these leaks. Such attacker may be (1) sophisticated registrants who become aware of name
collision domains by analyzing local DNS traffic or DNS traffic from OSINT (open-source
intelligence) sources such as DNS-OARC [120], (2) registrants not specifically targeting
name collision attacks at the domain registration time, but realize and start exploitation after
observing the leaked queries, or (3) miscreants who compromise the DNS servers of the
name collision domains, e.g., leveraging software vulnerabilities, to perform exploitation.
Fig. 5.1 illustrates the concept of a generalized name collision attack. Due to the name
collision problem, the leaked service discovery queries from a victim service client first
reach the attacker’s DNS servers. Based on the service name specified in the queries
(§2.2.3), the attacker’s DNS server points the client to an attacker-controlled server for
the service in request. In this step, the attacker controls the domain and thus can provide
105
Victim device using a
name collision domain
comp.ntld
Attacker-controlled 
authoritative DNS 
server
Attack server for the 
service svc
Publicly valid 
DNSSEC keys
Publicly valid 
TLS certificates
The public DNS namespace
Figure 5.1: The generalized name collision attack threat model.
authoritative responses signed by publicly valid Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) keys. Such discovery process may involve multiple rounds of DNS queries de-
pending on the usage scenario of the service protocol, which is characterized later in §5.4.
After the service discovery step, the service client initiates a connection to the attack
server. In this step, the client mistakenly accepts the identity of the attack server and pro-
ceeds with the intended service functionality. Since the intended server is typically located
in an internal network, we do not assume the attacker is capable of relaying the client re-
quests to the intended internal server and perform MitM attacks. Instead, the attacker’s
goal is to only leverage the server position to induce security breaches. Even though the
attacker is not performing a MitM attack on the sevice discovery process, the attacker may
still be able to exploit the server position to ultimately perform a MitM attack on the end
device as demonstrated by the WPAD name collision attack [172].
To perform the attack, we assume that the attacker can use any resource available in the
public namespace. An important example of such resource is a valid TLS certificate for the
attack server, which can be obtained freely in a few minutes from authorities such as Let’s
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Encrypt [75]. Compared to the threat model in the WPAD name collision attack, which
only considers one service discovery usage scenario with no modern server authentication
components, the threat model here considers a more general form of a name collision attack
that applies to a much broader set of internal network services using DNS-based service
discovery.
Compared to previous attacks on internal network services, which typically have tight
requirements of both the attack placement and timing, name collision attacks are much
more severe due to several unique properties. The first is the ease in which they can be
launched. Internal network attacks typically require an attack device in the victim’s inter-
nal network, but name collision attacks only require the registration of certain vulnerable
domains. Second, they are of larger scale in terms of victim sources. Compared to the
limited internal scope of internal network attacks, name collision attacks affect all leaked
queries within the same colliding domain from potential victims all over the world. Third,
they are also more powerful, since the attacker can use a number of valid identities in the
public namespace, e.g., DNSSEC keys and TLS certificates, that are typically not available
for internal network attackers. This class of attacks is also stealthy, since after the do-
main registration, it is difficult for third parties to further check the subdomains for attack
attempts due to privacy consideration [207].
5.2.2 Vulnerability Definition
Under the threat model above, we define a vulnerable internal network service with two
properties:
(1) Service query exposure. For a service software to be vulnerable, it needs to (1)
use DNS-based service discovery, and (2) have the discovery queries being leaked to the
public namespace. In §5.3, we use the leaked query traffic collected at the DNS root servers
to measure the services with query leaks, which we call are exposed to the name collision
problem. In this work, the query leakage volumes are used to quantify the degree of such
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exposure.
(2) Client-side name collision vulnerability. With service query exposure, the ser-
vice client software needs to have vulnerable design or implementations that accept the
identity of the attack server from the discovery. In this work, if these vulnerable design
or implementations, alone or in combination, cause the client software to pass all server
authentication logic if implemented, and reach the execution point of starting the intended
service functionality with the attack server, we call the client software to have a client-side
name collision vulnerability. Since in our threat model the attackers cannot access the le-
gitimate internal server to obtain the right proof of identity, the client should be able to tell
the attack server apart. However, our vulnerability analysis results indicate that the server
authentication logic in today’s service clients is generally not robust enough to correctly
handle name collision attacks. Later in §5.4, we detail the analysis results and findings.
5.3 Exposed Service Characterization
In this section, we measure the exposed internal network services (defined in §5.2.2),
and characterize their functionality.
5.3.1 Methodology
Leaked query dataset. We perform the leaked DNS query measurement using query
traffic collected at DNS root servers in the DNS-OARC Day In The Life of the Internet
(DITL) project [8]. The DITL project has collected DNS traffic from participating DNS
root servers for 48 hours annually since 2006, which delivers the largest scale simultaneous
DNS traffic collection from the global DNS infrastructure [168]. Considering that the
dataset has multi-year collections but each collection is limited to two days, our analysis is
performed at the granularity of days and aims at identifying the most frequently requested
services observed during the collection.
Our analysis uses the 2011 to 2016 query traffic data, which are collected at 10 to 11
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Exposed service Exposed service Potential security
functionality name implications
Proxy/tunnel config. wpad① (N), isatap② (N), MitM attack
proxy② (N)
Time config. ntp③ Time shifting attack
Software activation vlmcs② (N) DoS
Directory service ns*① (N), alt*① (N), Server spoofing,
(help a client locate lb① (N), db① (N), dns-sd①, service info. leakage
a server of the dr① (N), tracker② (N),
requested service) dns-llq⑤, dns-update⑤
Web service www*① (N), api① (N), Web-based phishing
static① (N), cf① (N), attack, malicious script
share① (N), http②, https③ execution
Server config. retrieval stun④ Config. info. spoofing
Multimedia file access ptp③, dpap④ Phishing attack
Authentication service kerberos① DoS
Coding library retrieval rubygems⑤ Malicious code injection
Database service gc① (N), ldap①, carddav④, Phishing attack,
(organization data, ldaps④, caldav④, caldavs④, organization data
calendar, contacts, etc.) carddavs④ leakage
Remote access to afs3-vlserver④, adisk④, Phishing attack,
computers/file systems smb④, afpovertcp④, ftp④, info. leakage
sftp-ssh④, rfb④, webdav⑤,
odisk⑤, eppc⑤, telnet⑤
System kpasswd②, airport③, System config. info
management servermgr⑤ leakage
Mail autodiscover① (N), Email spoofing, phishing
outlook① (N), mail*① (N),
pop3②, smtp②
VoIP sipinternaltls① (N), sip① Call spoofing, phishing
sipinternal① (N),
sipexternal① (N), sips③
Messaging xmpp-server③, xmpp-client③ Msg. spoofing, phishing
Printer printer③, pdl-datastream③, Internal/personal
riousbprint③, ipp③ document leakage
Scanner/camera scanner③, ica-networking⑤ Phishing attack
Distributed computing xgrid④ Malicious code execution
System monitoring syslog⑤ Organization info. leakage
Table 5.1: Functionality characterization of the exposed internal network services and the
potential security implications. Circled numbers are the ranges of the average daily query
leak volumes: ① > 100,000, ② 10,000 – 100,000, ③ 1,000 – 10,000, ④ 100 – 1,000, ⑤
10 – 100. N denotes non-registered service. Documentations for individual services are in
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
out of the total 13 root servers each year. To estimate the total global leakage volume to
all root servers, the query volumes in our results are calibrated by multiplying the average
volumes per root server by 13.
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Service name Service description and documentation
wpad (N) Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) protocol,
used by web clients to locate web proxies [198]
isatap (N) Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP),
used by dual-stack (IPv6/IPv4) clients to automatically tunnel
IPv6 packets in IPv4 networks [98]
proxy (N) Popular first label for a web proxy server [139]
vlmcs (N) Microsoft Key Management Services (KMS), used by
Microsoft clients to automatically activate volume license
editions of Microsoft Windows and Office [79]
ntp Network Time Protocol (NTP), used by clients to synchronize
computer clocks in the Internet [85]
ns* (N), alt* (N) Popular first label for a DNS name server [83, 91]
lb (N), db (N), Labels for domain enumeration in DNS-SD [2]
dr (N), dns-sd
tracker (N) Used by BitTorrent users to locate the tracker, which manages
BitTorrent peers in a torrent [118]
dns-llq DNS Long-Lived Queries, used by clients to locate DNS
servers with long-lived query support, which allows clients
to learn DNS data changes without polling the server [41]
www* (N), Popular first labels for a server hosting web content,
api (N), static (N), web elements, and web operations [32, 97, 116, 16, 33]
share (N), cf (N)
http, https Hypertext Transfer Protocol, used by web clients to browse
web content [64, 63]
stun Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), used by clients to
get the IP address and port allocated to it by a NAT [107]
ptp Picture Transfer Protocol (PTP), used by clients to transfer
images from digital cameras [93]
dpap Digital Photo Access Protocol (DPAP), used by iPhoto clients
to share photos starting in iPhoto 4.0 [23]
kerberos The Kerberos service, used by clients to perform network
authentications [73]
rubygems Used by RubyGems, the package manager in Ruby to help
clients download Ruby coding libraries [42]
gc (N) Used by clients to locate a Microsoft Global Catalog (GC)
server in a domain [80]
ldap, ldaps Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), used by
clients to access directory services [76]
carddav, carddavs vCard Extensions to WebDAV (CardDAV), used by clients
to access, manage, and share contact information [26]
caldav, caldavs Calendaring Extensions to WebDAV (CalDAV), used by clients
to access, manage, and share calendaring information [25]
dns-update Dynamic Updates in the DNS, used by DNS clients to add or
delete resource records in DNS zones [45]
afs3-vlserver Used by clients to access the Andrew distributed file system
(AFS) [90]
Table 5.2: Descriptions and documentations of the exposed internal network services (Part
1). N denotes non-registered service.
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Service name Service description and documentation
adisk Used by Apple Time Machine clients to perform automatic
disk discovery [57]
smb Server Message Block (SMB), used by clients to share file
over a network [106]
afpovertcp Apple Filing Protocol Over TCP, used by clients to share file
over a network [9]
ftp, sftp-ssh File Transfer Protocol (FTP), used by clients to transfer file
over a network [50, 108]
webdav HTTP Extensions for Distributed Authoring (WebDAV), used
by web clients to manage remote web content [62]
odisk Used by Mac Clients to access remote CD or DVD
rfb Remote Framebuffer (RFB) protocol, used by clients to view
and control a window system on a remote computer [122]
ssh Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, used by clients to access a remote
computer [23]
eppc Used by clients to send remote Apple events [23]
telnet Used by clients to access a remote computer [23]
kpasswd Used by clients to change Kerberos passwords [74]
airport Used by clients to configure a AirPort base station [23]
servermgr Used by macOS clients to manage macOS servers [23]
autodiscover (N), Exchange Autodiscover service, used by clients
outlook (N) to automatically configure Microsoft Exchange [15]
mail* Used by clients to locate POP3 or SMTP mail servers [31]
pop3 Post Office Protocol (POP), used by clients to locate POP
mail servers [94]
smtp Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), used by clients to
locate SMTP mail servers [109]
sip, sips, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), used by clients to
sipinternaltls (N), create, modify, and terminate Internet telephone
sipinternal (N), call sessions [110, 96]
sipexternal (N)
xmpp-server, Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP),
xmpp-client used by clients to manage sessions for messaging, network
availability, and request-response interactions [6]
printer Used by client to locate network printers [23]
riousbprint Used by the AirPort base station to share USB printers [23]
pdl-datastream Used by client to locate network printers supporting
Page Description Language (PDL) [92]
ipp Internet Printing Protocol (IPP), used by clients to
locate network printers supporting IPP [71]
scanner Used by macOS clients to locate network scanners [23]
ica-networking Used by macOS Image Capture app to share cameras [23]
xgrid Used by macOS clients to locate Apple xGrid agents for
distributed computing [78]
syslog The Syslog protocol, used by clients to send and receive event
notification messages [99]
Table 5.3: Descriptions and documentations of the exposed internal network services (Part
2). N denotes non-registered service.
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Before the delegation of a new gTLD, the leaked internal service queries are answered
by the DNS root servers as non-existent domains, or NXD [239]. Thus, from the DNS root
traffic, we form the leaked query dataset by extracting queries with (1) NXD responses,
and (2) TLD strings that have been delegated in the New gTLD Program today. In this
work, we consider the delegated new gTLDs as of March 4, 2017, which include 1,216
new gTLDs in total [151].
Exposed service measurement. To measure the exposed services, we extract the ser-
vice names from the queries in the leaked query dataset using the service discovery query
format (§2.2.3). In our study, our main focus is the services officially registered in the
IANA registry [65]. These are services that are widely used in industry, e.g., sip and
ldap, and their IANA registration entries have service information such as protocol de-
scription, which are critical for us to understand and characterize their functionality.
To measure the registered services, we calculate the average daily query leak volume
for each service in the IANA registry. One problem is that our measurements are impacted
starting late 2013 as many of the new gTLDs began delegation and our observation space of
the leaks decreases. To solve it, we obtain the delegation dates for the targeted new gTLDs
and compute the per-TLD daily query leak volumes for each service, only using the data
collected before each new gTLD’s delegation date. Then, the average leak volume for a
service is the sum of its per-TLD leak volumes.
In this work, we also study the non-registered services, some of which are also popular,
e.g., the WPAD service. However, compared to registered services they are significantly
more challenging to study due to the lack of readily available documentation as they are
typically proprietary. It is especially difficult to identify services with non-standard queries,
since all the first labels in the queried domain names are considered as candidate service
names. This loose filtering condition results in a large number of potential service names
and as described later in §5.3.2 a large portion of them are actually irrelevant, e.g., random
strings potentially sent by Chrome for infobar customization [27].
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To effectively identify valid non-registered service names from the extremely large can-
didate string set (78.5 million from our measurement in §5.3.2), we use an automated ap-
proach to conservatively rule out service name candidates that lack sufficient information
for our study. We label each candidate service name with nochar, noinfo, noinfo suf, or
info suf. If the name string does not contain an English letter, we label it nochar, indicating
that the string itself lacks useful information about the service. Otherwise, we use a python
script to search the string using Google, and if there are no search results, we label it as
noinfo, indicating that the string is either not related to a service, or not popular enough
so that no related information is available online for our study to proceed. If the label
has search results, we then append it with popular service discovery suffixes and perform
another Google search. For standard queries, we append suffixes tcp and udp. For
non-standard queries, we append example.com, example.net, contoso.com, and
contoso.net, which are popular example domain names in network service documenta-
tions [47, 66]. If these searches do not have results, it is labeled as noinfo suf ; otherwise it
is info suf. In the subsequent protocol study, we then focus on the candidates with info suf
labels.
5.3.2 Exposed Services
From our measurement, 115 registered services in the IANA registry are found to have
service query exposure. The leakage volume distribution exhibits a long tail property with
40.9% (47) of the services receiving less than five queries globally per day. To focus
our analysis on the ones with considerable degrees of query exposure, we pick the top
50 services for subsequent analysis.
For the non-registered services, since the query formats are loosely defined, the output
of our measurement includes 78.5 million candidate strings. Fig. 5.2 shows the automatic
labeling results using the automatic labeling script (§5.3.1). As shown, for the top 50 server
string candidates, the majority (60%) of them are popular names that at least have some
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Figure 5.2: Automatic labeling results for the top 300 non-registered service string candi-
dates.
online references or configuration tutorials. After the top 50, 60–80% of the names do not
have related online information. As shown, the majority of them either have no letters in
the name, or have no search results even without DNS domain suffixes. While registered
services are the main focus of this work, we pick the 30 service names with info suf labels
among the top 50 candidates for our subsequent analysis. This enables us to cover the most
popular non-registered services, making our study more comprehensive.
In total, we form an exposed service dataset of 80 services with highest levels of service
query exposure today. Table 5.1 characterizes 68 of them according to their designed func-
tionality and potential security implications under name collision attacks. Table 5.2 and
Table 5.3 include the documentations we collected for each of them. For the remaining 12,
we are unable to further analyze them since they either have no online documentation or
no precise service information (details in Table 5.4). In Table 5.1, the average daily query
leak volumes are presented as circled numbers ① to ⑤ indicating five volume ranges. For
non-registered service names, strings that only differ in the suffix numbers, e.g., www1 and
www2, are aggregated into names ending with “*”, e.g., www*.
As shown in Table 5.1, in addition to the previously-studied WPAD service [172], the
name collision problem actually affects a wide spectrum of internal network services with
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Service name Exclusion reason
ssp④, grid⑤, dltimesync⑤, No online service
fmserver-admin⑤ documentation
server*① (NR), your① (NR), test① (NR), No service specific
int① (NR), personalize① (NR), dc*① (NR), information
ad*① (NR), domaindnszones① (NR)
Table 5.4: Services in the exposed service dataset without sufficient information for us to
perform service design characterization. Numbers in circle denote the range level of the
average daily query leak volume: ① > 100,000,② 10,000 – 100,000,③ 1,000 – 10,000,④
100 – 1,000, ⑤ 10 – 100. NR denotes non-registered service names.
diverse functionality today. More importantly, many of these exposed services are critical
for security and privacy, e.g., proxy configuration, coding library discovery, printer dis-
covery, etc. As shown in Table 5.1, if the service software has client-side name collision
vulnerabilities, attackers may cause a wide range of security problems. In the next section,
we collect the service implementations to concretely evaluate their robustness under the
name collision attack threat model.
5.4 Vulnerability Analysis
To evaluate the robustness of the exposed services under name collision attacks, in this
section we perform vulnerability analysis on the service client implementations and analyze
the causes.
5.4.1 Methodology
Service client implementation collection. For each exposed service, the goal is to
collect its client implementations that are generating the leaked service discovery queries
observed in our measurement. Based on the service names and registration information,
we read over ten pages of Google search results, download and test candidate software.
We only pick a candidate if it is manually confirmed to (1) use DNS-based service dis-
covery, and (2) automatically combine the service name and a discovery domain to form
the discovery query. The discovery domain configuration processes depend on the client
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Exposed Client implementation Us- Vulnerability cause Vuln.
service age V1 V2 V3 V4 ?
In-domain Windows 10 logon, U1 ✗ - - ✓ ✓
ldap official Linux command ldapsearch
IPA Client logon U1 ✗ - - ✗ ✗
wpad Windows 10 WPAD service U1 ✓ - - - ✓
isatap Windows 10 ISATAP tunnel service U1 ✓ - - - ✓
kerberos In-domain Windows 10 logon, IPA logon U1 ✗ - - ✗ ✗
dns-sd, lb, macOS 10.12 domain enumeration U1 ✓ - - - ✓
db, dr
sip, sipinternal, Skype for Business 2016 U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
sipinternaltls, X-Lite, Blink, Phoner, Linphone, Jisti U1 ✓ - - ✓ ✓
sipexternal
gc In-domain Windows 10 DSQUERY command U1 ✗ - - ✓ ✓
mail Outlook 2016 IMAP service U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
autodiscover, Outlook 2016 Autodiscover service U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
outlook
kpassword Kerberos for Windows U1 ✗ - - ✗ ✗
pop3 Outlook 2016 POP service U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
smtp Outlook 2016 SMTP service U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
sips X-Lite, Blink, Phoner, Linphone U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
Jisti U1 ✗ ✗ - ✓ ✓*
ipp, printer
pdl-datastream, macOS 10.12 printer discovery U2 ✓ - ✓q,r - ✓
riousbprint
xmpp-server ejabberd U1 ✓ - - - ✓
ntp IPA Client logon U1 ✓ - - - ✓
xmpp-client PSI logon, Adium logon U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
http macOS 10.12 Safari Bonjour browser U2 ✓ - ✓q - ✓
stun X-Lite, Blink U1 ✓ - - - ✓
afs3-server IBM OpenAFS U1 ✗ - - ✗ ✗
carddav iOS 10.3 Contacts CardDAV account U1 ✗ - - ✓ ✓
adisk macOS 10.12 Time Machine disk discovery U2 ✗ - ✓q,r ✓ ✓
afpovertcp, The Shared section in macOS 10.12 Finder U2 ✗ - ✓q ✓ ✓
smb, rfb
ssh, telnet “New Remote Connection...” U2 ✗ - ✓q,r ✓ ✓
ftp, sftp-ssh in macOS 10.12 Terminal
caldav iOS 10.3 Calendar CalDAV account U1 ✗ - - ✓ ✓
dpap macOS iPhoto photo sharing U2 ✓ - ✓q,r ✓ ✓
carddavs Contacts CardDAV in macOS 10.12, iOS 10.3 U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
webdav Cyberduck discovery U2 ✗ - ✓q ✓ ✓
dns-llq macOS 10.12 Back To My Mac service U1 ✓ - - - ✓
severmgr macOS Server 5.1 discovery U2 ✗ ✓ ✓q,r ✓ ✓
dns-update macOS 10.12 dynamic global hostname U1 ✓ - - ✓ ✓
rubygems RubyGems gem and bundle commands U1 ✓ - - - ✓
caldavs Calendar CalDAV in macOS 10.12, iOS 10.3 U1 ✗ ✓ - ✓ ✓
Table 5.5: Vulnerability analysis results for the collected client implementations of the ex-
posed services. “q” and “r” denote query-side and response-side mixing in domain discov-
ery (detailed in §5.4.3). “*” means that the vulnerability status depends on user decisions.
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Service name Exclusion reason
scanner Need a physical scanner for server setup
ptp Need a physical camera for server setup
airport Need an Apple AirPort for server setup
vlmcs (NR) Need a valid Microsoft production key
for server setup
xgrid, ica-networking Deprecated in the latest macOS
ldaps, https, eppc, Failed to find a client software using the
odisk, syslog service name with unicast domain discovery
www* (NR), api (NR), These are non-official naming conventions;
static (NR), share (NR), Excluded since we are more interested in
cf (NR), ns* (NR), uncovering the vulnerable design and
alt* (NR), proxy (NR), implementation choices made under the
tracker (NR) default service discovery configurations.
Table 5.6: Services excluded in the client-side name collision vulnerability analysis. NR
denotes non-registered service.
implementation details. For the clients we have explored, they typically use the OS domain
or the user account domain. For services with multiple client implementations, our analysis
mainly focuses on the ones that are more popular among corporate or end users and thus
has higher impact. We focus our analysis on the most recent releases available to us so that
our analysis results are current and relevant.
Column one and two in Table 5.5 list the services and the collected client implemen-
tations. This collection includes 57 client implementations covering 48 (70.6%) out of the
68 services with service design information in our exposed service dataset. We prioritize
our efforts to cover the registered services with the highest level of exposure. Specifically,
our collection covers 14 out of the 17 registered services with over 1,000 daily query leaks
in Table 5.1. For the remaining ones, we were unable to obtain valid software for our study
(details in Table 5.6).
Many services are registered for a single product, e.g., gc and outlook. Thus, most
of the services in the table only have one client listed. Also, the list of clients has a skew
towards a particular vendor’s products because that vendor is the major supporter for DNS-
SD and has registered many of them for their own use, e.g., adisk, afpovertcp, dpap,
etc. [65]
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Analysis steps. Due to service functionality or usage model differences, these service
clients may need to contact multiple servers for different purposes and ultimately result in
different levels of vulnerability exposure in name collision attacks. Thus, to systematically
analyze the client-side name collision vulnerability, we first perform a characterization of
the service discovery usage scenarios implemented in the collected clients. In this analysis,
we first configure the client and server software, and ensure the service functionality is
performed as expected. We then trigger the service discovery in the client, and analyze the
network traffic to understand the usage.
Based on the usage characterization results, we identify the attack points for each usage
scenario and perform vulnerability analysis for a client at every attack point. Our analysis
uses a simulated name collision attack environment and dynamically analyses the vulnera-
bility status. The victim client software is installed in the same computer being connected
to two namespaces, simulating an internal DNS namespace and the public DNS namespace
in which name collisions can occur. Our analysis assumes the absence of the attacker at
the first-time software usage. Thus, we first trigger the designed functionality without at-
tack in the simulated internal DNS namespace. After that, we disconnect the client from
all legitimate internal servers and switch to the simulated public namespace to start the
vulnerability analysis. For the client-side requests at each attack point, we construct pos-
sible attack server responses only using resources available in the public namespace. Note
that since we do not assume the attacker can access the legitimate internal servers (§5.2.1),
the attack and legitimate servers are configured differently in the non-default settings, e.g.,
server names, zone file content, user credentials, etc. Using this analysis method, a client-
side name collision vulnerability is revealed if the client accepts the attack server responses
at all attack points of its usage scenario. Since this method identifies vulnerabilities by
directly testing attacks, it does not have false positives, but can have false negatives since
it may not explore all vulnerable paths in the software, which is an inherent limitation for
dynamic analysis [115].
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Analysis framework. We develop a dynamic analysis framework to support the anal-
ysis tasks above. The victim client software is installed in a virtual machine configured in
two network environments, each having its own DNS server but using a local zone file with
the same domain name. To conform to our threat model, we registered a real new gTLD
domain to set up the name collision domain. During the vulnerability analysis, we switch
the network environment by changing the client DNS resolver address and shutting down
all server virtual machines in the previous network environment. In this framework, the
traffic between the client and the server are intercepted by a MitM proxy for the protocol
analysis on TLS traffic and the attack server response injection. We develop this proxy by
customizing the SSLSplit tool [113].
For the services using TLS, the servers in the simulated internal namespace are config-
ured with certificates signed by a local CA. To simulate the public namespace, we obtain
valid public certificates for the attack servers for free through the Let’s Encrypt CA [75].
After obtaining the certificates, we configure our DNS servers to only serve the IP addresses
we control.
Note that currently most parts of this analysis are manual. We made this decision
because generally automating the analysis, e.g., identifying, configuring, and triggering a
targeted behavior for arbitrary software, is very challenging. The diversity in platforms and
software design further complicates the task. Despite the manual effort, our analysis covers
a relatively complete range of services so the analysis results, our main contribution, are
not significantly affected. The efforts made in this work also helps shed light on how to
automate the analysis in the future.
5.4.2 Service Discovery Usage Scenarios
Our analysis identified two usage scenarios:
U1. Locate a single server in the discovery domain. In our collection, the clients for
33 of the 48 exposed services are in this usage scenario. As shown on the left of Fig. 5.3,
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of usage scenario U1 and U2 of DNS-based service discovery
(§5.4.2) in our service client collection.
these clients use the traditional service discovery methods via SRV or A/AAAA queries as
introduced in §2.2.3. In U1, the client contacts two attacker-controlled servers, the DNS
server for comp.ntld and the server for the requested service svc. In the figure, they
are labeled as AP2 and AP3, denoting the two attack points in name collision attacks.
U2. Locate multiple servers in both local link and the unicast discovery domain.
The remaining 16 clients, covering 15 of the 48 exposed services, use DNS-based service
discovery to find a list of services instead of a single one. These clients uses PTR queries to
retrieve a list of server names for the user to choose as shown on the right of Fig. 5.3, which
conforms to the Zeroconf usage of the DNS-SD standard [144]. Even though Zeroconf is
mostly designed for discovering nearby devices without unicast DNS server support [22],
these clients have unicast query leaks mainly due to their support of discovering both the
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local link via mDNS and the discovery domain via unicast DNS. Compared to U1, clients
in U2 have an additional user selection step. Thus, to increase the attack success rate, the
attacker needs to spend extra effort to carefully craft PTR responses to trick the user into
choosing the attack server in the list, which is labeled as AP1 in Fig. 5.3.
5.4.3 Vulnerability Analysis
Using the analysis framework, 57 clients in 45 (93.8%) of the 48 exposed services are
found to be vulnerable. In this section, we report four common vulnerable software design
or implementation choices causing such widespread vulnerability exposure. The analysis
results are summarized in Table 5.5.
V1. Lack of server authentication by default. At AP1 and AP2, even though the
attack zone file setup and the DNS response content are different from the legitimate one,
we find that all 57 clients accept the malicious DNS responses after switching namespaces.
This is not entirely surprising: DNS clients solely rely on their recursive resolvers to locate
the appropriate DNS servers, and thus are are not in the position to differentiate names-
paces.
Even though name collision attackers can pass AP1 and AP2, the 57 clients have the
full potential to block the attack at AP3, where various server authentication methods can
be used. However, to our surprise, we find that the clients for 16 (33.3%) out of these
48 exposed services do not implement any server authentication method by default for the
server(s) from discovery. It includes four printing service software, seven communication
service software, tunneling services isatap, etc. As shown in Table 5.1, the potential
security implications for these services are high severe, including MitM attacks, malicious
script execution, document leakage, etc.
This lack of server authentication is not entirely poor implementation choices. Ser-
vices such as wpad, isatap, stun, etc., have no server authentication specified in their
protocol design [198, 72, 107]. Also for services such as sip and ftp, server authenti-
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cation is mentioned but the implementation is not enforced [51, 105]. Thus, to solve this
problem, both the service design documentation and the actual implementations need to be
strengthened.
V2. Accept a publicly-valid but previously-unseen TLS certificate by default. In
our client collection, 36 clients for two thirds (32) of the 48 exposed services do use server
authentication in AP3. Seventeen of them use TLS certificates, and when we first trigger
the service functionality in the simulated internal namespace, all of them require explicit
user addition or approval steps to trust the legitimate internal server certificates signed by
the local CA. However, after switching to the simulated public namespace, we find that 16
of the 17 clients by default accept the publicly-valid but previously-unseen TLS certificate
we prepared for the attack server. As shown in Table 5.5, they involve highly popular
clients for VoIP, mail, contacts, and calendar. The only client that does not accept the
attack certificate by default is sips software Jisti, which requires user approval for any
certificate that was not previously seen. However, it still relies on the user to make the
correct security decision instead of directly terminating the connection.
Since in our experiments the connection to the intended server in the internal network
is established first, these clients should be capable of distinguishing the attack certificate
from the legitimate one, e.g., they are not signed by the same CA. Unfortunately, they
make the choice of accepting any previously-unseen publicly-valid certificate by default.
This may be because they are not designed to be only used in the internal network. For
example, for the SIP and XMPP clients, the targeted use cases are not only for the internal
servers but also for the public ones such as sip2sip and xmpp.jp. Thus, to increase the
convenience in the latter use cases their trusted CA lists by default include the public CAs.
Note that this is not a weakness in TLS-based server authentication. The server au-
thentication in TLS is only designed for validating the certificate chain for a given domain
name, and in this case, the certificate chains are indeed valid in both internal and public
networks. The fundamental cause is in the use of TLS-based server authentication in these
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service clients: they are designed to be used in both internal and public namespaces but
lacks the awareness of differentiating the use in different namespaces. Later in §6.8, we
have more discussions on this problem cause.
V3. Mix local-link and unicast DNS domain discovery. As discussed in §5.4.2,
clients in U2 are mainly designed to discover servers at nearby devices in the local link
using mDNS queries [22] and thus should not be exposed to the name collision problem.
However, to extend such discovery to wider areas beyond a local link, e.g., large corpo-
rate networks with multiple subnetworks, these clients also browse a configured discovery
domain using unicast DNS queries. Unfortunately, such extended functionality support
causes the 16 clients in U2 to have mixed queries to both local link and the unicast DNS
domain, causing service query exposure.
In fact, we find that for many Zeroconf software with unicast DNS discovery, such
extended functionality is actually not always necessary. Two examples are the macOS
Parental Control function, which implements the registered service parentcontrol,
and the Docs To Go software, which implements the registered service dxtgsync. The
macOS Parental Control is designed for parents to monitor and manage their children’s
Mac computers, and Docs To Go is used for a single user to synchronize documents on
various personal devices under the same WiFi. They are mainly designed for accessing
nearby devices in local link without a local unicast DNS server setup, but they by default
generates unicast DNS discovery queries along with the mDNS queries. Another example
is application DropCopy that implements the registered service dropcopy. It is designed
to transfer files among nearby devices similar to Docs To Go. It uses unicast DNS discovery
but does not show the results in the server list, making it more obvious that the unicast DNS
discovery functionality is actually not needed.
To understand why these software implementations choose to support the redundant
unicast DNS discovery, we take a close look at the most popular Zeroconf framework,
Bonjour, and find that this is potentially caused by the default behavior of the discovery
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API. We analyze the API according to the documentation [21], and find that if the domain
parameter is not specified, the discovery API by default discovers both the local link using
mDNS and the system-configured domain using unicast DNS. Thus, if the developer is
not careful enough, such default API behavior with mixed local-link and unicast domain
discovery unnecessarily causes the software to be exposed to name collision attacks.
Besides the queries, the mixing of local-link and unicast domain discovery also hap-
pens to the discovery results in the responses. Among the 16 implementations in U2, 11 of
them do not differentiate the servers from local-link discovery and those from unicast do-
main discovery in the user selection step. These implementations are all in macOS system
applications, including the printer discovery process and the system terminal’s remote shell
functionality. As illustrated in Fig. 5.3, only the service instance name strings, e.g., “inst1”
if the response is inst1. svc. prot.comp.ntld, are shown to the user without any
indicator of the discovery domain. This makes it impossible for even a security-savvy user
to tell the associated discovery domain for the discovered servers, allowing name collision
attackers to have arbitrary control over the content shown on the user interface and thus
more easily influence the user choice. Later in §5.5, we use concrete examples to illustrate
how this can be exploited to directly prevent the user from choosing the legitimate server.
For the other five clients, the discovered servers in the list are labeled with the namespaces,
e.g., “local” for local link and “comp.ntld” for discovery domain comp.ntld. Actually
among them there are some macOS system applications, e.g., Finder and Safari Bonjour
browser, but unfortunately this practice is not consistently enforced throughout the system.
V4. No enforcement of server authentication in PSK-based authentication. Be-
sides using TLS certificates, PSK can also be used to provide server authentication at AP3.
Since the password is only shared with the intended internal server, the client can detect a
name collision attack server since the attacker cannot prove the possession of the correct
password. In our collection, 42 clients for 33 services use PSK-based authentication by
default. However, we find that 37 clients for 30 (90.9%) out of these 33 services have no
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enforcement of server authentication. Nineteen of them only use the PSK for client authen-
tication without requiring server authentication by default. For some, the user name and
password are even sent in plain text to the attack server. This not only fails to detect the
attack server but also leads to credential theft.
The remaining 18 clients choose to use mutual authentication methods such as Kerberos
or DIGEST-MD5 by default. However, they are still found vulnerable since they can all be
downgraded to not use mutual authentication if the attack server suggests so, without even
notifying the user that the current authentication is less secure. For XMPP implementations
PSI and Adium, the CardDAV, CalDAV, and WebDAV implementations including macOS
and iOS Contacts and Calendars, HTTP Authentication is used with DIGEST-MD5 by de-
fault, but these clients can all be downgraded to use Basic, which sends the Base64 encoded
password. We find that without TLS being enabled, PSI and Adium actually refuse to use
Basic by default. We suspect that they choose to accept the weaker authentication method
under TLS mainly because they assume that the server has already been authenticated after
it passes the TLS certificate validation. Unfortunately, according to our analysis results for
V2, this assumption is generally broken for the collected clients using TLS, including PSI
and Adium.
The ldap implementation used during Windows 10 logon, the SIP client Microsoft
Skype for Business 2016, the mail client Outlook 2016, and the macOS Finder imple-
mentation of smb all by default use Kerberos. However, they can be downgraded to using
NTLM, which does not provide server authentication [30]. For another ldap client, the of-
ficial Linux LDAP command ldapsearch, when the PSK-based authentication method
is not explicitly specified, the program by default accepts the server suggestion of using
NTLM. The disk discovery implementations in macOS Finder and Time Machine, which
implement afpovertcp and adisk respectively, both use the AFP (Apple Filing Pro-
tocol) [9] and by default use Kerberos. However, it can be downgraded to use DHX2
(Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 2) that is clearly explained in the documentation that “there
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is no way for the client to verify that the server knows the password” [3].
Among the 57 clients, only six do not exhibit the client-side name collision vulnerability
in our analysis. Besides the SIP implementation Jisti that depends on the user to make the
right decision, the other five are not vulnerable since they only support Kerberos.
5.4.4 Discussion
As shown above, nearly all (51) of the 57 service clients we collected are vulnerable
to name collision attacks, suggesting that the name collision attack threat model broadly
breaks common security assumptions made in today’s internal network service clients.
From the analysis, we observe two fundamental causes at the software design level. First,
internal service clients today tend to place excessive trust on the server side. As shown,
clients for one third of the 48 exposed services do not use any server authentication by
default. For clients using PSK-based authentication, around 90% of them have no enforce-
ment of server authentication. This is probably because by design these clients are expected
to be used in internal networks, e.g., in companies, which have network isolation and cer-
tain levels of security protections, and thus make the security assumption that the servers
are trusted. Such assumption is broken under the threat model of local network attacks,
e.g., ARP spoofing attacks, but it may be deceptively safe considering that these attacks
usually have tight requirements of the attack placement and timing. However, with inter-
nal query leaks exposing these service clients to malicious servers in the public network,
the name collision attack threat model is thus a new attack vector to break such assump-
tion, and as discussed in §5.2.1, it is more powerful and easier to launch than typical local
network attacks.
Second, the service clients today using DNS-based service discovery generally lack the
awareness of differentiating the namespaces of the domain names in the DNS responses.
In this work, we call it a lack of namespace differentiation. As shown, in service discovery,
11 of the 16 clients in U2 do not differentiate the responses from the local-link namespace
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(.local) and the unicast domain namespace. For server authentication, 16 out of the
17 clients relying on TLS to authenticate a domain name accept a certificate from the
public namespace by default, even though the previously user-approved certificate for such
domain name is from an internal namespace. This is a fundamental problem introduced
by the newly-emerged name collision attack threat model. By design, DNS namespaces
should be isolated and thus internal network service clients are not expected to differentiate
namespaces. However, since the name collision problem is happening today, such a general
lack of namespace differentiation leaves the service clients incapable of handling potential
name collisions, causing the vulnerability exposure in our analysis.
Based on these insights, in §5.6 we propose a set of defense strategies at the service
client software design level.
5.5 Exploitation Case Study
To demonstrate the severity of the identified vulnerabilities, we construct realistic attack
scenarios in our analysis framework. Table 5.7 summarizes our results. As shown, a num-
ber of new name collision attacks are uncovered with a wide range of security implications,
i.e., a new MitM attack vector in addition to the WPAD name collision attack [172], doc-
ument leakage, malicious code injection, credential theft, and phishing attacks. Note that
the new MitM attack vector exploits an IP tunneling service, and thus besides intercepting
web traffic like the WPAD attack, it can also intercept DNS traffic and launch DNS-based
exploits such as DNS response spoofing.
5.5.1 MitM Attack
In the previous work [172], the name collision attack on the Windows implementation
of wpad has been found to cause MitM attacks. In this study, we find that the Windows
implementation of isatap, a service with completely different design purpose in com-
parison to wpad, can also be exploited by name collision attackers to launch MitM attacks.
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Section Client software Service name Vuln. design/ Exploitation
impl. choice
§5.5.1 Microsoft Windows 10 isatap V1 MitM attack (web traffic
& DNS traffic)
§5.5.2 RubyGems 2.6.12 rubygems V1, V2 Malicious code injection
§5.5.3 macOS 10.12 printer ipp V1, V3 Document leakage
discovery
PSI 0.15, macOS 10.12 xmpp-client, caldav,
and iOS 10.3 Contacts, caldavs, carddav, V1, V2, V4
§5.5.4 Calendar carddavs Credential theft
macOS 10.12 Terminal ftp, ssh, sftp-ssh, V1, V3, V4
New Remote Connection telnet
§5.5.5 Linphone 3.10.2, PSI 0.15 sip, xmpp-client V1, V2, V4 Phishing calls & msg.
§5.5.6 macOS 10.12 and iOS carddav, carddavs V1, V2, V4 Phishing name card &
10.3 Contacts, Calendar caldav, caldavs calendar event injection
Table 5.7: Exploitation case studies for the identified client-side name collision vulnerabil-
ities. V1 to V4 are detailed in §5.4.3.
In this section, we report the attack construction for the implementation of isatap in
Windows 10.
The protocol for isatap service is ISATAP (Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing
Protocol) [72]. It is an IPv6 transition mechanism to enable a client to use IPv6 in an
internal network that only has IPv4 network infrastructure. The ISATAP server is connected
to both the internal IPv4 network and an external IPv6 network. When the client uses IPv6,
the traffic is encapsulated in IPv4 packets between the client and the ISATAP server, and
then decapsulated by the ISATAP server to contact the IPv6 sites on behalf of the client.
This mechanism is implemented primarily in Windows OSes and also supported in Linux.
Service query exposure. We first configure a Windows 10 client to log into a Windows
domain, which is common practice in a corporate network [34]. In our simulated name
collision attack environment, we find that the ISATAP service is by default enabled and the
service query exposure happens at the OS booting time, during which the client sends a
query by prepending the isatap label to the Windows domain to discover the ISATAP
server.
Exploitation. We set up the attack server by configuring the Linux ISATAP router
program radvdwith IP forwarding enabled [77]. Since the client makes vulnerable choice
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V1, i.e., having no server authentication by default, to launch the exploit we only need to
point the client requested query name to our ISATAP server IP address in the colliding
domain zone file.
In the virtual machine setup, our host machine does not have a public IPv6 address
allocation. This emulates a network without IPv6 support, which is common in home
networks using popular cable services in majority of the states in the U.S. [29]. After
switching to the attack environment, after booting the Windows 10 client is found to have
accepted and already configured to use the attack server in the ISATAP tunnel interface.
Then, all web traffic to IPv6 sites are found to be intercepted by our attack server.
In addition, we find that as an IP tunneling protocol, ISATAP can affect not only web
traffic like WPAD, but also DNS traffic. In our experiments, we find that the Windows 10
OS prioritizes the IPv6 DNS servers when both IPv4 and IPv6 DNS servers are configured.
Thus, as long as the DNS configuration includes one IPv6 DNS server, for example popular
public open resolvers [54], the ISATAP tunnel is tried first for any DNS request. This causes
all DNS queries to be intercepted, leading to another dimension of exploits leveraging DNS
response spoofing. In this case, since the attacker acts as the client’s DNS resolver, she can
bypass the DNSSEC integrity check due to the last mile problem for DNS [119] and can
thus read and modify arbitrary DNS responses.
5.5.2 Malicious Library Injection
Service rubygems is used in RubyGems, the Ruby package manager serving Ruby
coding libraries, called gems. In this section, we detail a name collision attack on this
service to inject malicious libraries.
Service query exposure. To use the service, RubyGems first needs to configure the
discovery domain, called adding sources. The sources typically include the official Ruby
package server rubygems.org to discover standard packages, and can also include inter-
nal domains to download libraries developed internally, e.g., those for company-wide use
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only. After switching to the attack environment in our analysis framework, service queries
to both the official package server and the internal domain are triggered when installing
or updating a gem with the gem commands or the bundle commands. Since the source
configuration is at the coding platform level, as long as the user runs these commands on
a computer with the internal source configured, e.g., a corporate computer, the internal do-
main discovery is always triggered even if the user’s coding task is unrelated to internal
libraries.
Exploitation. We set up the attack server using Gem in a Box [124]. The attack goal is
to let the client install an attacker-prepared version of a public library that should be served
at the official Ruby package server. Compared to infecting internal libraries, preparing
malicious public libraries are easier since the API information is public, and can potentially
infect more parts of a developer’s program when targeting popular libraries. Also it is
more stealthy since the attacker can carefully insert code so that the API functionality
still appears normal. In RubyGems, we find that when the gem or bundle commands
are triggered, all the sources are contacted simultaneously to download the required gem
instead of being contacted one by one. Since the public library we target is served by the
official package server, the malicious library on the attack server needs to compete with the
legitimate one.
From the source code, we find that the client first retrieves the metadata of the requested
gems from all servers, merges them into a list, and picks the last one in the list to install.
Each gem metadata is a tuple with several package information, and the different fields for
gems with the same name are mainly the version number and the source server name. In
the code, this list is sorted using the default Ruby tuple comparator; thus, for gems from the
same source, normally the one of the latest version is picked. For the install commands
of bundle and gem, we find that the source server name field is put before the version
number field in the tuple. Thus, as long as the malicious server name is larger than the
official Ruby package server name in string comparison, the gem from the attack server is
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picked. In the SRV response, the attacker controls the attack server name string, and can
thus deterministically force the installation of the malicious gem. For the update com-
mands of bundle and gem, only the version number is used so that the gem is installed
only if its version number is larger than the one that is already installed by the client. Thus,
for update commands, the attack gem just needs to use a version number that is higher
than that in the latest public one to force the installation.
For both install and update commands, we have verified that the injection suc-
ceeds by modifying the official net-dns gem to include additional code. These com-
mands can also use HTTPS, but similar to the results in §5.4.3, they are found vulnerable
due to V2. Using our analysis framework, we have also verified the injection attack under
HTTPS. Also note that since the version number is used in the gem selection during the
update commands, the attacker can use a large version number to prevent future updates
of a gem, making the malicious library injection permanent.
5.5.3 Document Leakage
In macOS, the printer service discovery is triggered by going to the Printer & Scanner
preference page, or by clicking on the Print option in an editor. The discovery process
discovers both the local link and the configured device domain for exposed service ipp,
printer, pdl-datastream, and riousbprint. The attack strategies for these ser-
vices are the same, and in this section we only describe the attack on ipp as an illustrative
example.
In the ipp discovery in macOS, only the service instance name fields are extracted and
presented in a list for the user to choose (illustrated in Fig. 5.3). This leads to the vulnerable
design choice V3 on the discovery responses, allowing the attacker to have arbitrary control
over all the user-visible content. Thus, the attack strategy is to pick a deceptive name to
trick the user into using the attacker’s printer. Since printers are typically named using
the brand and the model number, e.g., “Brother HL-6180DW series”, the attacker can just
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pick some popular names. Even if the user is intended to use a nearby printer in local link
instead of a network printer in the discovery domain, she can still make the wrong choice
since the service instance names alone provide no such information.
In addition, we find that the attacker can control not only the content, but also the order
of the printer names in the list. In the implementation, the discovered printer name list is
sorted in ascending alphabetical order. Thus, an attacker can start the attack printer name
string with an invisible character that is smaller than any English letter in character compar-
ison, e.g., STX (ASCII code 2 [12]). With this, we have confirmed that the attacker-injected
printer name is always ranked the first so that it is more likely to be chosen, especially when
the names in the list all appear legitimate.
For the macOS ipp implementation, no server authentication is used in AP3. Thus,
once the user picks the attack printer, the printed documents are leaked to the attacker.
Thus, to prevent such exploit it solely depends on whether the user can choose the legiti-
mate name. However, since only the service instance name field is used, both the printer
name and order in the user interface are fully controlled by the attacker to influence the
user’s choice.
5.5.4 Credential Theft
For the services in U1, sending a password in plain text to the server in the PSK-based
authentication directly causes credential theft. XMPP client PSI, CardDAV and CalDAV
clients macOS and iOS Contacts and Calendar, all use TLS but accept a publicly-valid
certificate by default. After bypassing such check by exploiting V2, the attack server then
exploits V4 to get the password in plain text by suggesting to use PLAIN for PSI, and Basic
for macOS and iOS Contacts and Calendar. These exploits are stealthy, since these clients
support background launching or syncing: PSI by default launches during OS booting, and
macOS and iOS Contacts and Calendar have periodic syncing that can be as frequent as
every one minute. Details about the attack setup are in §5.5.5, §5.5.6.
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For the services in U2, causing password leakage requires not only a weak PSK-based
authentication method, but also an effective way to trick the user to select the attack server
in the discovered server list. In the following, we detail credential theft attacks on macOS
service discovery implementations for ftp, ssh, sftp-ssh, and telnet. When using
the macOS default terminal, the user can choose to browse remote connections with these
four options. Once they are clicked, the client issues the corresponding service discovery
queries to both the local link and the unicast discovery domain. If the user picks the attack
server to connect, these clients send the credential in plain text to the attack server.
For these clients, the key step of the exploitation is to leverage V3 to trick the user to
pick the attacker-provided server. In their UI design, we notice that the server names from
the discovery is displayed in a ranked list with a limited height, which requires scrolling
if the list is too long. Thus, the attacker can send a long list of server name strings with
invisible characters that are smaller than any English letter in character comparison, e.g., a
TAB [12], to push the legitimate server names out of the first page of the list. Meanwhile,
the attacker sends a deceptive server name starting with another invisible character that is
even smaller in character comparison, e.g., STX [12]. In the current implementation, when
the server name list is longer than the visible area, the scrolling bar is not shown by default.
Thus, in the list, the attack server appears to be the only choice when the user browses for
remote connections. With the use of a legitimate looking name such as “MacBook Pro,” it
is likely that the user will at least try this only choice, especially when she sees the same
results after re-browsing multiple times.
5.5.5 Phishing Calls and Messages
Service query exposure. For the SIP client Linphone and the XMPP client PSI, a user
account, for example alice@comp.ntld, is needed for service registration. When the
account is configured, these clients perform service discovery of U1 in the user account
domain, typically happening at the software launching time. Since these clients remem-
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ber the account name, when launching them after switching to the attack environment in
our analysis framework, they still perform discovery based on internal domains in the ac-
count names, causing service query exposure. Both Linephone and PSI support automatic
launching during OS booting. Thus, their query exposure may happen even without user
interaction. In fact, this automatic launching is the default configuration for PSI.
Exploitation. We set up the attack server using Asterisk for Linphone [13], and ejab-
berd for PSI [48]. During the account logon, Linphone sends password in MD5 hash with-
out server authentication, which is the designed SIP authentication method [110]. For PSI,
the authentication process by default uses DIGEST-MD5, which provides server authenti-
cation [61]. By modifying the ejabberd server response in our analysis framework, we let
the server claim to only support PLAIN, which requests the client to send the password
in plain text. As reported in the vulnerability analysis (§5.4.3 V4), with a publicly valid
certificate used to bypass its certificate check, PSI accepts to use PLAIN.
In this attack, our attack servers are implemented to allow a client to log in with any
password. More specifically, after getting the user name from the client logon request, the
attack server creates an account with the same user name but a different password on the
attack server. To allow the victim client to use her password to log in without modifying the
server software, we utilize an attacker-side proxy to replace the credential used in the client
authentication with the valid credential for the attack server. Since the proxy is attacker-
controlled, the credential is still leaked, while the victim client appears to be logged in as
normal.
After the victim client is logged in, the attacker uses another account on her server to
initiate phishing calls or messages. Under both Asterisk and ejabberd, we have confirmed
that the displayed caller or sender names of the attacking accounts are controlled by the
attacker. Thus, the attacker can choose a deceptive name, e.g., “Manager” or “IT Depart-
ment”, to increase the success rate.
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5.5.6 Phishing Contacts & Calendar Events
Service query exposure. For system applications Contacts and Calendar on ma-
cOS and iOS, the user can configure CardDAV and CalDAV accounts in the form of
alice@comp.ntld, and the account domain becomes the discovery domain. After con-
tacting the discovered server, new contacts and calendar events are retrieved and merged
with those from all other accounts such as the iCloud account to present to the user. These
clients have periodic synchronization with the server, which can be every one minute, one
hour, etc. When the user leaves the internal network, e.g., at home after work, this periodic
synchronization can thus directly lead to service query exposure. In our analysis frame-
work, we set it to synchronize every 1 minute, and have confirmed the query leakage after
switching to the attack environment.
Exploitation. We use Baı¨kal to set up the attack server for these CardDAV and Cal-
DAV clients [19]. To avoid using server authentication, we configure the server to use
Basic instead of the default choice DIGEST-MD5 as the PSK-based authentication mecha-
nism [61]. During synchronization, Contacts and Calendar in both macOS and iOS accept
the server suggestion of Basic, and directly send the password encoded in Base64 to the
attack server. All these clients by default choose to use TLS, but they all make the vulner-
able design choice of accepting our publicly valid certificate by default. Using the proxy
approach detailed in the last section, our attack server lets any client to pass the client
authentication, and thus these CardDAV and CalDAV clients all proceed with the synchro-
nization functionality.
After the clients are connected, our phishing attack goal is to inject malicious contacts
and calendar events. Following the protocol design, after a synchronization, the server
gives the client a synchronization token to record the latest synchronization state. In these
implementations, we find that a state number is used as the token. During the synchroniza-
tion, these clients first request the server state number, and only pull new data from the
server if the server state number is higher than the one from the last synchronization. If
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the server state number is lower, the client makes no action except storing this lower server
state number as the latest state. Thus, for the name collision attacker, the attack strategy is
to keep a high state number, so if the client-stored state number is lower, the attacker di-
rectly triggers the client data pulling request. In case that the attack server state number is
lower than the client-stored one, the attacker can wait until the client stores the lower state
number after the first round of synchronization, and then start adding phishing contacts or
calendar events to trigger data pulling from the client side.
For macOS and iOS Contacts, to increase the attack success rate, the attacker can
choose to inject name cards that are likely to be frequently searched and dialed by the
user, for example hotline numbers like “Customer Care”. In such attack, since the victim
voluntarily dials the phishing number, she is more likely to follow the attacker’s instruction,
for example telling sensitive personal information such as the SSN number or the account
password. For macOS and iOS Calendar, the phishing calendar events are best used as the
delivery method for other exploits. For example, the events can include links to phishing
websites or PDF files with malicious scripts. To increase the success rate, they can mas-
querade as reminders for popular corporate events such as “Weekly Meeting” and set up to
pop up during working hours.
5.6 Defense Discussion
As shown, the widespread client-side name collision vulnerabilities in the exposed ser-
vice clients cause a wide range of security risks, and thus require immediate attention and
remediation. In this section, we propose a set of defense strategies at both the service client
software level and the DNS ecosystem level.
5.6.1 Service Level Defense Discussion
Based on the insights from our vulnerability analysis in §5.4, we propose several soft-
ware design guidelines to secure future clients using DNS-based service discovery.
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Integrate and enforce server authentication. As discussed in §6.8 and exhibited
in V1 and V4, one fundamental cause for the exposed vulnerabilities is the general lack
of server authentication in today’s internal network service clients. Since these services
are expected to be used in internal networks, e.g., corporate networks, where each user
has an internal account, adding PSK-based authentication into the client software design
may be most appropriate. To avoid vulnerable choice V4, the implementation needs to
strictly enforce mutual authentication during the negotiation. Since the secret is pre-shared,
the server has no excuse to not prove that it knows the secret. For the cases in which
PSK may be difficult to deploy, e.g., NTP servers or printers, the client should use TLS
certificates to verify the sever identity. To avoid vulnerable choice V2, the TLS certificate
validation with namespace differentiation proposed next should be used. Adding these
server authentication logic is generally beneficial for defending not only name collision
attacks but traditional local network server spoofing attacks as well.
Enable namespace differentiation in service discovery and server authentication
mechanisms. As discussed in §6.8 and exhibited in V2 and V3, the other fundamental vul-
nerability cause is the general lack of namespace differentiation in today’s internal service
clients using DNS-based service discovery. To solve the problem for the service discov-
ery process, the client software developers need to be explicit about which namespace the
discovery is expected to occur in and limit the discovery process to only local link if appro-
priate. At the platform level, we suggest the Bonjour or other Zeroconf platforms to limit
their discovery APIs to only perform local link discovery if unicast DNS domain discovery
is not explicitly specified. Since these platforms are mainly designed for local link dis-
covery, the default API behavior should not include the unicast domain discovery. These
additional resolution requests unnecessarily enlarge the attack surface and allow name col-
lision attacks to happen.
To enable namespace differentiation in the TLS-based server authentication, service
clients need additional functionality to differentiate certificates with the same name sub-
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ject but from different namespaces. One candidate solution for this may come from a set
of recent standards from the IETF, called DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) [39]. In DANE, authorities specify the authentication information of their ser-
vices through the DNS lookup. This natively addresses the name collision vulnerability in
the same substrate where it is normally exploited: DNS [244]. More concrete evaluation of
this defense solution direction is left as future work.
Application-specific defenses. Internal service clients can also add application-
specific defenses. For example, for the malicious library injection attack on the Ruby
library discovery service (§5.5.2), a library signing process can be added on the internal
servers for the client to check the authenticity of the libraries. Also, for the document leak-
age attack on the printer discovery service (§5.5.3), the client software can disable the use
of invisible characters to prevent the attacker from manipulating printer name display.
5.6.2 DNS Ecosystem Level Defense Discussion
Besides the service level, defense solutions can also be deployed at the DNS ecosystem
level, i.e., by relevant parties such as new gTLD registries, victim Autonomous Systems
(ASes), and end users. In this section, we discuss how to extend the previous DNS ecosys-
tem level remediation strategies for the WPAD name collision attack [172] to the general
form of name collision attacks in this work.
New gTLD registry and victim AS level remediation. Previous work proposes that
the new gTLD registries and the victim ASes with high volumes of query leakage can
mitigate the WPAD name collision attack based on a set of highly-vulnerable domains
(HVDs) [172]. With the HVD set, new gTLD registries can prevent the attack by ensuring
that these HVDs are not registered or at least treated more carefully during registration.
The victim ASes can filter or alter the queries to these domains before directing them to
the public namespace. These remediation strategies are still applicable for the general form
of name collision attacks in this work. The previously established HVD set would need to
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include the extended service list in addition to the WPAD service.
End user level remediation. At the end user level, the defense mechanisms are more
challenging since the leakage may be caused not only by OS-level hardcoding like those
in the WPAD name collision attack but also by application-level hardcoding such as by the
user account configurations in SIP and XMPP clients. Thus, we propose to design an name
collision defense software which can filter out DNS queries to the public namespace if they
are only intended to be resolved locally. To perform such filtering, a policy configuration
needs to be provided to specify whether the queries to a domain should be “local resolution
only”. This defense software can be integrated into corporate OS images and IT depart-
ments can set such policies during the initial device setup. For example, if the company
using the local domain name comp.ntld does not own the domain in the public names-
pace, it can simply set the policy for this domain as “local resolution only”. A long-term
remediation, though one that could require a significant amount of operational effort, is
to convert from using iTLDs to fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) as the root of this
threat stems from the use of iTLDs that collide with the globally delegated TLDs.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we perform a systematic study of the robustness of the service client de-
sign and implementations under name collision attacks for internal network services using
DNS-based service discovery. We measure the services exposed to this threat, and perform
vulnerability analysis on their clients. Our results show that nearly all the exposed services
have popular clients vulnerable, suggesting that the name collision problem broadly breaks
common security assumptions made in today’s internal network service clients. To demon-
strate the severity, we construct exploits and find a set of new name collision attacks with
severe security implications. Based on the insights from our study, we propose a series
of service software design level solutions, which enables the victim services to actively
defend against name collision attacks.
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CHAPTER VI
Systematic Discovery and Analysis of Algorithm-level
Vulnerabilities in Next-generation Smart Transportation
6.1 Introduction
Connected vehicle (CV) technology will soon transform today’s transportation systems.
In September 2016, the USDOT (U.S. Department of Transportation) launched the CV Pi-
lot Program as a national effort to deploy, test, and operationalize a series of CV-based
transportation systems [129, 35]. In these systems, vehicles and infrastructure are con-
nected through wireless communication, and leverage such connectivity to improve mo-
bility, safety, environmental impact, and public agency operations. These systems are cur-
rently under testing in three cities including New York City [129]. To push for a nationwide
deployment, USDOT has already proposed to mandate all new light-duty vehicles to equip
CV technology [128].
While having a great potential, such dramatically increased connectivity also opens a
new door for cyber attacks. To ensure the security of vehicles and transportation infrastruc-
ture and the safety of drivers and pedestrians, it is highly important to understand potential
security vulnerabilities so that they can be proactively addressed before nationwide deploy-
ment.
In this work, we perform the first security analysis on the next-generation CV-based
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transportation systems. As a first step, we target the USDOT sponsored design and imple-
mentation of a system called Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG), which performs one
of the most basic urban traffic operations, traffic signal control. In this system, real-time
vehicle trajectory data transmitted using the CV technology are used to intelligently con-
trol the duration and sequence of traffic signals. Such system is fully implemented and has
been tested on real road intersections in Anthem, AZ, and Palo Alto, CA, and has shown
to achieve a 26.6% reduction in total vehicle delay [82]. In this study, our goal is to iden-
tify fundamental security challenges, especially those specific to CV-based traffic control.
Thus, we are particularly interested in security problems that are at the signal control algo-
rithm level and are caused by design or implementation choices instead of implementation
bugs. The analysis results are expected to serve as a guideline for understanding whether
and why the current design or implementation choices in the I-SIG system are vulnerable,
as well as providing insights on how to fundamentally secure it before large-scale deploy-
ment.
The only attack requirement in our study is that attackers can compromise the vehicle-
side devices on their own vehicles or other people’s vehicles, and send malicious CV mes-
sages to the I-SIG system to influence the traffic control decisions. As reported by previous
work, such compromise can be performed physically [224], wirelessly [171], or through
malware [236]. Also, we assume that the vehicle certificate system developed by USDOT
(§2.3.1) can correctly authenticate all CV messages. Thus, instead of the sender identity,
the attack vehicle can only spoof its trajectory data, e.g., speed and location, in the CV
messages. To maximize the realism, in this work we assume that only one attack vehicle
exists in an intersection. This ensures that both our analysis and the discovered security
problems have high practical implications.
With such a threat model, the attack goal in our analysis is to create congestion in an
intersection. Traffic signal control has been proven to be one of the most cost effective way
to increase transportation productivity, and thus it is highly important to ensure its correct
141
and efficient functioning. This is exactly the reason why the USDOT focuses on deploying
the CV-based signal control system [129]. Thus, as the first security study, this work fo-
cuses on identifying the congestion creation vulnerabilities, aiming at directly subvert such
design goals.
We first analyze the I-SIG system design and identify a set of trajectory data spoofing
strategies that can potentially influence the signal control algorithms used in the system. We
then enumerate all the data spoofing options for the identified strategies on the I-SIG system
to understand the upper bound of the congestion attack effectiveness. A commercial-grade
traffic simulation software, PTV VISSIM [95], is used to generate synthetic traffic snap-
shots as the input to the I-SIG system for this analysis. Based on the results, we analyze
the causes for the highly effective attack results, and construct practical exploits under
real-world attack resource constraints.
In our analysis, we find that data spoofing attacks are highly effective for the signal
control algorithm with the default configurations in I-SIG: the spoofed trajectory data from
one single attack vehicle is able to increase the total delay by as high as 68.1%, which
completely reverses the benefit of using the I-SIG system (26.6% decrease) and cause the
mobility to be even 23.4% worse than that without using the I-SIG system. This is very
surprising, since the I-SIG system uses an optimal signal control algorithm that can mini-
mize the total delay of typically over 100 vehicles in an intersection. Thus, the data from
a single vehicle should not have such significant influence. We find that this is due to a
vulnerability at the signal control algorithm level, which we call the last vehicle advantage,
meaning that the latest arriving vehicle can determine the signal plan. Fundamentally, we
find that this is due to a trade off between security and deployability: due to the limited
computation power on the infrastructure-side devices, the developers are forced to choose
a less optimal configuration of the theoretically optimal signal control algorithm, which
unexpectedly exposes the congestion creation vulnerability.
Even though the deployability issue exists today, this problem may be resolvable in the
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future when the infrastructure-side devices have more computation power. Thus, we then
analyze whether the I-SIG system is still vulnerable with more optimal configurations. In
such scenario, we find that data spoofing attacks can still be highly effective when the I-SIG
system is in the operation mode for the transition period, i.e., when the market penetration
rate (PR) of the CV technology is lower than 95%. In such period, an algorithm that esti-
mates the status of unequipped vehicles, i.e., vehicles without CV technology, is performed
before the signal control algorithm. This is because the signal control algorithm can be very
ineffective due to lack of visibility of the unequipped vehicles, but we find that this allows
the attacker to manipulate such estimation process to create congestion using spoofed data.
To understand the real-world implications of the identified vulnerabilities, we construct
and fully implement the exploits, and evaluate them using simulations on a real-world
intersection map. To increase the realism, we videotaped all traffic flows in the intersection
for one hour and manually counted the passing vehicles as the input to the simulation
model. The results are consistent with our vulnerability analysis, and surprisingly, we
find that the attacks can even cause a blocking effect to jam an entire approach. Fig. 6.1
shows an snapshot in the simulation when the blocking effect is created. As shown, in the
northbound, southbound, and eastbound approaches, the vehicles in the left-turn lanes spill
over and block the through lanes, causing massive traffic jams. In such jamming period,
22% of the vehicles need to spend over 7 minutes for an originally half-minute trip, which
is 14 times higher.
Based on our analysis, even though the I-SIG system has shown high effectiveness in
reducing traffic delay in benign settings, the current algorithm design and configuration
choices are high vulnerable to data spoofing, and even the data from one single attack vehi-
cle is able to manipulate the traffic control to a great extent, causing massive congestion. To
addressed these problems, we discuss promising defense directions leveraging the insights
from our analysis.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
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Figure 6.1: The blocking effect created by our congestion attack on a real-world intersec-
tion map with real traffic demand. Due to the attack from one single attack vehicle parking
nearby, in the northbound and southbound approaches the vehicles in the left-turn lanes
spill over their lanes and directly block the entire approaches, causing massive traffic jams.
• We perform the first security analysis of a CV-based transportation system, the
USDOT sponsored I-SIG system. We formulate the problem with a highly realistic threat
model, data spoofing from one single attack vehicle, and analyze the system design to
identify a set of data spoofing strategies.
• Targeting the goal of creating congestion, we first perform vulnerability analysis to
understand the upper bound of the attack effectiveness. We analyze the causes for the highly
effective cases, and find that the current signal control algorithm design and configuration
choices are highly vulnerable to data spoofing from even a single attack vehicle. These
vulnerabilities exist throughout the full deployment and the transition periods, and can
cause the mobility to be even worse than that without using the I-SIG system.
• For the identified vulnerabilities, we construct practical exploits and evaluate them
under real-world intersection settings. The results validate the attack effectiveness; further-
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more, for the transition period, the attacks can even create a blocking effect that jams an
entire approach.
6.2 The I-SIG System
As the first security study on CV-based transportation systems, we target the CV-based
traffic control system developed in the DMA program, called Intelligent Traffic Signal Sys-
tem (I-SIG) [132]. In this system, real-time vehicle trajectory data transmitted via DSRC
are leveraged to perform more effective traffic signal control in an intersection.
In the DMA program, the development of I-SIG was assigned by USDOT to a team of
signal control experts. In this work, we use the latest released version, MMITSS-AZ [37].
This version is fully functional in the field, which has been tested in real intersections in
Anthem and Palo Alto and shown high effectiveness with a 26.6% reduction in the total
vehicle delay [82]. In this section, we first introduce some key concepts in signal control,
and then describe the I-SIG system design.
6.2.0.1 Traffic Control Concepts
As shown in Fig. 6.2, the I-SIG system is operated on an RSU located at an intersection
to control the traffic signals. As shown, there are 8 traffic signals, called phases. Phases
with odd numbers are for left-turn lanes; the others are for through lanes. Each phase is
initially configured with the minimum green light lasting time, tgmin , the maximum green
light lasting time, tgmax, the yellow light lasting time ty, and the clearance red light lasting
time tr. During the signal control, a phase can be set to turn green and last for a duration
tg. The green duration tg must be at least tgmin and at most tgmax; this is enforced at the
hardware level. After tg time passes, the phase will be yellow for ty, and then red for tr
before the subsequent phase turns green, which is for safety purposes since there might be
red light runners.
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Signal control is performed by setting tg and the phase sequence, which in combina-
tion called a signal plan. Fig. 6.3 illustrates a signal plan. Number 1 to 8 are phases,
and the green, yellow, and clearance red light periods for each phase are filled with the
corresponding colors. As shown, this plan has two phase sequences, called rings, op-
erating simultaneously. The phases in the same ring is in conflict with each other, and
thus need to be planned sequentially. This is called dual-ring signal phasing, which is the
NEMA (National Electrical Manufacturers Association) standard and the most common in
the U.S. [272]. For each ring, the phase sequence is broken down to stages. Two types of
stages are planned alternatively, one for phase 1, 2, 5, and 6, and another for phase 3, 4, 7,
and 8. The phases in the former stage type are in conflict with those in the latter stage type,
and thus the phases in the same stage are planned as a whole.
A signal control algorithm needs to follow the rules above, and plan (1) tg for each
phase, and (2) the sequence of phases in the same ring and same stage, e.g., phase 1 and 2
in the figure. A typical goal of such algorithm is to reduce the total delay for all vehicles
in the intersection. The delay time for a vehicle spent in an intersection is calculated as
the actual time the vehicle spent to pass the intersection subtracting the so-called free-flow
travel time, meaning that the vehicle is traveling at the speed limit without slowing down
or stopping due to red lights or other vehicles. The traffic load for an intersection is called
traffic demand.
6.2.0.2 System Design
Fig. 6.4 shows the design of the I-SIG system. The BSM messages broadcast by the
equipped vehicles are received by a component called trajectory awareness, which main-
tains the latest trajectory for each vehicle indexed by the vehicle ID in the BSM messages.
It also does some pre-processing tasks for the use in the signal planning component, e.g.,
assigning vehicle data to their requested phases based on the intersection map. The sig-
nal planning component listens to the traffic signal status reported by the signal controller,
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Figure 6.2: The operation scenario for the I-SIG system.
and launches signal planning stage by stage. More specifically, at the beginning of each
stage, the signal planning component pulls the pre-processed real-time trajectory data for
the vehicles in the intersection, performs the planning, and sends signal control commands
to the signal controller. In the current design, the following algorithms are used for signal
planning:
The COP algorithm. The signal planning in the I-SIG system uses a dual-ring version
of the COP (Controlled Optimization of Phases) algorithm[260, 197]. The input of the
COP algorithm is each approaching vehicle’s estimated arrival time at the intersection,
which is defined as the estimated remaining time for a vehicle to reach the stop bar of its
current lane. Based on the arrival time, COP uses dynamic programming to calculate an
optimal signal plan with the least estimated total delay. To estimate the total delay, COP
first estimates the releasing time for a vehicle based on the queue length at its arrival time.
If there is no queue, there is no delay; otherwise, it uses a queuing model to estimate when
the queue before the vehicle is cleared. Then, the delay for a vehicle is calculated as its
releasing time subtracting its arrival time. If there are no vehicle requesting a certain phase,
COP skips this phase in its planning so that the subsequent phases that have vehicle request
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of a signal plan. Number 1 to 8 are phases.
can be planned earlier.
In the design, COP can plan for unlimited number of stages until all vehicles in the
intersection can be served based on its estimation. Since there might be more vehicles ar-
riving at the phases in the second stage, the I-SIG system only applies the planned signal
duration for first stage at each signal control time. Since the operation of the signal con-
troller requires to know what the next phase is after the current phase, the I-SIG system
also sets the phase sequence for the next stage at the time of signal control. This means
that in Fig. 6.3, the I-SIG system cannot change the order of phases in the first stage, since
this is set by the signal control last time. It can change the duration of these phases, and the
sequence of the phases in the second stage based on the output of the COP algorithm.
In the current I-SIG system, a limit of the planning stages is configured in COP. This
is because in practice the signal planning needs to finish within tgmin , usually 5-7 seconds,
in order to be applied to the signal controller in time. Thus, with computation and memory
resource constraints in practice, COP cannot plan with unlimited stages like in its design.
With limited planning stages, the COP algorithm may not be able to serve all vehicles.
Thus, the current implementation in the I-SIG system first finds the plans with the least
unserved vehicles, and then choose the one with the least total delay. As shown later
in 6.6.3.1, such planning stage limit unexpectedly leaves the I-SIG system vulnerable to
congestion attacks.
Transition period: the EVLS algorithm. If the COP algorithm only optimizes the
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Figure 6.4: The I-SIG system design.
signal plan for the equipped vehicles, its effectiveness is found to be largely reduced if
the portion of the equipped vehicles is not sufficiently high, e.g., less than 95% [197].
Since it is estimated that the market penetration rate needs 25-30 years to reach at least
95% [135], the I-SIG system uses an algorithm called EVLS (Estimation of Location and
Speed) to estimate the trajectory data of the unequipped vehicles. In the EVLS algorithm,
the trajectory data of the equipped vehicles is used for such estimation leveraging multiple
traffic models (detailed later in §6.5.2).
Design representativeness and current deployment. The use of COP and EVLS is
chosen by the I-SIG designer, the team of USDOT-selected signal control experts, based
on a 2015 paper published in Transportation Research Part C [197], a top-tier journal in
transportation research. The COP algorithm is chosen because it is very suitable for the
CV environment: its input is the arrival time for individual vehicles instead of aggregated
traffic information, and thus can best leverage the per-vehicle trajectory data in the CV en-
vironment to effectively handle traffic dynamics. As discussed earlier, the EVLS algorithm
is developed to overcome the limitation of COP in the transition period. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the only design in the transportation literature that is fully imple-
mented and tested on real roads. In the CV Pilot Program, this system is currently under
deployment in Tampa [36].
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6.3 Threat Model
As illustrated in §6.2, the operation of the I-SIG system involves both infrastructure-side
devices, i.e., RSUs and signal controllers, and vehicle-side devices, the OBUs. Previous
work found that the traditional transportation infrastructure side devices tend to use weak
credentials so that attackers can easily take full control [202]. This is a known problem
across many embedded network devices [183] and we assume that the next generation CV-
based transportation systems will be fully aware of this problem, and adopt sufficiently
strong authentication mechanisms as advised by previous work [202] so that they cannot
be easily compromised.
Thus, in this work we focus on the attacks from the vehicle-side devices, the OBUs.
More specifically, we assume that the attacker can compromise the in-vehicle systems or
OBUs on their own vehicles or others’ vehicles so that she can send malicious BSM mes-
sages to the RSUs to influence the signal plan. It’s important to note that we do not as-
sume that the attackers can spoof the sender identities in the BSM messages. Introduced
in §2.3.1, the USDOT will deploy the SCMS system to ensure that all BSM messages are
authenticated. Since in this work we are more interested in new security problems specific
to CV-based traffic control, we assume that the SCMS system is sufficiently tested and not
easily exploitable.
Thus, in our threat model the attack vehicles need to use their true identities so that
the sent BSM messages are still correctly signed, but send spoofed vehicle trajectory data,
e.g., speed and location, in these messages. This can be achieved in two ways. First, the at-
tacker may directly compromise OBUs by exploiting software vulnerabilities, similar to the
demonstrated compromises on other Electronic Control Units (ECUs) [224, 171]. Second,
if compromising OBUs is difficult, the attacker can send fabricated CAN messages with
spoofed sensor data to the OBUs by compromising other ECUs [224, 171, 180]. Since
the attack model includes malicious vehicle owners who have arbitrary physical accesses,
as long as in-vehicle systems are not vulnerability-free, which has been proved repeat-
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edly [224, 171, 236], such compromises are always achievable in practice, just like the
smartphone jailbreaking/rooting practices today.
To maximize the realism of our threat model, in this work we assume that only one
attack vehicle presents in an intersection. Since the COP algorithm targets optimized total
delay for all vehicles in an intersection, which normally have over 100 of them, it should
be very challenging for the data from one single vehicle to significantly influence the signal
planning. However, as shown later, this is actually possible due to several newly-discovered
vulnerable design and configuration choices.
The attacker is assumed to have limited computation power to launch the attack, e.g.,
only using a consumer laptop. More specifically, when using paralleled computation, the
attack laptop is assumed to have four processors to execute simultaneously, which is a
common specification for consumer laptops such as Macbook Pro. Before attacking an
intersection, the attacker is assumed to have performed sufficient reconnaissance and thus
already knows (1) the signal control algorithm choices, by testing the algorithm-specific
vulnerabilities identified in this work (detailed later), and (2) signal control configurations
and the intersection map, by measuring the opened phases, the corresponding signal dura-
tion, and the intersection map beforehand.
Since in the CV environment the vehicles are broadcasting BSM messages to the sur-
rounding devices (§2.3.1) and the attack vehicle is in the victim intersection, we assume
that the attack vehicle can receive the same set of BSM messages as those in the RSU.
Thus, they can run the COP and EVLS algorithms themselves to know the executed signal
plans and also estimate the signal plans to be executed, which is also implemented in our
exploitation process(§6.7.1).
6.4 Analysis Methodology Overview
In this section, we describe the target attack goals and overview the analysis methodol-
ogy.
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6.4.1 Attack Goals
Targeting the traffic signal control functionality, our analysis considers three attractive
attack goals as follows:
Congestion attack. One immediate attack goal is to directly subvert the core design
goal of the I-SIG system, total vehicle delay reduction. More specifically, the attacker
aims to send spoofed trajectory data to influence the signal plan in order to increase the
total delay of other vehicles in the intersection. The attack vehicle is not necessarily in the
traffic flows; it might just park nearby, e.g., in a gas station as shown in Fig. 6.1, listening
to the BSM messages from other vehicles, and seek chances to launch attacks.
Such attacks can be politically or financially incentivized, e.g., blocking routes to busi-
ness competitors, like denial-of-service attacks on Internet. Since one attack vehicle can
only attack one intersection, to cause larger-scale damage, attackers can form groups to
attack consecutive intersections along arterial roads in an area.
Personal gain attack. Besides causing traffic jams, another attractive attack goal is
to change the traffic signal plan to decrease the travel time for the attack vehicle so that
the attacker can gain unfair advantage at the cost of other vehicles’ travel time in an in-
tersection. Different to the congestion attack scenario, the attack vehicle in this attack is
inside the traffic flow. While it approaches an intersection, instead of broadcasting BSM
messages like normal, it first listens to the broadcast driving data from other vehicles and
then launches data spoofing attacks for its own advantage.
Safety attack. Besides influencing the vehicle travel time, attacking traffic signal con-
trol can also increase the safety risks of other vehicles in an intersection. More specifically,
we target a safety problem specific to the traffic signal control domain, dilemma zone (DZ).
A dilemma zone is an area on the high-speed intersection approach, i.e., at least 35 mph,
where vehicles at the onset of the yellow light can neither safely stop before the stop line
nor proceed through the intersection by the start of the red light [286]. It has been rec-
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ognized as a major factor causing rear-end and right-angle crashes [279], leading to more
than one million car collisions a year where a quarter of them involves death or injury [38].
On average, it is estimated that each vehicle in the dilemma zone costs $1.13 for the victim
and the government [264].
Targeting this severe safety issue, the concrete goal of this attack is to change the traffic
signal plan to put as many victim vehicles as possible into the dilemma zone. Like the
congestion attack scenario, in this attack the attack vehicle does not need to be in the traffic
flow, and might just park near the intersection when launching the attack.
Later in §6.6.2, we will detail how we quantify the attack effectiveness for each of these
attack goals in our security analysis.
6.4.2 Analysis Methodology Overview
To understand how vulnerable the current I-SIG system design and implementation is
under our threat model, our security analysis consists of the following key steps:
(1) Data spoofing strategy identification. Before analyzing the vulnerability of the
I-SIG system, we first need to identify the meaningful data spoofing strategies. Since the
attack input is the data in the BSM messages, we analyze the data flow of the I-SIG sys-
tem starting from the receiving BSM messages to understand how the spoofed data can
potentially influence the signal control.
(2) Vulnerability analysis for each attack goal. With data spoofing strategies iden-
tified, we then enumerate all the data spoofing options for these strategies on the I-SIG
system to understand the upper-bound attack effectiveness. To quantifiably evaluate attack
effectiveness, we design quantification metrics for each of the attack goals based on their
definitions. To analyze the I-SIG system, we need realistic vehicle trajectory data as input
to trigger the signal planning. Since it is impossible to use real vehicles in an intersection
due to ethical concerns, our analysis uses a commercial-grade traffic simulation software,
PTV VISSIM [95], to simulate traffic patterns with a realistic modelling of driver behav-
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iors.
To ensure the generality of this analysis, we create an intersection map with the a
generic intersection structure and the common phase configuration in the U.S. We then
use VISSIM to generate traffic flows of normal demand following the common practices
in the transportation research area. We take snapshots of the vehicle trajectory data in the
simulation periodically, which is then used as the input to our analysis. For each snapshot,
we run the signal planning in the I-SIG system with and without attack data input, and
quantify the attack effectiveness using the defined metrics for the three attack goals.
(3) Cause analysis and practical exploit construction. With the attack effectiveness
for all possible data spoofing options quantified, we perform cause analysis for the highly
effective attacks to understand why the current signal control is vulnerable. Leveraging
the insights, we construct practical exploits under real-world attack resource constraints,
e.g., computation power of a normal laptop as described in our threat model (§6.3). As
detailed later in §6.7.1, this means that the attacker cannot exhaustively try all possible data
spoofing options before making the attack decision; instead, she needs to strategically plan
the attack decision process to ensure that she does not miss the attack timing.
(4) Evaluation using simulations with real-world intersection settings. To more
concretely understand the practical impact of the constructed exploits, we implement and
evaluate these exploits using simulations with real-world intersection settings. We use the
map of a real-world intersection with its real phase configurations, and generate traffic
flows according to the real traffic demand that we manually measured for one hour on
that intersection. Also, compared to attacking individual snapshots in the vulnerability
analysis step, in this experiment the attacks are continuously launched for one hour, closely
evaluating real-world attack situations.
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6.5 Data Spoofing Strategy
As the first step in our analysis, in this section we analyze attack input data flows to
identify data spoofing strategies.
6.5.1 Attack Input Data Flow and Direct Spoofing Strategy
Fig. 6.5 shows the attack input data flow in the I-SIG system. When the spoofed vehicle
trajectory data is received, it first performs a geofence check, and only accepts the data if
its location is within the geographic boundaries of the intersection. Thus, as described
in §6.3, the attacker needs to perform reconnaissance to know the geographic coordinates
of a targeted intersection, and only generate valid location data to pass the geofence check.
Then, if the configured PR in the I-SIG system is lower than 95%, it is considered
a transition period and the attack data are feed into the EVLS algorithm to estimate the
trajectory data for the unequipped vehicles. Otherwise, it is considered a full deployment
period and the EVLS algorithm is skipped.
A list of vehicle trajectory data entries, including the ones for both the equipped vehicles
and the estimated unequipped vehicles if it is during the transition period, is then processed
to a structure called arrival table. An arrival table is an array with two dimensions: the
estimated arrival time and the phases. The arrival time is rounded to seconds. Each array
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element at (i, j) is the number of vehicles for the arrival time i at phase j. The first row is
for vehicles with zero arrival time, meaning that they are stopped (speed is 0) and waiting
in queue.
The COP algorithm computes a signal plan with the optimal total delay for all vehicles
based on the arrival table. Thus, the direct goal of the data spoofing attack is to change the
values in the arrival table so that it can influence the planning in the COP algorithm. Since
each vehicle has a position in the arrival table, the direct data spoofing strategy is:
S1. Arrival time and phase spoofing, for both the full deployment and transition
periods. In both the full deployment and transition periods, the attacker can change the
speed and location in its BSM message to set the arrival time and the requested phase of
her choice and thus increase the corresponding arrival table element by one. In current
implementation, the arrival table considers vehicles arriving in no more than 130 seconds.
Thus, in this strategy the attacker has 131 (arrival time) × 8 (phase) data spoofing options.
6.5.2 Spoofing Strategy For The Transition Period Only
To change the arrival table, besides directly spoofing the attack vehicle’s own data, the
unequipped vehicle estimation process in the transition period is another attractive attack
target. Since both the data from equipped and unequipped vehicles are considered in the
arrival table, manipulating the estimation results may more significantly influence the signal
plan than only changing one vehicle’s data in S1.
The unequipped vehicle estimation process, i.e., the EVLS algorithm [197], is detailed
in the lower part of Fig. 6.5. As shown, the equipped vehicle data for each lane are first
assigned into three regions: (1) queuing region, including vehicles waiting in the queue
with zero speed, (2) slow-down region, including vehicles slowing down because of the
front vehicles, and (3) free-flow region, including vehicles far away from the queue so
that they behave independently. The algorithm first finds the stopped equipped vehicle
that is the farthest from the lane stop bar and uses its location as the end of the queuing
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region. The slow-down region started right after the queuing region, and the algorithm
uses the equipped vehicle’s trajectory data to judge whether it is slowing down due to an
unequipped front vehicle based on a car-following model. After the slow-down region
begins the free-flow region.
After the region assignment, the algorithm first estimates the number of vehicles in
queue by dividing the length of the queuing region by the sum of the vehicle length and
the headway in queue, which is 6.56 meters in the implementation. For the slow-down
region, for each pair of adjacent equipped vehicles, the algorithm inserts unequipped ve-
hicles between them based on the car-following model. Then if the number of vehicles
after the vehicle addition in the queuing and slow-down regions is smaller than the num-
ber of equipped vehicles divided by the PR, the algorithm adds the remaining unequipped
vehicles to the free-flow region.
Among the three regions, we find that manipulating the estimation of the queuing region
is most effective. The attacker can just set the speed to zero and set its location to the
farthest possible point of the most empty lane within the geofence so that the lane can be
fully filled with queuing vehicles after the estimation. In comparison, attacking the slow-
down region is less effective since (1) the number of vehicles it can add is fewer since
the space headway between moving vehicles in the car-following model is larger than that
between queuing vehicles, and (2) the increased delay by adding moving vehicles is no
greater than that by adding queuing vehicles, since the queuing releasing process can create
more delay as introduced in §6.2. Since the COP algorithm is designed to optimize the total
delay, more vehicles to add and more delay time to increase can have more impact on the
signal planning.
Thus, the best strategy is attacking the queue estimation:
S2. Queue length manipulation, for the transition period only. In the transition
period, the attacker can change the speed and location data in its BSM message to set
the location of the farthest stopped vehicle in a chosen lane, and thus add a number of
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unequipped queuing vehicles after the original farthest stopped vehicle in the EVLS algo-
rithm. Since this attack only adds queuing vehicles, the change to the arrival table is at the
first row. For each phase, the attacker has multiple data spoofing options that can increase
the value from by one to by the maximum queue length she can add considering the loca-
tion of the originally farthest stopped vehicle and the geofence range of the lanes in that
phase.
6.6 Vulnerability Analysis
In this section, we use the identified data spoofing strategies to analyze the vulnerability
status of the I-SIG system.
6.6.1 Experiment Setup
Traffic snapshot generation. As described earlier in §6.4.2, we use a generic in-
tersection settings for this analysis. The intersection structure, e.g., number of lanes for
each phase, is shown earlier in Fig. 6.2. The speed limits for all approaches are 40 mph.
Each arm of the intersection is set to about 300 meters from the center of the intersection,
which is similar to the DSRC communication range [195]. The tgmin , tgmax , ty, and tr
of each phase are configured according to the recommendations from the Signal Timing
Manual [272]. In this generic intersection, we use VISSIM to generate vehicles at 0.7 v/c
(vehicle per capacity), which corresponds to the medium traffic demand level [235]. Then
we run the I-SIG system, and take vehicle trajectory snapshots every time the I-SIG system
needs to perform signal planning.
We run the traffic simulation for each scenario three times, each time lasting one hour
with a different random seed following the common practices in the transportation research
area [260, 164]. In total, we generated 873 snapshots. These snapshots are directly used
when we experiment for the fully deployment period. When experimenting for the transi-
tion period, we consider three PR levels, 25%, 50%, and 75%, which is the same as that in
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the EVLS algorithm paper [197]. In these experiments, we still use the 873 snapshots, but
randomly select a subset of data according to the PR. The random seed for such selection
is the same for all experiments with the same PR so that their results are comparable.
Attack data generation. Using these snapshots, we perform vulnerability analysis of
the I-SIG system for congestion attacks by trying all data spoofing options for the strategies
identified in §6.5. For the full deployment period, only strategy S1 is experimented, and
for the transition period, both S1 and S2 are experimented. For each data spoofing trial, a
new vehicle trajectory data entry with the spoofed data is added to the traffic snapshot as
the attack input.
6.6.2 Attack Effectiveness Quantification
For each snapshot, we run the I-SIG system to get the signal plans with and without
attack. Since our goal is to understand the upper bound attack effectiveness, for a snap-
shot and a chosen data spoofing strategy, we pick the attack result from the most effective
data spoofing trial. Based on the semantics of the attack goals, we calculate the attack
effectiveness as follow:
Congestion attack. For the goal of creating congestions, we analyze the attack effec-
tiveness by comparing the total delay of all vehicles with and without the attack input in
each snapshot. For the signal plans with attack, the total vehicle delay time is calculated
after the attack vehicle data being removed. For the transition period, the ground truth
unequipped vehicle data (instead of the estimated data) are used in the calculation.
In the delay calculation, we use the same vehicle delay estimation method in the COP
algorithm (§6.2). Since this calculation is based on the arrival time estimation, the calcu-
lated delay is not the actual delay since the vehicles may not behave as predicted after the
snapshot is taken. However, considering that the COP algorithm has a demonstrated effec-
tiveness [82, 197], such estimation is effective for our purpose, i.e., comparing the attack
effectiveness among different attack trials. In addition, since our goal is to study the vul-
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nerabilities at the signal control algorithm level, using this estimation method allows us to
directly evaluate the attack’s influence on the signal planning in the COP algorithm. Later
in our attack evaluation (§6.7.2), we will directly measure the actual vehicle delay using
the ground truth vehicle trajectory in VISSIM.
In this analysis, we quantify the attack effectiveness using three metrics: (1) attack suc-
cess rate, which is the percentage of the snapshots with the total delay increased under the
attack, which we also call vulnerable snapshots, (2) average delay increase time, which is
the average absolute increase of the total delay under attack, and (3) average delay increase
percentage, which is the average ratio of the increased total delay under attack to the total
delay without attack.
Personal gain attack. For the goal of decreasing the attacker vehicle’s travel time, we
need to specify an attack vehicle first for the effectiveness calculation. In our analysis, we
randomly pick a vehicle in each traffic snapshot as the attack vehicle, and remove it from the
snapshot before attack trials. For the signal plan with and without attack, we only compare
the travel delay for the selected attack vehicle. Like in the congestion attack, we use the
same vehicle delay estimation method in the COP algorithm for the delay calculation.
In this analysis, we quantify the attack effectiveness using three metrics: (1) attack suc-
cess rate, which is the percentage of the snapshots with the attack vehicle’s delay decreased
under the attack, (2) average delay decrease time, which is the average absolute decrease of
the attack vehicle’s delay under attack, and (3) average delay decrease percentage, which
is the average ratio of the decreased attack vehicle’s delay to its delay without attack.
Safety attack. As defined in §6.4.1, for this goal the attacker aims to put as many
vehicles as possible into dilemma zones. For the signal plan with and without attack, we
calculate the total number of vehicles inside dilemma zones using the definition of dilemma
zone in the transportation field [286].
In this analysis, we quantify the attack effectiveness using three metrics: (1) attack
success rate, which is the percentage of the snapshots with the number of vehicles inside
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CV Full deployment Transition period
deployment 100% PR 75% PR
COP configuration 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S
Strategy S1 S1 S1 S2 S1 S2
Success % 99.9% 96.4% 99.1% 98.3% 83.2% 96.8%
Average delay 1078.7 162.7 982.2 536.3 167.3 533.9
increase (s) & % 68.1% 11.5% 60.2% 32.7% 10.6% 33.5%
Table 6.1: Vulnerability analysis results for congestion attacks in full deployment period
and transition period with 75% penetration rate. PR is short for penetration rate. Two-stage
planning and five-stage planning in the COP algorithm configuration are denoted as 2-S
and 5-S respectively, with the former being the default choice.
dilemma zone increased under the attack, (2) average in-DZ vehicle increase, which is
the average absolute increased number of vehicles inside dilemma zone under attack, and
(3) average in-DZ vehicle increase percentage, which is the average ratio of the increased
number of vehicles inside dilemma zone to that without attack.
6.6.3 Congestion Attack Analayis
In this section, we analyze the results for congestion attacks. The results for the full
deployment period is in §6.6.3.1 and those for the transition period is in 6.6.3.2.
6.6.3.1 The Full Deployment Period
The attack results for the full deployment period are shown in Column 2 to 3 in Ta-
ble 6.1. In these columns, non-successful attacks means that the total vehicle delay is not
changed. As introduced in §6.2, the COP algorithm implemented in I-SIG configures a
limit on the number of planning stages. By default it uses two-stage planning, which is
denoted as 2-S in the table. We first analyze the results with such default configuration:
Two-stage planning results. As shown in Column 2 in Table 6.1, we find that S1 is
quite effective in creating congestions: it is able to successfully increase the total delay
for nearly all (99.9%) snapshots with as high as 68.1% delay increase. In comparison, the
benefit of using the I-SIG system is only a 26.6% total delay reduction [82], but our attack
can completely reverse such benefit and cause the traffic mobility to be even 23.4% worse
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CV Transition period
deployment 50% PR 25% PR
COP configuration 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S
Strategy S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Success % 99.4% 99.2% 83.0% 97.4% 99.9% 98.9% 82.0% 91.6%
Average delay 1001.3 536.2 206.6 569.6 1009.2 531.1 295.8 616.7
increase (s) & % 61.4% 33.0% 12.5% 34.6% 60.6% 32.4% 17.0% 34.3%
Table 6.2: Vulnerability analysis results for congestion attacks in transition period with
50% and 25% penetration rates. PR is short for penetration rate. Two-stage planning
and five-stage planning in the COP algorithm configuration are denoted as 2-S and 5-S
respectively, with the former being the default choice.
than that without using the I-SIG system. This is very surprising, since COP optimizes for
the total delay of typically over 100 vehicles in an intersection, and a single vehicle data
should not have such significant influence.
Vulnerability cause: last vehicle advantage. By manually examining the signal plan
output, we find that for all the vulnerable snapshots, the most successful attack trial adds
a spoofed vehicle with very late arrival time. In this work, we call it the last vehicle ad-
vantage, which is illustrated in Fig. 6.6. As shown, in the signal plan, such late vehicle
determines the green light end time for its requested phase. This delays the green light
begin time for all the phases after it, and thus increases the delay for the vehicles in these
phases. If tg of the phase with this late vehicle reaches tgmax , the tg for the phases before
this phase will also extend in order to serve this late vehicle, which further delays the ve-
hicles in later phases. Fig. 6.6 illustrates such attack on phase 2. As shown, due to the
spoofed late arriving vehicle, the tg of all the phases in the first stage are extended in order
to be able to serve it, causing long delay to serving time of the vehicles in the second stage.
However, as an algorithm optimizing for the delay of all vehicles, COP should just give
up serving this very late vehicle in this green light if serving it costs too much delay for
other vehicles. We find that the root cause lies in the planning stage limit when imple-
menting COP in practice. Since the default configuration uses two-stage planning, each
phase can only be planned once. Thus, for each phase, planning has to serve all vehicles in
this only serving opportunity, causing the planning to be significantly affected by the last
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arriving vehicle.
This issue can be alleviated when the COP algorithm is allowed to plan for more stages.
For example, if the planning stage limit is four, COP now has two opportunities to serve
the vehicles for one phase. Thus, even if a vehicle arrives very late, it can delay serving it
to the second opportunity. In this case, vehicles in other phases can be served in the first
opportunity and thus is less likely to be affected. Fig. 6.7 shows the percentage of snapshots
vulnerable to the last vehicle advantage for the COP algorithm configured with two-stage
to eight-stage planning. In the calculation, a snapshot is concluded vulnerable if the most
successful attack trial comes from a spoofed vehicle arriving the last in its request phase.
As shown, for two-stage planning, nearly all the snapshots can be the most successfully
attacked using the last vehicle advantage, and such percentage decreases when more plan-
ning stages are configured. The most significant decrease is at four-stage planning, since
with such configuration all phases get two serving opportunities. With over four planning
stages, the last vehicle advantage is no longer the best trial for any snapshot.
Trade off between security and deployability. Knowing that two-stage planning is
highly vulnerable to late arriving vehicles, we are curious why the I-SIG system devel-
opers chose to set it as the default value. We contacted the developers and find that it is
actually an interesting trade off between deployability and security. As indicated by the
developers, they chose two-stage planning because the running time for more planning
stages are too high in practice to meet the planning deadline. Since the planning has to
finish in tgmin (§6.2), which is typically around 5-7 seconds [272], they told us that running
three-stage planning on their RSUs takes more than three seconds due to the limited com-
putation power on RSUs, making it too risky to use. Meanwhile, in their testing, they find
two-stage planning does not have much planning effectiveness degradation in comparison
to five-stage planning, so they choose it as the default value.
They told us that they use the mainstream Savari StreetWAVE RSU [103] and the 95
percentile running time for two-stage planning takes 1.2 seconds. We then use the ratio
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between this number and the corresponding running time on our machine to estimate the
running time for more planning stages on these RSUs. As shown in Fig. 6.7, our estima-
tion results are consistent with their observations: purely running COP with three planning
stages takes around 3 seconds, and with communication delay and the running time of
other parts, e.g., the EVLS algorithm, it is indeed risky to use more than two planning
stages. In our snapshots without attack, we also confirmed that using two-stage planning
only has 6.5% increase in total delay on average than that using five-stage planning. Thus,
choosing two-stage planning is indeed a practical choice that trades small planning effec-
tiveness degradation for reliability. However, such choice is found to be highly exploitable
leveraging the last vehicle advantage.
Expected to be mounted outdoor in every intersection, RSUs need to be sufficiently
reliable with low cost, which leads to performance constraints just like many real-time
embedded systems today [241, 231]. While we have shown that such constraints today
cause security vulnerabilities, we envision that this situation may be resolvable in future
when the infrastructure-side devices have more computation power. Thus, we are also
interested in exploring whether the I-SIG system is still vulnerable after the last vehicle
advantage is largely mitigated, i.e., with more planning stages configured. Thus, next we
perform analysis for the I-SIG system with five-stage planning, with which exploiting last
vehicle advantage is no longer the most successful trial (shown in Fig. 6.7).
Five-stage planning results. Column 3 in Table 6.1 shows the results after we con-
figure the COP algorithm to use five-stage planning. As shown, even though the success
rate is still high, the attack is much less effective: both the increased total delay time and
percentage are nearly 7× less. Thus, without the last vehicle advantage, the I-SIG system
becomes much less vulnerable to the data spoofing from one attack vehicle.
Nevertheless, the attacks can still cause a 11.5% total delay increase on average. Con-
sidering that the benefit of using the I-SIG system is around 26.2% total delay reduc-
tion [82], the attack result still shows moderate effectiveness. We analyze the causes and
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find two types of effective spoofing trials:
• Open a skipped phase. If there are skipped phases, the attacker can add the spoofed
vehicle to one of them to force the signal planning to open it. Since an open phase needs
at least tgmin green light time, which is 7 seconds in our generic intersection settings [272],
this causes the signal plan under attack to waste the time in serving an empty phase at
the cost of the vehicle delay in other phases. If only trying this category of data spoofing
options, the total delay increase percentage is 8.9%, which is already very close to that
165
(11.5%) with all data spoofing options enumerated.
• Extend the green light end time. Besides opening a skipped phase, the most suc-
cessful data spoofing options are to set the spoofed vehicle arrival time to a few seconds
after the original green light end time for a phase. This vehicle needs to wait for a whole
planning stage if its serving is delayed to the next serving opportunity, which increases its
delay and also the total delay by 20-50 seconds depending on the length of the next plan-
ning stage. Thus, in COP it is sometimes more cost effective by just extending the original
green light end time for a few seconds to serve this vehicle. However, such extension is
usually at most 4 seconds since it is no longer cost effective if the total delay added to the
vehicles waiting in the subsequent phases is too much.
The data spoofing options for these two categories in total has around 10.1% in the
total delay increase percentage. For the remaining 1.4% difference to that with all options
enumerated, we find that the left-out successful trials are highly dependent on the traffic
pattern and do not have a clear pattern.
6.6.3.2 The Transition Period
In this section, we analyze the vulnerability status of the I-SIG system in the transition
period. The analysis results are shown in Column 4 to 7 in Table 6.1 and column 2 to 9 in
Table 6.2. In the transition period, strategy S2 can now be used in addition to S1. Thus, in
this section we analyze both strategies for each PR and planning stage configuration. As
described in §6.5.2, S2 can add a number of non-existing unequipped vehicles by exploiting
the queue length estimation in the EVLS algorithm. Since there are around 100 vehicles in
each snapshot, these non-existing vehicles constitute a substantial share of total vehicles in
the signal planning. This should trick the COP algorithm into giving more priorities to this
big group of non-existing vehicles at the cost of other vehicles’ delay.
Overall effectiveness. As shown in the table, for a combination of a PR, a planning
stage configuration, and a data spoofing strategy, the attack success rates and the average
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total delay increase percentages are 94.0% and 38.2% on average. This show that both
strategy S1 and S2 are effective in creating congestion and can completely reverse the mo-
bility benefit of using the I-SIG system. Also, we find that for each combination, the three
attack effectiveness metrics are relatively the same, with less than 6% absolute differences
in the average total delay increase percentages. This shows that the attack effectiveness is
not significantly affected by PR. Next, we perform more in-depth analysis for the attacks
on the two-stage and five-stage planning configurations respectively.
Two-stage planning results. Column 4-5 in Table 6.1 and column 2-3, and 6-7 in
Table 6.2 show the attack results for the two-stage planning. As shown, strategy S1 can
still achieve over 99.1% success rate, and increase over 60.6% in the total delay. We find
that the underlying cause is the same as that for the full deployment period: the last vehicle
advantage (§6.6.3.1). Since the arrival time to maximally extend the green light time of the
phases is not affected by the traffic conditions, the last vehicle advantage can always be
reliably exploited for the two-stage planning scenarios regardless of the PR.
Strategy S2, which is newly enabled in the transition period, also shows high effective-
ness. For all three PRs, the attack success rates are over 98.3%, and the average total delay
increase percentages are over 32.4%. However, the increased percentages are still around
50% less than those using S1. We compare the most successful data spoofing options from
S1 and S2, and find that for 99.0% of the snapshots, the best trial from S1 is no less than
that from S2. We find that this is because even though adding the non-existing vehicles
can indeed cause the signal planning to extend the tg of a target phase to tgmax like S1, last
vehicle advantage is able to further cause the tg of the preceding phases to extend so that
the vehicles in the subsequent phases can be further delayed.
Five-stage planning results. Column 6-7 in Table 6.1 and column 4-5, and 8-9 in Ta-
ble 6.2 show the results for five-stage planning. As shown, since the last vehicle advantage
is much less effective for five-stage planning, the success rates and average delay increase
percentages for S1 reduce to at most 83.2% and 17% respectively, as opposed to at least
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99.1% and 60.2% for two-stage planning. Very similar to the full deployment period, we
find that the most successful data spoofing trials are opening a skipped phase and extending
green light end time.
Thus, with the last vehicle advantage becoming much less effective, S2 is now the dom-
inating strategy. We compare the results between these two strategies for each snapshot,
and find that for 93.5% of the snapshots, the best trial from S2 is no less than that from
S1. We then analyze which data spoofing trials in S2 are the most successful. We find that
for a certain phase, the best trial is to add the most non-existing unequipped vehicles, i.e.,
adding a farthest stopped vehicle using S2. If we only try these 8 options (one for each
phase), the best trials among them and those among all possible data spoofing options only
have 0.009% differences in the average total delay increase percentage. This is expected
since adding more non-existing vehicles should gain more priority in signal planning and
thus cost more delay to the other vehicles. For very few cases these 8 options fail to hit the
most successful data spoofing trial. This is caused by the differences between the estimated
and actual arrival time of the unequipped vehicles; if we calculate the attack effectiveness
based on the estimated arrival time from the EVLS algorithm, these 8 options are always
the best. Thus, in our exploit construction later, we only need to consider these 8 options,
which is much less than trying all (usually over 250) possible options.
6.6.4 Personal Gain and Safety Attacks
In this section, we analyze the results for personal gain and safety attacks. Compared to
the congestion attack, launching these two types of attacks effectively requires the attackers
to have much higher signal control capabilities. For the congestion attack, total vehicle
delay increase can be achieved as long as the attack can create a mismatch between the
signal plan and the actual traffic demand, e.g., by giving a long green light to a phase with
nearly empty traffic. The more significant the mismatch is, the longer vehicle delay time
can be causes. Thus, as long as the attack is able to change the original signal plan, the goal
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Attack goal Effectiveness Attack scenarios
metrics S1, 2-S S2, 5-S
100% PR 75% PR 75% PR
Success % 9.5% 12.7% 38.2%
Personal gain attack Ave. delay 17.4 16.2 13.6
dec. (s) & % 32.4% 28.9% 29.1%
Success % 0% 0% 9.4%
Safety attack Ave. in-DZ 0 0 0.11
vehicle inc. # & % 0% 0% 132%
Table 6.3: Vulnerability analysis results for personal gain attack and safety attack. PR is
short for penetration rate. Two-stage planning and five-stage planning in the COP algorithm
configuration are denoted as 2-S and 5-S respectively, with the former being the default
choice. For the transition period, we only show the results for 75% PR since the results for
50% and 25% PRs are very similar to those for 75% PR.
of congestion attack is achieved.
In comparison, achieving personal gain and safety attacks are not just about changing
the original signal plan. For the personal gain attack, it needs to (1) change the green light
for a specific phase that the attack vehicle is in, and (2) change that green light in favor of
the travel time of a specific vehicle, i.e., the attack vehicle, not just a mismatch with the
overall traffic demand for that phase. For the safety attack, it does not require the attack
to be capable of controling a specific traffic signal, but it needs very precise control of the
green light length, i.e., with the error of at most 2 to 3 seconds, so that it can put vehicles
at the dilemma zone when the green light is off [286].
Thus, the signal control capability requirements for personal gain and safety attacks are
the subset of those for the congestion attacks. According to the vulnerability analysis for
the congestion attack in §6.6.3, there are two effective attack scenarios that can potentially
have the signal control capability needs for personal gain and safety attacks:
• S1 for two-stage planning. As analyzed in §6.6.3, when I-SIG is using two-stage
planning, the default configuration, in both full deployment and transition periods, the
attacker can exploit last vehicle advantage to control the green light length for a specific
phase.
• S2 for transition period. As analyzed in §6.6.3.2, when I-SIG is not vulnerable to
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last vehicle advantage, e.g., when using five-stage planning, in the transition periods the
attacker can exploit the vulnerability in the queue estimation in the EVLS algorithm to
control the green light length for a given phase.
Thus, in our experiments we perform vulnerability analysis for personal gain and safety
attacks in these two attack scenarios. Table 6.3 shows a summary of the results.
6.6.4.1 Personal Gain Attack Analysis
In this section, we analyze the results for the personal gain attack under the two attack
scenarios: S1 for two-stage planning and S2 for transition period.
S1 for two-stage planning. As shown in Table 6.3, different from the congestion at-
tack, the success rates for personal gain attacks in the attack scenario for S1 is very low:
only around 10%. We inspect the attack logs and find that the cause is that last vehicle
advantage is in fact not effective for personal gain attack. In two-stage planning, due to the
last vehicle advantage, the system is already trying to extend all the green light to serve all
the vehicles for all the phase. Thus, for an attack vehicle, if it comes after the planned green
light, the system simply cannot extend the green light any more due to hard traffic signal
length limitations such as tgmax (introduced in §6.2.0.1). If it comes before the planned
green light, it needs to reduce the green light lengths of earlier phases, which cannot be
achieved with last vehicle advantage. Thus, in the table, none of the successful personal
gain attacks comes from lst vehicle advantage.
For the successful cases in Table 6.3, we find that they are dependent on specific traffic
patterns. For example, when there is a skipped phase that should happen before the attack
vehicle’s phase, the attack vehicle can inject a spoofed vehicle to open that phase. In this
case, even originally the attack vehicle cannot be served even when the green light of its
corresponding phase is tgmax , the skipped phase opened by the attack vehicle can delay the
attack vehicle’s phase, thus making it possible to serve the attack vehicle. Even thought
these cases do not appear very often, leading to only around 10% success rate, the benefit
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of attacking them is substantial: the attacks can reduce the vehicle delay by around 30% as
shown in Table 6.3.
S2 for transition period. Compared to the attack scenario for S1, the attack success
rate for the scenario for S2 in the transition period is much higher, achieving nearly 40%.
For these success cases, the personal gains are all achieved by exploiting the queue esti-
mation vulnerability in the EVLS algorithm. Without last vehicle advantage, the attack
vehicles can be left out in green lights and thus adding queues of unequipped vehicles can
extend the attack vehicle’s phase till the attack vehicle’s arrival time to achieve personal
gain. At the same time, for the cases when the attack vehicle comes before the planed
green light, it can also add queues of unequipped vehicles to increase the importance of its
corresponding phase. This can force the algorithm to decrease the green light lengths of
the earlier phases and thus serve the attack vehicle earlier. As shown in Table 6.3, personal
gain attacks under this attack scenario not only have high success rate, but also have around
30% gains in vehicle delay time. It’s important to note that even though the delay decrease
percentage for this attack scenario is similar to the attack scenario for S1, the success rate
is around 3× higher, making this attack scenario much more cost-effective.
6.6.4.2 Safety Attack Analysis
In this section, we analyze the results for the safety attack under the two attack scenar-
ios: S1 for two-stage planning and S2 for transition period.
S1 for two-stage planning. As shown in Table 6.3, safety attacks in the attack scenario
for S1 is not effective at all: the success rate is 0%. We double checked the attack logs
and confirmed that none of the attack cases are able to put more vehicles into the dilemma
zone. Similar to the personal gain attacks in this attack scenario discussed in §6.6.4.1, this
is mainly because the I-SIG system tries to serve all vehicles due to last vehicle advantage.
Thus, in nearly all cases the I-SIG system already serves all vehicles and no victim vehicles
can be found even if last vehicle advantage can extend the green light. Theoretically, if there
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are vehicles coming within a few seconds after the green light when the green light length
is tgmax , the attack vehicle can use last vehicle advantage to extend the green light to tgmax
and thus put those vehicles in the dilemma zone. However, such cases may be too rare and
thus we are not able to observe them in our experiments.
S2 for transition period. Same as the personal gain attacks for this attack scenario, the
attack cases are able to exploit the queue estimation vulnerability in the EVLS algorithm
to achieve safety risk increases. However, the success rate is only 9.4%, which is not high.
Like we discussed earlier, safety attacks require very precise control of the green light
length. Thus, even with the ability to add queuing unequipped vehicles, the attack is still
not easy to succeed. Nevertheless, for the success cases, the attacker is able to increase
the number of in-DZ vehicles by 132% on average. This more than doubles the safety
risks in normal cases, which is thus quite substantial considering the severity of the attack
consequences.
6.7 Exploitation Case Study: Congestion Attack
6.7.1 Exploit Construction
Real-time attack requirement. In the last section, to understand the upper bound
of the attack effectiveness, we enumerate all data spoofing options, which takes around
24.5 minutes on average on a single core computer. Since we only assume the attacker to
have a consumer laptop that has four processors with usually around 3× speedup, this full
enumeration takes 8 minutes on average. However, in practice the attack decision needs to
be made fast enough so that the traffic condition does not change so much that the attack
decision no longer applies.
Thus, to explore the end-to-end exploitability of the identified congestion creation vul-
nerabilities, in this section we take the real-time attack requirement into consideration and
leverage the insights from our analysis in the last section to perform practical exploit con-
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struction.
6.7.1.1 Attack Decision Process
To meet the real-time attack requirement, our exploit construction uses a budget-based
attack decision process. In this process, the attacker first passively tracks the phase changes.
Once the phase in the current stage turns yellow, the attacker waits for 1 second and then
triggers the decision process. This is based on our observation that after one second of
yellow light all moving vehicles slow down and their trajectories start to stabilize. Since
typically ty + tr is 6 seconds [272], this gives the attacker up to 5 seconds of decision time.
In the decision period, the attacker first predicts the vehicle trajectory data at the next
signal planning time. Like in the trajectory awareness component in the I-SIG system
(§6.2.0.2), the attacker maintains a vehicle trajectory database to store data like location,
speed, and acceleration for the equipped vehicles based on the received broadcast BSM
messages. In the prediction, the attacker assumes that the vehicles maintain their accelera-
tions and thus predicts their speeds and locations after 5 seconds. In this step, the attacker
needs to use the intersection map obtained from the reconnaissance step (§6.3) to deter-
mine whether a vehicle passes the stop bar of that lane after 5 seconds. If so and the current
acceleration value is negative, we predict that it plans to have a hard stop at the stop bar
and set the stop bar location as the predicted location.
Next, the attacker needs to make decisions about whether to attack, and if so, what data
spoofing option to use. According to our vulnerability analysis, some of the most successful
data spoofing trials are related to the signal plan without attack, e.g., the green light end
time. Thus, the attacker first runs the I-SIG system for the predicted vehicle trajectory data
without trying any data spoofing option. Using the output signal plan and total vehicle
delay without attack, the attacker then tries several data spoofing options just like in the
vulnerability analysis, and pick the most successful one to use in the actual attack.
Since running the I-SIG system is time consuming, a trial budget is used to ensure that
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CV Full deployment Transition period
deployment 100% PR 75% PR 50% PR 25% PR
COP configuration 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S
Strategy S1 S1 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Average trial # 3.8 13.3 3.8 14.7 3.8 23.9 3.6 28.8
Success % 99.8% 84.7% 99.1% 95.6% 99.4% 96.6% 99.8% 91.5%
Average delay 1077.4 119.8 1057.1 595.3 1061.0 591.7 1008.98 609.6
increase (s) & % 68.0% 9.3% 60.0% 35.4% 61.2% 35.1% 60.6% 33.9%
Table 6.4: Practical exploit effectiveness for congestion attacks. PR is short for penetration
rate. Two-stage planning and five-stage planning in the COP algorithm configuration are
denoted as 2-S and 5-S respectively, with the former being the default choice.
the whole decision process can finish in 5 seconds. Assuming the other parts, e.g., the BSM
transition time and other local computation time, take less than 1 second (which typically
take much less), we spare 4 seconds in total for (1) running the I-SIG system without
attack, and (2) trying the data spoofing options. Since these trials are independent to each
other, we use parallel computation to accelerate this part. We first measure the running
time for the signal planning without attack, tnormal, and then calculate the trial budget as
3 × 4−tnormal
tnormal
, as the personal laptop with four processors in our lab is measured to have
around 3× speedup. With this, the attacker can plan their trials under this budget. The
detailed budget-based trial strategies for different attack scenarios are described in the next
section.
Based on the trial results, the attacker finds the data spoofing option with the highest
total delay increases. If such increase is larger than zero, the attacker uses the corresponding
data spoofing option to construct the BSM message and broadcast it out. Otherwise, the
attacker does not attack.
6.7.1.2 Exploitation Strategy
In this section, we describe the exploitation strategies, i.e., the budget-based data spoof-
ing trial strategies, for different combinations of PRs and planning stage configurations.
Table 6.4 summarizes the attack effectiveness for the constructed exploits in this section.
E1: Congestion attack for two-stage planning:
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(1) In the first stage, if there are no skipped phases, try the data spoofing option with the
latest arrival time for any of the two latter phases in stage 1, and then jump to (3). Trying
the latter phases is because their latest vehicles are able to further extend the tg of the two
former phases to tgmax .
(2) In the first stage, if there is a skipped phase, try the data spoofing option with the
latest arrival time for this phase, and then jump to step (3). If there are two skipped and the
budget allows more trials, try both and then jump to step (3). This is because opening an
originally skipped phase can cause more total delay increase as explained in §6.6.3.1.
(3) In the second stage, if there are no skipped phases, try the two data spoofing options
with the latest arrival time for the two former phases. If the budget allows more trials, try
the latest arrival time for the two latter phases. Try the former phases first is because their
latest vehicles can cause phase sequence switches to further increase the delay.
(4) In the second stage, if there is a skipped phase, try the data spoofing options with
the latest arrival time for this phase. If the budget allows more trials, try the latest arrival
time for the former phases, and then the latter phases. If there are two skipped phase, try
the two data spoofing options with the latest arrival time for these two phases.
As introduced in §6.2.0.2, at each planning time only the planned duration for the first
stage is immediately applied. Thus, in the above strategy we prioritize the attacking on the
first stage so that the attack has an immediate effect. Also, in this strategy we only consider
at most two skipped phase since we do not observe any snapshot in our analysis has more
than two skipped phases under the normal traffic demand.
E2: Congestion attack for five-stage planning in the full deployment period:
(1) If there are skipped phases, try any data spoofing option for each of these phases. If
the budget is not enough, prioritize the ones in the earlier stages.
(2) Try the data spoofing options bg seconds after the originally green end time for
each open phase. For the first time entering this step, bg is 1. If the budget is not enough,
prioritize the ones in the earlier stages.
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Figure 6.8: Relative differences between the average delay increase percentages using the
three exploits with limited trial budgets and those by trying all possible options.
(3) If the budget allows more trials, repeatedly try (2) with bg being increased by 1 each
time until the budget is used up.
E3: Congestion attack for five-stage planning in the transition period:
(1) For the through phases, try the data spoofing options that addQp non-existing queu-
ing unequipped vehicles for each phase p. If the budget is not enough, prioritize the ones
in the first stage.
(2) For the left-turn phases, try the data spoofing options that add Qp non-existing
queuing unequipped vehicles for each phase p. If the budget is not enough, prioritize the
ones in the first stage.
(3) If the budget allows more trials, repeatedly try (1) and (2) with Qp being decreased
by 1 each time until the budget is used up.
In this strategy, we prioritize the through phases since their lanes are longer than those
of the left-turn phases, and thus has much (usually twice) larger Qp.
Fig. 6.8 shows the attack effectiveness of these three exploits with different trial budget
on the snapshots in the vulnerability analysis. In the figure, the attack effectiveness metric is
the average total delay increase percentage. As shown, for E1, only 4 trials are need to reach
the upper bound attack effectiveness, i.e., the one by trying all possible options. For E2, the
attack effectiveness converges quickly after using 2 trials, and then decreases very slowly
when bg increases with more available budget. At the tail, the relative difference to the
upper bound attack effectiveness is around 20%, but since the upper bound is only 11.5%,
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it only has 2.3% absolute difference. As discussed in §6.6.3.1, the best trials responsible
for such difference highly depend on specific traffic patterns. For E3, only 8 trials are
need to reach the upper bound attack effectiveness, which is consistent with the discussion
in §6.6.3.2.
We implement this budget-based trial strategies, and evaluate their effectiveness on
the snapshots in the vulnerability analysis. In this experiment, we use the running time
without attack for each snapshot to dynamically choose trial budget. The results is shown
in Table 6.4. As shown, even though two-stage planning is much faster than five-stage
planning, the maximum trial number needed for E1 is only 6 so the average trial number
is 3.6-3.8. For five-stage planning scenarios, in the worst case the attacker can at most try
13.3 options due to the real-time attack requirement. This is already much less than trying
all possible options, which needs nearly 1000 trials for S1 and around 250 options for S2.
Nevertheless, our trial strategies show high effectiveness with less than 2.2% difference to
the upper bound attack effectiveness.
6.7.2 Attack Evaluation
In this section, we implement and evaluate the constructed exploits using simulations
with real-world intersection settings.
6.7.2.1 Evaluation Setup
Real-world intersection settings. In this evaluation we use the map of a real-world
intersection with its real phase configurations. The intersection map is shown in the screen-
shot in Fig. 6.1. Compared to the generic intersection structure, this intersection has dif-
ferent speed limits on each approach. The speed limits are 30 mph, 35 mph, 40 mph, and
45 mph for southbound, eastbound, northbound and westbound respectively. Only north-
bound approach has dedicated right turn lane, while in other approaches the right turn lane
is shared with the through lane. The map range of the eastbound approach is only extended
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to 220 meters because of the existence of a close-spaced upstream intersection.
Real-world traffic demand. To increase the practicality of our analysis, we use the
real traffic demand for this intersection in our VISSIM configuration. To measure such
demand, we went to the intersection and videotaped the traffic in the intersection on May
16th, 2017, 4-5 pm. Based on the videos, we manually counted the passing vehicles for
each lane, and calculated the traffic demand of each approach and the turning ratio for each
lane (the possibility of turning left or right for the vehicles), as the input to the VISSIM
traffic model.
Experiment setup. In the experiment, the I-SIG system and attack program can receive
the BSM messages within their DSRC ranges. The DSRC ranges for all approaches are set
to the normal value, 300 meters, except the one for the eastbound approach is 220 meters
as its lanes are shorter. On the attacker side, the BSM messages are used in the attack
decision process detailed in §6.7.1.1. After that, the BSM message sent with the spoofed
data is merged with the other BSM messages. The I-SIG system uses these BSM messages,
which may or may not have the attack message, to perform the signal planning and then
use the plan to control the traffic signals in VISSIM.
For each combination of PR and planning stage configuration, we run the experiments
for one hour three times, each with a different random seed, based on the aforementioned
real-world traffic demand. In this experiment we launch the attack continuously for every
signal planning in the I-SIG system. This is different to the experiments in the vulnerability
analysis in which the attacks are launched individually to each snapshot. In comparison,
such continuous attacking is closer to real-world attack situations. As we will show later,
this is able to create a cumulative attack effect and thus create even more congestion than
that in the vulnerability analysis.
Attack effectiveness measurement. In the evaluation we directly measure the vehicle
travel delay using each vehicle’s trajectory output by VISSIM. To calculate the per-vehicle
delay, we subtract the free-flow travel time, i.e., the travel time at the speed limit, from the
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vehicle’s actual travel time. Then the total vehicle delay is calculated as the sum of the per-
vehicle delay for all vehicles generated in the experiment. In the VISSIM simulation, for
the same random seed the vehicle generated with the same ID has exactly the same initial
data, e.g., the same generation time and the same initial speed and location. Thus, both the
total vehicle delay and the per-vehicle delay for experiments with and without attack are
comparable.
CV Full deployment Transition period
deployment 100% PR 75% PR 50% PR 25% PR
COP config. 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S 2-S 5-S
Exploit E1 E2 E1 E3 E1 E3 E1 E3
Ave. delay 68435.4 4695.9 64008.0 187746.0 66797.4 197410.0 56618.0 146685.0
inc. (s) & % 66.7% 4.8% 61.7% 181.6% 64.2% 193.3% 46.2% 133.2%
Table 6.5: Evaluation results for the practical exploits. PR is short for penetration rate.
Two-stage planning and five-stage planning in COP are denoted as 2-S and 5-S, with the
former being the default choice.
6.7.2.2 Results
The results are summarized in Table 6.5 and analyzed below:
E1 and E2. Column 2, 4, 6, and 8 show the results for E1. As shown, E1 is able to
increase more than 60% of the total delay for all cases expect when the PR is 25%. These
results are consistent with those in Table 6.4, showing high attack effectiveness. When
the PR is 25%, we find that the errors in the unequipped vehicle estimations in the EVLS
algorithm are greater than those in the generic intersection settings, causing the attack
effectiveness to decrease. Nevertheless, the total delay increase percentage is still very
high (46.2%): for a vehicle, a one-hour trip now takes nearly one and half hours, showing
a significant decrease of the transportation mobility.
The results for E2 are shown in Column 3. As shown, the attack effectiveness is only
4.8%, which is around 50% lower than that in the vulnerability analysis. We find that this
is because both categories of the successful data spoofing trials in §6.6.3.1 can be largely
affected by errors in the vehicle trajectory data prediction in our attack decision process
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(§6.7.1.1). For the one that opens the skipped phase, any legitimate vehicle requesting that
phase in 5 seconds nullifies the attack effect. For the one that extends the green light end
time, the original green light end time can vary after 5 seconds due to changes in the arrival
table. Among the three exploits, E2 is the most dependent on traffic conditions and thus
more sensitive to the errors in our prediction. Considering that it also has the least attack
effectiveness, E2 is thus the least attractive exploit among the three.
Exploit E3. The results for E3 are shown in Column 5, 7, and 9. Surprisingly, we find
that these attacks are much more effective than those in the vulnerability analysis: when
the PRs are 75% and 50%, the average delay increase percentages are 181.6% and 193.3%,
which are over 5× more than those in the vulnerability analysis. The increase for the 25%
PR scenario is a bit lower, but is still around 4× more.
The lane blocking effect. We find that such significant increase is because continuous at-
tacking is able to cause the attack effect to accumulate, and thus greatly escalates the attack
effectiveness. More specifically, in five-stage planning, since the planning is allowed to
delay serving some vehicles in the current stage for more optimal long-term benefit, these
vehicles are attacked for another time in the next signal planning time. If the vehicle is near
the end of the queue, it can be attacked multiple times. Since in the vulnerability analysis
we only estimate the effectiveness for attacking once, such cumulative attack effect causes
the average total delay to significantly increase in comparison to that in the vulnerability
analysis. Such cumulative attack effect does not exhibit for the two-stage planning scenar-
ios, since two-stage planning only has one serving opportunity for each phase and it is not
allowed to delay serving any vehicle.
We further find that such cumulative attack effect is able to cause an even higher level
of congestion, which can block an entire approach, causing massive traffic jams. This is
because with such effect the queues in the left-turn lanes cannot be effectively released and
thus begin to increase with time. Since the left-turn lanes are shorter in nature, at a certain
point the queues start to spill over to the through lanes and block the through lane. This
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causes the through lane to start queuing after the spilled-over left-turn vehicles. With both
the real queuing vehicles and the non-existing unequipped vehicles added by our attack in
the through lanes, the COP algorithm sees more than 80 vehicles queuing in the through
lanes and thus only gives the spilled-over left-turn phase the minimum green light time.
Thus, the left-turn phase can now only release the fewest possible vehicles. When some
spilled-over vehicles finally enter the left-turn lane, the following left-turn vehicles quickly
block the through lanes again.
Such blocking effect is shown earlier in Fig. 6.1, which is a screenshot taken at the
1785.80 second in the VISSIM simulation for one of the three random seeds and the 75%
PR. Note that such spillover and blocking effect always appears on at least one approach
in all E3 experiments. As shown in the figure, in both the northbound and southbound ap-
proaches, the left-turn vehicles spill over and block the through lanes, causing long queues
in the approach. In the real-world traffic demand we collected from 4 to 5 pm, the north-
bound approach has the most left-turn vehicles and thus is the earliest to block and thus
have the longest queue at the time of the screenshot.
Fig. 6.9 shows the average delay every one minute with and without attack in the north-
bound approach in this experiment. As shown, the delay under attack usually has an in-
crease when the delay without attack increases. This is because when the approach is more
congested without attack due to a temporarily higher demand, the congestion attack can
further escalate such congestion. As shown, at around second 1125, such higher demand
is leveraged to create the blocking effect, and thus the congestion level is significantly in-
creased. After 10 minutes, the spillover is finally cleared, but in as short as 1 minute, the
blocking effect happens again. In the figure, we can see such repeated blocking effect till
the end of the experiments. In the traffic jam period starting from second 1125 till the end,
nearly 600 vehicles arrive and around 50% of them need to spend nearly three minutes for
an originally half-minute trip (27.7 seconds on average), and around 22% need to spend
over 7 minutes, which is 14 times higher. This means that for these 22% of vehicle, if the
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Figure 6.9: Average vehicle delay every one minute with and without attack. The repeated
blocking effects start at around second 1125.
trip involves a series of intersections, i.e., in a corridor, a 10-minute trip can now cost over
2 hours.
6.8 Defense Discussions
As shown in our study, even though the I-SIG system has shown high effectiveness in
benign settings, the current algorithm design and configuration choices are highly vulner-
able to data spoofing. To proactively addressed these problems before larger-scale deploy-
ment, this section discusses defense directions based on the insights from our analysis.
Robust algorithm design for the transition period. As concretely shown in our eval-
uation, the most effective congestion attack is on the transition period: the total delay in-
crease percentage is nearly 200%, and by continuously attacking for less than 20 minutes,
it is able to trigger the blocking effect on an entire approach, causing massive traffic jams.
According to the current I-SIG system design, such problem can only be largely alleviated
when PR reaches more than 95%. This is thus the most urgent problem in the current I-SIG
system design: the market penetration rate of CV technology needs to start somewhere,
and thus it inevitably needs to go through a transition period. Even after all new light-duty
vehicles are mandated to install OBUs, which is exactly what the USDOT is proposing
now, there are still heavy duty vehicles and old vehicles on the roads. As estimated by the
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USDOT [135], it may take 25-30 years to reach a 95% PR after it starts such mandate.
Thus, if such system cannot handle the security challenges for the transition period, it is
not robust enough to get the larger-scale deployment even started in practice.
Fundamentally, this is caused by the lack of a sufficiently robust signal control algo-
rithm for the transition period. As introduced in §6.2.0.2, the COP algorithm is a suitable
design choice for the CV-based signal control, but it is only optimal in the full deployment
period. To ensure that the I-SIG system can still be effective when PR is low, the current
design tries to infer the unequipped vehicle data to solve the dilemma. However, if such
inference is not robust, it can be greatly manipulated for malicious purposes— which is ex-
actly what we have uncovered in this study. Since the amount of vehicle data input is much
less than that in the full deployment period, any signal control algorithm for the transition
period is inherently more sensitive to data spoofing attacks, making it fundamentally more
challenging to ensure the robustness. Considering that the transition period is unavoidable
and may last as long as 30 years, we believe that this calls for a joint research effort among
both the transportation and the security communities to design effective and robust signal
control algorithms specifically for the transition period.
Performance improvement for RSUs. As introduced in §6.2.0.2 and analyzed in §6.6,
the arrival time based signal planning in the COP algorithm is very suitable for the CV-
based signal control, and when given enough computation power, such planning is indeed
very hard to be maliciously influenced by small amounts of spoofed data in the full deploy-
ment period. Unfortunately, due to the limited performance in today’s RSUs, the I-SIG
system has to use a suboptimal implementation of the COP algorithm, which is found to
introduce the last vehicle advantage, allowing the data from one single attack vehicle to
significantly influence the signal control. Because of this, even if the security challenge
for the transition period is addressed, the I-SIG system can still be greatly manipulated by
data spoofing attacks. Thus, it is important to improve the performance of today’s RSUs
so that more optimal configurations can be used in the traffic control. Such improvement
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can be at both the software level, e.g., code optimization, and the hardware level, e.g.,
CPU and memory upgrades. Such performance improvement is generally beneficial since
more computation capabilities can help better balance the trade-off between security and
performance.
Data spoofing detection using infrastructure-controlled sensors. Besides improving
the robustness at the control algorithm level, another defense direction is to detect and filter
the BSM messages with spoofed data on the infrastructure side. Since these messages are
still correctly signed, such defense must rely on data validity checks. Unfortunately, in the
current design, the I-SIG system only has one data source about the attack vehicle — the
attacker-controlled trajectory data via BSM messages [82]. Thus, any data validity check
methods based on this are unlikely to be effective since the attacker can strategically control
the spoofed data so that the vehicle trajectories appears perfectly normal.
Thus, to ensure high effectiveness, data spoofing detection on the infrastructure side
needs to rely on data sources that attackers cannot easily control, e.g., infrastructure-
controlled sensors, to cross validate the data in BSM messages. We find that there are
actually existing infrastructure-side sensors ready to be used for this purpose. For exam-
ple, the vehicle detectors buries underneath the stop bar of each lane was used to measure
aggregated traffic information in today’s traffic control. Even though they are less useful
in the CV environment, they may be re-purposed to help detect data spoofing, which may
be a cost effective solution since they are installed already. If such aggregated data is not
sufficient, the infrastructure side may need to install sensors with more informative data,
e.g., cameras. One challenge in this direction is how to best leverage different types of
infrastructure-side sensors to design a detection system that is both accurate and hard to
evade, which we leave as future work.
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6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we perform the first security analysis of the emerging CV-based signal
control system. Targeting a highly realistic threat model, data spoofing from one single
attack vehicle, we perform vulnerability analysis and find that the current signal control
algorithm design and configuration choices are highly vulnerable, which can be exploited
to launch congestion, personal gain, and safety attacks. The evaluation results under real-
world settings validate the attack effectiveness and show that the attacks can even create a
blocking effect that jams whole approaches. Defense directions are then discussed lever-
aging the insights.
This work serves as a first step to understand the new security problems and challenges
in the next-generation CV-based transportation systems. It is expected to inspire a series
of follow-up studies, including but not limited to (1) more extensive evaluation with dif-
ferent intersection sizes and traffic patterns, (2) more extensive analysis considering other
CV-based transportation systems, algorithms, and security implications, (3) more concrete
defense system design and evaluation.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I develop a series of proactive vulnerability discovery and assess-
ment approaches that can systematically discover and assess security challenge in two most
fundamental capabilities in any smart, connected system: network stack and smart control.
More specifically, my research is able to demonstrate that static/dynamic program analysis
and network measurement can be used to make the following two categories of research
contributions:
(1) Systematically identify new code-level and network-level security challenges in
smart, connected systems. In this category, the contributions made in my dissertation
research include:
• Discovering and analyzing WPAD name collision attack (US-CERT alert TA16-
144A [127]). In the network stack, we discover a new MitM attack vector exposed in the
new gTLD era called WPAD name collision attack. We then conduct the first system-
atic vulnerability study of this attack vector by systematically characterizing the problem
severity and the vulnerability causes using network measurement. Through this analysis,
we identify that the cause of the new security problem is that the recent delegation of new
gTLDs unexpectedly breaks the implicit namespace isolation assumptions made in the in-
ternal DNS namespaces. This is a network-level security problem newly exposed in the new
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gTLD era, which is fundamentally challenging to solve due to the lack of coordination in a
distributed system like the Internet.
• Analyzing client-side name collision vulnerability. We generalize theWPAD name
collision attack to a new class of attacks on the broad set of internal network services using
DNS-based service discovery, and perform the first systematic study of the vulnerability
status, named client-side name collision vulnerability, of internal service software under
this new class of attacks. We first measure and collect the client implementations of the
affected internal service today, and then perform vulnerability analysis using dynamic pro-
gram analysis. We find that nearly all the exposed services have popular clients vulnerable
due to several common design and implementation choices, which suggests that the name
collision attack threat model broadly breaks common security assumptions made in the
service clients today. Through our subsequent vulnerability cause analysis, we find that
such widespread vulnerability exposure is caused by several code-level security challenges
newly exposed in the new gTLD era, e.g., lack of namespace differentiation. Based on the
insights, we propose a set of service software level solutions.
• Discovering and analyzing algorithm-level vulnerability in Connected Vehicle
(CV) based smart signal control. We perform the first security analysis of a CV-based
transportation system, the USDOT sponsored I-SIG system. Targeting a highly realis-
tic threat model, data spoofing from one single attack vehicle, we perform vulnerability
analysis and find that the signal control in the system can be manipulated greatly by data
spoofing from even a single attack vehicle, which can be exploited to launch congestion,
personal gain, and safety attacks. We analyze the vulnerability causes, and find that the
current signal control algorithm design and configuration choices in the I-SIG system are
highly vulnerable to data spoofing attacks, which is a code-level security challenge newly
exposed in the emerging CV-based smart transportation systems. To addressed this chal-
lenge, we discuss several defense directions aiming at increasing the algorithm robustness
and mitigating spoofing attacks.
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(2) Gain insights about problem severity to address design trade-offs in the defense
solutions. In this category, the contributions made in my dissertation research include:
• Designing PacketGuardian, the first automated detection tool for packet injection
vulnerabilities. In the network stack, to detect packet injection vulnerability, the current so-
lution is to manually inspect the protocol code bases and apply case-by-case patches. How-
ever, due to the complex nature of the problem, new packet injection vulnerabilities are still
emerging. To stop this recurring problem, we build a static program analysis tool, Pack-
etGuardian, to systematically examine network protocol implementations to detect such
vulnerability. In the design, we face a unique challenge due to the design trade-off between
detection precision and recall: to accurately detect leaks of secrete protocol states, implicit
data flows need to be analyzed; however, performing implicit data flow analysis causes high
volumes of false alarms, which is thus a commonly excluded feature. To address this chal-
lenge, we find that only a specific type of implicit data flows is highly exploitable for packet
injection attacks in practice, which we call attacker-controlled implicit information leaks.
Thus, we design our tool to prioritize the detection of such highly-exploitable implicit data
flows, which effectively reduces false alarms without compromising tool effectiveness. Us-
ing PacketGuardian, even though the recently-reported packet injection vulnerabilities have
been patched, we are still able to uncover 17 new ones in the Linux kernel TCP implemen-
tation with confirmed exploitability.
• Designing Highly-VulnerableDomains (HVDs) for name collision attack defenses.
To defend against WPAD name collision attacks, new gTLD operations and vulnerable
ASes need to know the attack surface, i.e., the set of vulnerable domains, for domain regis-
tration scrutinization and query leakage filtering. However, defining the attack surface has
a unique challenge due to the design trade-off between defense effectiveness and economic
incentive: if including all domain names seen in the query leakage into the attack surface,
large numbers of popular domains are blocked from registration, which hurts the economic
incentive for operating new gTLDs. To address this challenge, we perform analysis using
188
network measurement and find that most domain names in leaked queries are transient and
low-volume, which are thus both of low value and hard to exploit in practice. Leveraging
this insight, we propose a more useful definition of attack surface, calledHighly-Vulnerable
Domains (HVDs), which are the domains that persistently expose many victims. Using em-
pirical data analysis, we show that using HVDs as the attack surface can achieve a much
better balance of defense effectiveness and economic incentive: using the list of HVDs,
61% of new gTLD operators only need to block less than 10 domains in total and at the
same time more than 97% of the leaked queries are protected.
7.2 Future Work
Following my dissertation research, there are numerous future directions worth further
investigation:
Critical domain: Systems security in transportation. Transportation systems and
automobiles today will be soon transformed profoundly due to the recent advances in Con-
nected Vehicle (CV) and Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technologies. To secure the security
of such safety critical systems, it is highly desired to perform further research into the
following two subdirections:
• Connected Vehicle (CV) systems security. Following up my dissertation research on
the first security analysis of the CV-based traffic signal control system (§VI), this
research direction can be further explored from two perspectives: (1) CV applica-
tion security, by more broadly and more systematically analyzing the security of
the released USDOT-sponsored CV-based transportation system and application pro-
totypes, and (2) CV communication security, by analyzing the security of the CV
network protocol stack design and implementations on CV devices. The analysis
insights can be used to develop practical defenses at both the infrastructure and vehi-
cle sides. For example, leveraging insights from the current analysis results in §VI,
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developing data spoofing detection mechanisms leveraging infrastructure-controlled
data sources can be one of the promising defense directions. Since this direction
is interdisciplinary by nature, collaborations between security and transportation re-
searchers may be necessary in order to combine the expertise from both domains for
effective problem solving.
• Autonomous Vehicle (AV) systems security. To enable intelligent driving, all the ve-
hicle subsystems including critical control systems such as brake and acceleration
are now controlled by software, making software quality, especially reliability and
security, a concern that is more critical than ever. Due to the fact that (1) such
control is managed by a complex distributed systems involving tens of microcon-
trollers, and (2) software development in in-vehicle systems is commonly outsourced
to third-party sources [171], it is especially challenging to secure the software stack in
such systems. As demonstrated in this dissertation, static/dynamic program analysis
techniques can be used to tackle such code-level security challenges. For example,
one promising starting point can be developing a security analysis framework us-
ing static and dynamic program analysis for open-source AV systems such as Baidu
Apollo [18] and Autoware [17].
Software control algorithm security. In smart, connected systems, optimization al-
gorithms and machine learning models are used popularly to enable various smart control
capabilities, e.g., the smart traffic signal control studied in this dissertation research (§VI)
and machine learning based autonomous driving [138, 49, 60]. Such algorithm-based con-
trol in smart, connected systems introduces two new challenges in software security anal-
ysis. First, it is unclear how to ensure soundness in the software analysis on algorithm
implementations. Current security analysis of optimization algorithm and machine learn-
ing model implementations mainly uses dynamic program analysis [176, 249]. However,
dynamic analysis cannot fully eliminate false negatives and thus cannot provide soundness
guarantee of the absence of a particular security vulnerability, which is highly desired for
190
smart, connected systems in safety critical domains. However, classic sound software anal-
ysis methods, e.g., static program analysis, cannot be directly applied since in algorithm
implementations control decisions are made based on numerical computations in data flows
instead of explicit logics in control flows. To address this challenge, two directions may be
worth exploring: (1) design more fine-grained data flow analysis to directly analyze the im-
plicit control logic in data flows, and (2) design program analysis based approaches to first
extract a model from the algorithm implementations, and then use model-based security
analysis methods in algorithm analysis and machine learning fields.
Second, besides analyzing the security of the algorithm implementation itself, it is un-
clear how to incorporate its domain-specific usages into the security analysis. In smart,
connected systems, these domain-specific usages, e.g., the pre- and post-processing steps,
are also critical since (1) they have a direct impact on the end-to-end exploitability of po-
tential vulnerabilities in the algorithm implementations, e.g., the discovered vulnerability
in the EVLS algorithm in §VI of this dissertation, and (2) these usages themselves may
cause security problems, similar to the API misuse problem in TLS/SSL clients [184, 196].
The key challenge in this direction is how to effectively perform vulnerability analysis of
the whole model usage work flow, which is usually a complicated process involving vari-
ous types of data processing. For example, in autonomous driving, camera input is first in
a machine learning based perception module, and then in a dynamic programming based
path and speed planning module, and then in a rule-based control module. To address this
challenge, one potential direction is to first explore the possibility of modeling the data
processing steps before and after the machine learning model using program analysis tech-
niques, and then design an extension of the existing analysis methodology with the modeled
data processing steps plugged in.
Anomaly detection for IoT/CPS using physical properties. In IoT/CPS systems such
as smart home and smart transportation systems, the behaviors of the IoT/CPS devices
need to follow physical laws. For example, sensor input such as vehicle trajectory and
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room temperature needs to have space/time continuity; otherwise, the input is physically
invalid, which may be a result of sensor spoofing attacks such as the ones studied in §VI.
Thus, physical properties can be a unique opportunity for anomaly detection in IoT/CPS
systems. One challenge in this direction is how to systematically map cyber events to their
corresponding physical properties. To address this challenge, two solution directions may
be worth exploring: (1) using well-established behavior models in specific domains, e.g.,
car following model and queuing model in the transportation field, and (2) using data-
driven modeling approach, e.g., using traces of normal behaviors to infer the mapping
between cyber and physical events.
Trusted computing hardware assisted security. The software stacks in modern com-
puter systems are large and complex, making it highly difficult, if not impossible, to fully
eliminate software vulnerability. However, in safety-critical systems such as autonomous
driving and smart transportation, certain functionality, e.g., safety-related features, needs a
much stronger security guarantee. To address the challenge, one potential solution direction
is to leverage the recent advances in hardware features for trusted computing, e.g., ARM
TrustZone [11], and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [70]. These features provide
processor-level isolation to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of security-critical code
and data even when the underlying operating systems or any runtime libraries are compro-
mised. One concrete use of such hardware features directly related to this dissertation is to
design a CV data integrity protection system, which may fundamentally prevent the data
spoofing attacks we identified in smart transportation systems in §VI.
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